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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to examine the way that the videogame industry 
has evolved as a complex sociotechnological system and how the discourse 
surrounding the industry, as well as videogames as a medium of expression, has 
shaped that development.  This shift in the nature of videogame creation from 
individual authors and small studios to the monolithic entity known as "the 
Industry" was accompanied by the creation of an ideology that defines the 
identity of a community and places constraints on videogames as a medium. 
This is the ideology of the "hardcore" gamer.  In order to understand this 
ideology, its impact and its significance, I will focus on the discourse surrounding 
the videogame industry and particularly on the limits of this discourse.  One such 
area of discourse where antagonisms arise is in the growing community of 
independent game developers.
The independent games movement can be looked at as a direct result of 
what  Laclau and Mouffe refer to as articulation – the process by which 
relationships are established in such a way as to alter the identities of the 
elements themselves.  As the videogame industry became increasingly 
articulated, the identities of games, gamers and game makers became more and 
more narrowly defined.  This increased areas of antagonism within the discourse, 
allowing for resistance and the possibility of disarticulation.
Though the independent games movement has grown substantially in 
recent years, the degree to which this movement resists the ideology of the 
videogame industry is unclear, as is the role of the technology in this process. 
This paper will examine these relationships through the discourse of both the 
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From its humble beginnings in the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
medium of videogames has become a massive multinational industry.  Where 
game designers once had to acquire the prerequisite skills to bring their visions 
to life themselves, large development studios now command resources 
comparable to the motion picture industry (Nichols, Farrand, Rowley & Avery, 
2006, p. 5; Williams, 2009, p. 41).  However, with the development of any large 
sociotechnical system, the flow of information and resources is accompanied by 
a flow of power toward certain groups and away from others.  In the United 
States, there is one ideology that is commonly associated with videogames.  It is 
embodied in the concept of the “hardcore gamer.”  The hardcore gamer is a 
White male in his twenties or thirties.  He invests a great deal of time and money 
into playing games (Juul, 2010a, p. 29).  He plays fast, action-packed games like 
Halo (Kubik, 2010, p. 58) and places his videogames before all else, often 
forgoing social conventions and hygiene (Kushner, 2000b; Nichols et al., 2006, 
pp. 44-45).  This is the figure that many people see when they think of 
videogames.  He is the one seen by most of the game industry, as well as by 
many videogame researchers (Bogost, 2006a, p. 4).
2While the term hardcore gamer appears frequently in videogame 
discourse and is often used interchangeably with the term “real gamer,” it is 
important to note that this hardcore ideology is not the natural state of videogame 
culture, nor is it necessarily representative of videogame culture as a whole.  On 
the contrary, the “common sense” attitude toward this view of gamer culture is, 
itself, an indicator of strength of the ideological coloring that is occurring.  This 
does not imply that all videogame culture is a manifestation of this ideology, only 
that it cannot be completely separated from it (G. King & Krzywinska, 2006, p. 
188).  Indeed, it is difficult to escape from this view of videogame culture, as 
many of the most influential members of the videogame industry operate as if 
these hardcore gamers do, in fact, constitute the whole body of videogame 
players.
When compared to the target audiences of other media, such as television 
or newspapers, this demographic seems strangely narrow.  Indeed, the 
exclusionary nature of hardcore gamer ideology marginalizes the vast majority of 
people (Fron, et al., 2007).  Although the rise of the videogame industry has 
provided the resources for great technological advances for realizing creative 
expression, it has also created daunting barriers to creative input from outside 
the mainstream.  Whereas videogames used to be a medium for nonconformists 
to find new ways of expressing their ideas, there are now few individuals who 
hold enough sway in the industry to actually bring their visions to fruition.  As 
these voices are silenced, their potential audiences are left without any content 
designed to meet their needs.  It is only in the last few years that these 
3technological barriers have been lowered to the point that independent 
developers can enter the market, let alone compete.  Though many of the 
logistical barriers can be overcome through the steady march of technological 
development, the social barriers that have been erected are not so easily 
circumvented.  
In recent years, an independent games movement has arisen in response 
to many of the deficiencies of the mainstream videogame industry.  Consisting 
primarily of small studios and solo developers, the movement continues to grow, 
fueled by up-and-coming amateurs, as well as disillusioned industry pros (Kohler, 
2010).  Despite its growth and growing popularity, its place in the modern media 
landscape and its relationship to the videogame industry are still unclear.  Some 
scholars consider independent development to be part of the “greater games 
industry” (Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 278), while others claim that independent 
games are not really “independent” at all (Jahn-Sudmann, 2008).  This text will 
attempt to give perspective to the debate over the nature of the independent 
games movement by analyzing the relationships of power between independent 
developers and the industry, the ideologies expressed by these two groups in 
their discourse, and the ways in which these relationships and ideologies are 
shaped by the technology itself.
The key to understanding these relationships is understanding how the 
hardcore gamer ideology developed alongside the fledgling industry.  As this 
ideology became more and more narrow, it marginalized a greater and greater 
number of social groups.  Eventually, even developers began to call for a 
4revolution, attempting through discourse to distance themselves from the current 
videogame culture and associate themselves with the traditions of past 
developers (Designer X, et al., 2000).  Though calls for change came from a 
number of sources, it would take new technological developments in order for the 
movement to experience real growth.  Thus, it makes sense to try to understand 
the videogame industry and the opposing independent game movement as two 
parts of a large and complex sociotechnical system.
The Birth of an Industry
In order to address the hegemonic forces at play within the videogame 
industry, it is important to understand the history of videogames as a medium of 
expression and, more importantly, how the power structures related to 
videogame production have changed throughout this process, creating the 
current discourse surrounding the industry.  While a complete history of 
videogames is beyond the scope of this paper (and, indeed, many excellent 
books have already been written on the subject), I would like to highlight several 
key phases in this process, each of which is characterized by unique economic, 
political, and social relationships.  A more detailed description is provided in 
Chapter 2.  It is also important to note that this paper tends to focus on the 
history of videogames in the United States and North America (and to a lesser 
extent, Europe), rather than in Japan and East Asia.  Although the “gamer” 
paradigm in the Japanese market is substantially different from its American 
counterpart, many of the circumstances surrounding the American videogame 
5industry parallel similar situations in Asia.  In both cases, a discourse has 
emerged around the videogame industry, defining who is meant to play 
videogames and what videogames are supposed to be like.  Although the 
complex relationship between these two foci of videogame production and 
culture, that is, the United States and Japan, could easily warrant its own study, I 
will not attempt one in this paper.
The history of videogames can arguably be traced back to the late 1950s, 
when William Higinbotham, an American physicist, made Tennis for Two, an 
electronic tennis game played on an oscilloscope (See Figure 1.1).  The game 
was not made commercially available to the public, but rather was designed 
specifically for a visitors' day at Brookhaven National Laboratory.  It was a novelty 
item.  Indeed, Higinbotham made no attempts to capitalize off of his creation.  He 
was, after all, still a physicist and he saw his creation as little more than an 
example of the simulation capabilities of the existing oscilloscope (Bakie, 2005).
At this point in time, this was the field of videogames—a small network of 
people and technologies surrounding a single technological artifact.  The artifact 
itself had still not fully acquired its new identity as an entertainment device.  It 
was first and foremost an oscilloscope, a scientific tool.  Its intended audience did 
not go beyond laboratory visitors and its financial support came, technically 
speaking, from the US Department of Energy, which funded the lab (Bakie, 2005)
A few years later, a major step forward took place at MIT.  Steve Russel, a 
graduate student, created Spacewar.  Initially, the game was simple, with two 
ships each trying to shoot down the other.  As the game grew in popularity, 
6additional programmers added to the project, creating a star field in the 
background, gravity, and the “hyperspace” ability.  Though Spacewar gained a 
great deal of popularity among university students, the cost of the computer 
system to run it, about $120,000, was prohibitive to any practical commercial 
venture (Bakie, 2005; Kent, 2001, p. 26).  Nevertheless, Spacewar was a game. 
Its programmers and players had articulated it as such.  For the first time, 
videogames had their own sphere of public discourse.
The advent of the personal computer (PC) and dedicated videogame 
consoles made possible an entirely new paradigm of videogame development 
possible.  For once, not only did a large population have access to the tools to 
Figure 1.1: William Higinbothom's Schematics for Tennis for Two.  (Brookhaven 
National Laboratories, 1958)
7create videogames, but there was also a large potential audience.  Videogames 
were no longer just a novelty, they were a business.
Despite the rapid growth of videogames, many of the most successful 
games were created not by large companies, but by independent developers, 
often individual designers making games by themselves.  One of the first 
videogame designers to rise to prominence by means of the PC was Richard 
Garriott.  In 1980, at the age of 19, he created Akalabeth: World of Doom for the 
Apple II computer.  The game itself was a role-playing game, greatly inspired by 
the game Dungeons and Dragons.  Garriott began by selling copies of the game 
in Ziploc bags, until it was picked up by a publisher (B. King & Borland, 2003, p. 
38).  Sales of the game managed to put Garriott through college and the game 
later became the basis for Garriott's highly influential Ultima series (Bakie, 2005).
With games as a commercially viable enterprise, small game development 
studios began to emerge.  With more programmers at their disposal and ever-
increasing computer performance, game designers were able to create larger, 
more complicated and more visually appealing games. Many of these studios 
grew up around existing figures in the industry, such as Richard Garriott and 
Origin Systems (Bakie, 2005).  For the most part, this allowed designers to make 
use of the greater resources of the studio, removing many technical barriers, 
while still allowing them to maintain creative control over the content of the 
games.
As computing technology continued to improve and videogames gained 
more widespread popularity throughout the 1990s, many studios began to find 
8incredible success.  Games like Doom and Warcraft sold millions of copies, 
turning obscure companies into household names overnight (Bakie, 2005). 
Videogames had become a part of Western culture, as well as a lucrative new 
industry.
At this time, advances in graphics technology and computing speed 
enabled game developers to begin creating three-dimensional (3D) games. 
Though somewhat crude and blocky at first, in a matter of a few years, 3D went 
from being a neat gimmick to being the standard among games on both the PC 
and console systems.  However, these advances were not without their price.  By 
making the jump into 3D, the amount of work required to create a game 
increased dramatically.  Game studios went from a few dozen people to teams as 
big as 350 people (Schoback, 2005).  These dramatic shifts in technology, 
organizational structure and game content had a great impact upon the 
relationships and power structures that existed between members of the 
videogame community.  It also helped to solidify a certain image of videogames 
in the public mind.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, videogames had become big 
budget projects.  Gone were the days of a teenage kid making a game and 
selling it at the comic book store.  Hundreds of people worked on single titles, 
often outsourcing art and music to still other companies.  The videogame industry 
was now a social and economic force that rivaled Hollywood, although the 
medium itself had only existed a few decades.
9Move for Independence
It was at this time that the first calls for opposition began to appear.  One 
of the earliest of these was the Scratchware Manifesto, a document created in 
the summer of 2000 by a number of anonymous game developers led by Greg 
Costikyan, who was known in the Manifesto only as “Designer X.”  In it, they 
accused the videogame industry of suppressing creative vision and innovation in 
favor of merely imitating existing games.  They also highlighted many of the 
business practices that they rejected as unfair and detrimental to the quality of 
the finished games, including the concept of “crunch time.”  It was a call to arms 
directed at those working in the industry, filled with cries of “Death to EA and 
Vivendi!” (Designer X, et al., 2000).
The revolution that Designer X and his coconspirators hoped for did not 
occur.  The work practices of the videogame industry in the US at this time 
tended to be shrouded in secrecy (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 2), so the bold 
accusations of the Manifesto were lost on all but those working in the industry. 
However, many of the injustices of which they accused the videogame industry 
would be made public in just a few short years, thanks to a new communication 
tool – blogging.
In 2004, an anonymous blogger known only as “EA Spouse” (later 
revealed to be a woman by the name of Erin Hoffman) posted an entry on her 
LiveJournal page describing the working conditions that her then fiancée endured 
working for Electronic Arts (EA).  According to her, EA employees were 
consistently and deliberately overworked during crunch time, often over 85 hours 
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in a single week.  She went on to claim that they were denied overtime pay in 
violation of California state law.  This abuse was able to continue unnoticed for a 
long period of time by virtue of the unique nature of the videogame industry. 
Because potential employees were so eager for a chance to make videogames, 
they were generally very dedicated to the project, despite the poor working 
conditions.  Additionally, if an employee was unable to endure the harsh 
conditions, there were plenty more people eager for their chance (Hoffman, 
2004).
Hoffman's blog incited a wave of public outrage against EA.  Hundreds of 
exploited workers and their partners began to speak out against the software 
company and its employment practices.  The scandal ultimately ended in two 
class action lawsuits, with EA paying out a $14.9 million settlement to its software 
engineers and a $15.6 million settlement to its graphic artists (Gamasutra, 2006). 
In addition to exposing the organizational and administrative problems that 
Designer X had condemned 4 years earlier, the EA Spouse case illustrates the 
vast disconnect that had emerged between those with creative control over the 
content of a game and those who actually create it.
As quality of living for videogame developers was reaching all-time lows, 
alternatives were also disappearing as smaller developers were bought out by 
larger corporations.  Electronic Arts became notorious for absorbing smaller 
studios including Westwood Studios, Maxis, Bullfrog and even Richard Garriott's 
Origin Studios (Bakie, 2005).  Eventually, this would lead to almost all creative 
control in the videogame industry being held by four companies, Electronic Arts, 
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Activision, THQ, and Ubisoft (Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 290).  Despite being a 
creative industry that thrives on new titles, the increasingly conservative mega-
conglomerates choked off their supply of new content, preferring to invest in 
“proven” titles (p. 284).  As the videogame industry became an increasingly 
stagnant and hostile environment for developers, the radical point of view of the 
Manifesto writers became more and more widespread.  Developers were no 
longer providing creative input to the titles on which they worked.  Their roles had 
become more akin to that of an auto worker on an assembly line (Shumacher, 
2006).
At the same time as these changes in videogame development culture 
were taking place, major technological changes were taking place as well. 
Though digital distribution had occurred in one form or another since the earliest 
days of videogames, it was not until 2005, with the introduction of the Xbox Live 
Marketplace that there was a means of providing downloadable content to 
consoles.  This created a way to bypass costly manufacturing and retail costs, 
thereby allowing lower budget titles to enter the highly competitive “mainstream” 
market (Williams, 2002, p. 44).  Digital distribution has since become one of the 
most important technologies for independent developers, even shaping the 
structure and identity of the independent development (Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 
280). 
The boundaries to entering the videogame industry were further lowered 
by the widespread availability of development tools such as Adobe (formerly 
Marcomedia) Flash (Irwin, 2008).  Traditionally, acquiring the necessary 
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development tools to begin creating games was difficult, particularly on consoles. 
Developing for a console required a specialized  software development kid (SDK) 
that could only be obtained from the company that created the console 
(O'Donnell, 2008, p. 2).  This meant that a start-up company needed a certain 
amount of starting capital, which in turn demanded that their final product have a 
higher financial return.  Affordable alternatives made it possible for small or one-
man teams to make small games without the promise of large sales.
This combination of social unrest and technological opportunity created 
spaces within the global cultural system in which the independent game 
movement could grow to become a significant influence, both culturally and 
economically.  As developers move into these spaces, they are proving the 
financial viability of markets that had long been overlooked by the industry 
(Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 292).  
Additionally, many of these developers are challenging existing economic 
models and basic industry assumptions.  In May of 2010, the Humble Indie 
Bundle, a collection of five  previously released independent games (with a sixth 
added later on), earned over a million dollars in the course of a single week by 
offering their games on a donation basis, free of digital rights management, 
donating nearly a third of the earnings to charity (Wolfire, 2010a).   While the 
success of Humble Bundle by in no way proved the reliability of this distribution 
model (Vogel, 2010), it challenged preconceived notions about the financial 
viability of independent games, the necessity of digital rights management 
(DRMs) and the nature of the gamer community.  A second Humble Bundle 
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would follow in December, becoming even more successful than the first (Wolfire, 
2010b).  As the independent movement grows, it opens up new questions as to 
the relationship between independent game developers and the videogame 
industry, as well as questions as to the nature of the independent game 
movement itself.
Genesis of Research Problem
Though videogames, as a medium, have become increasingly 
commonplace, even to the displacement of other media (Williams, 2009, p. 41), 
they still lack the sense of validity that more established media enjoy.  They have 
been questioned as art forms (Ebert, 2010; Jenkins, 2005), as narratives 
(Eskelinen, 2001), and even as protected speech (Gamasutra, 2010).  This is 
due, in part, to the inaccessibility of videogames to lay audiences.  Videogame 
culture, particularly that of developers, tends to be somewhat isolationist, 
operating in what O'Donnell calls “imaginative secrecy networks” (O'Donnell, 
2008, p. 38).  Many aspects of this culture, such as “game talk” (p. 45), carry 
over into the wider gamer culture, performing the dual function of uniting 
members of the culture and excluding others.  This makes the goal of 
widespread videogame literacy nigh unattainable and further complicates the 
cultural clash between gamers and other social groups.
In academic discourse, videogames do not fare much better.  As Williams 
(2002) points out, videogames often find themselves as the subject of media 
effects studies, though the methodologies employed by such studies are 
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problematic at best (Ferguson & Kilburn, 2010; United States Senate, 2001). 
The relatively young field of game studies has arisen to fill many of the 
theoretical gaps, yet is itself part of a culture with an ideology; one not immune to 
the influence of gamer culture.  Real hardcore games researchers focus on 
functionalist questions, not humanistic ones (Bogost, 2006a, p. 5).  Thus, there 
remains a great need for videogame research grounded in the humanities.
The purpose of this text is to examine the ways in which the ideology of 
the videogame industry has shaped technological development, as well as how 
technology has shaped this ideology.  I intend to do this by looking at the 
discourse associated with videogames, particularly at the limits of this discourse 
where antagonisms become apparent.  This approach suggests an obvious 
question:  What is the dominant ideology of the videogame industry?  I propose 
that this ideology is embodied in the concept of the hardcore gamer.  This term 
also provides a useful lens through which to view players, developers and even 
scholars.
Once the ideology of the videogame industry has been sufficiently 
described, the next step is to find the points of antagonism where the hegemonic 
discourse of the industry breaks down.  Though there could be many potential 
points of antagonism, I have chosen to focus on the independent games 
movement as a point of antagonism where resistance and rearticulation are 
possible.  This poses another question:  To what extent are independent 
developers actually independent?  If the independent games movement is to be 
considered a point of antagonism in videogame industry discourse, it is important 
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to understand how the movement's rhetoric actually compares with its role in the 
greater videogame ecology.
This brings me to my final question:  What is the role of technology in this 
system?  Is technology the deterministic force that is driving these social 
movements, or is current videogame technology a reflection of the power 
struggles that exist and have existed since the birth of the medium?  I find it 
unlikely that either scenario is an all-inclusive answer to this question.  Rather, I 
intend to suggest a theoretical layout of the sociotechnical system that 
encompasses the videogame industry and independent videogame movement.
As I consider my approach to be critical rhetorical in nature, this work also 
carries an inherent commitment to not only analysis and self-reflection, but also 
to furthering specific practical ends, or telos (Ono & Sloop, 1992, p. 48).  Thus, I 
see my research as having practical applications for the videogame industry and 
for independent developers, as well as for videogame players.  As the audience 
for videogames expands beyond its traditional demographics, the current 
discourse surrounding the medium will increasingly begin to break down, or 
encounter antagonisms.  Industry members who cling to these discourses will 
encounter resistance at these points of contention.  The subsequent 
rearticulation, or restructuring of these discourses, has the potential to redefine 
the nature of the videogame industry, leaving behind those who fail to adapt. 
Alternatively, these same points of resistance serve as opportunities for 
independent developers, not only to challenge oppressive discursive structures, 
but to redefine the underlying sociotechnical structures that have long been 
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detrimental to their ability to effectively use their medium of expression.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, these points of resistance allow marginalized 
players to challenge the dominant hardcore videogame ideology that has come 
to dominate the medium for the last 2 decades.  By seeing the independent 
games movement as resistance to hegemonic videogame ideology, players can 
use these competing structures as a way to combat the oppressive discourse 
and monolithic industry system that maintains these power structures.
Survey of Literature
In order to answer these questions, I will draw on three primary bodies of 
literature.  It should be noted that these categories are broad and by no means 
mutually exclusive.  In fact, due to the interdisciplinary nature of videogames 
(Aarseth, 2005, p. 4) and videogame development, which is comprised of artists, 
engineers, musicians and business people (to name a few), I feel that videogame 
scholarship must necessarily be somewhat interdisciplinary in order to provide 
perspective on the subject matter.  
The first of these broad categories of scholarship that I draw on is the field 
of critical rhetoric, particularly the theory of articulation.  Articulation theory, which 
arose as a means of separating deterministic relationship between Marxist 
concepts of culture and the economic base, has become a way of understanding 
struggle in a postmodern world (DeLuca, 1999, p. 335).  Articulation is the 
process of establishing relationships between elements in such a way that their 
identities are altered (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 88).  It is based on the 
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assumption that there is no transcendental signifier, no universal truth that can be 
objectively observed.  Therefore, the relationships between signifier and signified 
are not inherent, but must be spoken forth into existence by some agent.  This 
concept gives us a deeper understanding of ideology, which Stuart Hall refers to 
as the process of constantly “fixing” or “articulating” meaning (Hall, 1985, p. 95).
It should be noted that many rhetorical scholars, DeLuca included, find the 
use of the term “ideology” problematic.  Indeed, ideology is a very loaded term, 
invoking concepts such as objective truth, which is obfuscated by the false 
consciousness of ideology, and an essential subject that constructs this ideology, 
as well as the concept that ideology is merely an epiphenomenon of material 
reality (DeLuca, 1999, pp. 338-341).  In their book, Hegemony and Socialist  
Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouff displace the term ideology with “discourse,” 
addressing these problems and acknowledging the complexity of the underlying 
forces that create hegemony.
Although I find the concept of ideology to be quite useful in explicating 
power dynamics in society and use the term extensively throughout this 
document, I would like to qualify my use of the term.  Rather than referring to 
ideology in the traditional Marxist sense of being a reflection of some hidden 
truth, I take a more Foucauldian approach to ideology, treating  ideology 
(discourse) as being fundamentally linked with social practices and institutions 
(Foucault 1984, pp. 9-10).  Throughout this paper, I refer to both linguistic and 
behavioral social practices as constituting discourse  (See Laclau & Mouff, 1985, 
pp. 107-108).  I will also make use of the concept of ideology, as it is understood 
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in the context of articulation theory, in the sense that ideology functions more like 
language, being constructed collectively within a group through general 
consensus (Johnson-Eilola, 2004, pp. 203-204).  When referring directly to the 
process of articulation, however, I prefer to use DeLuca's vocabulary, referring to 
the process as articulation and the product of this process as discourse (DeLuca, 
1999, p. 347).
One of the key concepts in articulation theory is that of antagonism. 
Antagonisms point out the limits of discourse.  As all discourse must be 
articulated by an actor, there is no discourse that is universal.  For every 
discourse, there are boundaries at which the discourse no longer applies.  These 
antagonisms then provide a basis for other actors within the network to begin the 
process of disarticulation  or rearticulation.  DeLuca gives the example of the 
discourse of the “American Dream” facing the antagonisms of slavery, 
segregation, and the oppression of women.  Each of these antagonisms point out 
the limits of the discourse of the American Dream, thereby making struggle 
against this discourse possible in the form of the Civil War, the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Women's Suffrage Movement (DeLuca, 1999, p. 336). 
Whereas articulation gives us the means to address the formation of the 
discourse surrounding the hardcore gamer, the concepts of antagonisms and 
disarticulation provide a way in which marginalized groups can resist hegemonic 
discourse. 
The second body of literature that informs this work is that of game 
studies.  Although the primary focus of this text is not on individual games  as 
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subject matter, videogames as cultural artifacts are very much a part of the 
sociotechnological system on which it does focus.  As such, a deeper 
understanding of videogames informs our understanding of the people who 
create them and the people who play them.  Game studies is, itself, an 
interdisciplinary field, which contains elements of media studies, aesthetics, 
sociology and many others (Aarseth, 2001).  Though there is no clear 
methodology for conducting research in game studies (Lammes, 2007, p. 25), 
the actual playing of games is essential (Aarseth, 2003, p. 7).  In order to 
understand gamer culture, one must understand games.  The centrality of games 
to gamer culture goes beyond simply possessing social capital.  Games become 
the lingua franca for members of this community, allowing the communication of 
complex, abstract concepts between individuals of otherwise disparate 
backgrounds (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 42).  Thus, this study will examine videogames 
in their capacity as cultural artifacts that both create a discursive foundation for 
gamer culture and reflect the culture of their creators.
If, as games researchers, in which category I would place myself, we 
consider “play” to be the central focus of game studies (Lammes, 2007, p. 26), 
we must also concede the fact that we are members of gamer culture, if not a 
very specialized subset thereof.  Therefore, reflexivity becomes an important part 
of any methodology for understanding videogames (Bogost, 2006a, p. 2; 
Lammes, 2007, p. 28) or videogame culture.  In writing this thesis, I make no 
claims of academic objectivity, but rather acknowledge my own participation 
within my object of study.  
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As my research questions deal primarily with videogame culture and 
discourse, I approach game studies from a perspective firmly grounded in the 
humanities.  Many of the theories I draw on deal with the way in which 
videogames embody rhetoric and ideology.  Chief among these is Ian Bogost's 
concept of procedural rhetoric.  Procedural rhetoric is the way in which ideology 
is embodied by the very rules that make up a game (Bogost et al., 2005) or the 
authoring of arguments through processes (Bogost, Ferrari & Schweizer, 2010, p. 
130).  By playing a game, the player accepts certain rules as given, whether it be 
the ability to jump a certain height, the importance of acquiring wealth or the 
necessity of killing certain characters in order to progress.  These rules are 
created by humans – game designers and programmers.  As such, these rules 
are a product of the culture and ideology of their creators.
When players enter the game world, they enter a world that is steeped in 
ideology.  In the case of games created with a specific agenda in mind, such as 
advergames (games created for the purpose of advertisement), these frames are 
often easily identifiable.  However, the ideological frames present in commercial 
games, which can reach a much greater audience, are often implicit and in need 
of critique (Bogost, 2006b, p. 175).  By looking at the way in which ideology is 
embodied in the procedural structure of videogames, I hope to be able to more 
thoroughly analyze the ideology of the videogame industry itself.
Also of pertinence to this study is the literature within game studies that 
pertains directly to the independent game movement.  Particularly relevant is the 
question posed by Zimmerman (2002) as to whether or not independent games 
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are independent at all.  In his comparison to independent film, Jahn-Sudmann 
(2008) argues that independent games lack an oppositional logic that challenges 
the mainstream industry (p. 9).  In response to this claim, Martin and Deuze 
(2009) argue that the definition of independent games in this discourse is too 
narrow and that a developer's status as independent depends on a number of 
variables (p. 291).  Indeed, Jahn-Sudmann's definition of independence is even 
narrower than the definition originally proposed  by Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 
2002, p. 121).
In order to address this question of whether or not independent developers 
are truly independent, it becomes necessary to clarify to which groups the term 
“independent developers” is referring.  The term itself is applied to a wide range 
of groups, from large third-party development studios working with licensed 
intellectual property (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 1), to large and successful privately 
owned studios (Jenkins, 2006) to lone “hobbyist” game developers creating free 
games they distribute themselves.  Given the complex structure of game 
development outside the game industry, Martin and Deuze suggest that rather 
than asking “what is indie?” we should ask “how indie is it?” (Martin & Deuze, 
2009, p. 291).
The third body of scholarship from which I draw is the field of science and 
technology studies (STS).  This literature allows me to discuss not only the 
relationships between human agents, but the relationships that people have with 
the technology itself and how these technological relationships can influence 
interpersonal relationships.
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Within STS, one of my foci is research into technology-oriented and 
product-oriented movements.  In the public discourse about independent game 
development, the recent growth is often referred to as a “movement” 
(Gamasutra, 2007; IGF, 2010; Indiegames, 2010; Jahn-Sudmann, 2008, p. 5; 
Jenkins, 2006).  Although the independent game movement does not conform to 
the typical definition of a social movement, it could be considered a technology-
oriented movement, also potentially falling under the category of “new” social 
movements (Hess, 2005, p. 517).
Rather than having broad social changes as their goal, as in traditional 
social movements, technology- or product-oriented movements (TPMs) have as 
their end goal a change in products, technology or technology use (Hess, 2005, 
p. 518).  This builds upon the theoretical foundation laid by Langdon Winner 
(1986), who stated that objects themselves have political qualities (p. 19).  This 
assumption makes it possible to look at material culture not simply as a resource 
to be mobilized, but as an area of contestation (Hess, 2005, 518).  Hess cites the 
open source software movement as an example of this phenomenon.  Though 
the movement began in the 1970s and 1980s, it was later fueled by concern over 
Microsoft's market dominance of the computer industry.  Though protests in the 
traditional sense were rare, members of the movement fought back against 
Microsoft through coding.  In other words, the movement achieved its goals by 
creating an alternative product/technology (p. 528).
The independent game movement parallels the open source software 
movement in a number of ways.  In both cases, the movement is a reaction to 
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the dominance of a single entity or small group of entities that creates high 
barriers to entry into the market.  In both cases, traditional forms of protest are 
nearly absent, yet resistance is still present in the form of product development 
and technological innovation.
Another STS theory that I will make extensive use of in this text is actor-
network theory.  Actor-network theory grew out of the backlash against the social 
construction of technology as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two 
extremes of social constructivism and technological determinism.  One of the 
most influential steps toward this end was John Law's concept of heterogeneous 
engineering.  In this theory, technological systems can be understood as a 
network of heterogeneous elements including technical and scientific factors, as 
well factors that are social, economic, political or even natural (Law, 1987).  This 
theory creates an all-inclusive method of analysis that neither denies the 
influence of objects, nor creates artificial distinctions between “objects” and 
“beliefs about objects” (Latour, 1999).
This metaphor of technology as a “network” is the core concept of actor-
network theory.  A technology is not simply an artifact or a blueprint.  It is a 
complicated network of innovators, artifacts, ideas and users.  When applied to 
videogames as a technology, it allows us to look at the technology not as a 
console or a sequence of code, but as a complex network between game 
developers, platforms, controllers, players, retailers and so forth.  The technology 
is not made up solely of inanimate objects, nor is it simply a social construction. 
In this way, I intend to explore the central concept of this text, that is, to analyze 
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the evolution of the videogame industry as a complex sociotechnological system, 
focusing on the importance of discourse in this process.
The concept of the network is further refined by Law and Callon (1994) in 
their study of the British “TSR.2” project.  In this study they divide the actor 
network into two distinct parts, the global network and the local network.  The 
local network consists of the elements that are considered to be part of the 
project, while the global elements are external forces, such as government 
agencies, special interest groups and so forth.  In this model, the success or 
failure of a technology is based upon three things. First, the creation of a global 
network to supply resources for the project, second, the creation of a local 
network to take these resources and create a product that meets the global 
network's goals, and third, the establishment of an obligatory point of passage 
between the two networks (Law & Callon, 1994).  The idea of establishing a 
particular actor as an obligatory point of passage is similar in many ways to Law's 
concept of the “heterogeneous engineer” who attempts to associate the 
heterogeneous elements within the local network and attempts to dissociate 
hostile elements that interfere with the network stability (Law, 1987).  If an 
obligatory point of passage is not established during the development of a 
technology, the local network can lose control of the flow of resources, or the 
global network may not acknowledge its accomplishments (Law & Callon, 1994).
Another concept of actor-network theory that I find useful is that of the 
“script” or “scenario.”  This idea suggests that within a given actor-network, 
different actors will see the overall network differently.  While developers and 
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engineers may see a technology as fulfilling a certain need, end users may 
consider the technology an ineffective solution to their problem (Akrich, 1994). 
These different perspectives on the same actor-network are referred to as 
scripts.  This is a very appropriate term, not simply because it makes for a good 
extension of the theatrical metaphor already present in actor-network theory, but 
because it illustrates the value of analyzing multiple networks or scripts for any 
single technology.  A theater company usually keeps a fairly consistent lineup of 
actors, but will put on many different plays.  Between plays, the actors 
themselves change little (other than makeup and costumes), but their 
interactions and specific roles on stage will be completely different based on the 
script that the actors are using.  Therefore, even after the relevant actors in the 
actor-network of a particular technology have been identified, there are multiple 
ways in which the network or script can be perceived.
To those who are unfamiliar with actor-network theory (and its historical 
idiosyncrasies), my use of the term network throughout the rest of this study may 
seem somewhat unconventional.  Strict adherents of actor-network theory, on the 
other hand, may find my use of the term too conventional for their tastes. 
Without entering into a lengthy discussion of academic debates over semantics 
and naming conventions, it suffices to say that the use of the network metaphor 
in actor-network theory does not refer specifically to a technical network-like the 
Internet, nor to a social network-like al-Qaida (Latour, 2005, p. 131).  In fact, the 
object of study need not be overtly network-like at all (Latour, 2004, p. 63).  When 
I refer to technology as a network, I do not mean to imply that “technology” is 
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simply the physical connections between a number of mechanical or electronic 
components (although that might be part of it).  Rather, I mean that “technology” 
is made up of connections between people, ideas, physical mechanisms, 
organizations, laws and much more.  These connections are not permanent, nor 
are they stable.  They are performative – created and sustained by the 
interaction between the various nodes of the network (Latour, 2005, p. 132; Law, 
1999, pp. 3-4).  A node that ceases to act and influence the rest of the network 
becomes irrelevant and can no longer be considered part of the network at all 
(Latour, 2004, p. 70).
Even though the network metaphor in actor-network theory is often 
misunderstood as being literal, that does not preclude actor-network studies of 
traditional networks.  In fact, Latour notes that many of the earliest examples of 
actor-network studies focused on technical networks like subways and 
telephones (Latour, 2005, p. 131).  It is in this vein of research that I base my 
own study, looking at the connections between technical artifacts as well as the 
connections between other actors.  While my approach to actor-network theory 
may differ dramatically from some others, such divergence should not be 
unexpected.  As Law notes, “actor-network theory is diasporic” (Law, 1999, p. 
10).  Like its objects of study, it is heterogeneous and fluid.  The approach I use 
is certainly not the only way to conduct an actor-network study, but I find it well-
suited for the task of analyzing a large sociotechnical system such as the 
videogame industry.
Though videogame studies has grown significantly in the past 10 years, 
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the bulk of the research being done continues to be focused on the mainstream 
videogame industry.  Much of this probably can be attributed, as Jesper Juul 
suggests, to the fact that the people most likely to go into game studies are the 
people who are most dedicated to videogame culture (Juul, 2010a).  This trend, 
however, leaves the relationships and power structures between this mainstream 
gamer culture and other marginalized groups in need of critique.  The focus of 
this study is using various theories from science and technology studies to make 
these relationships explicit and then critiquing them, thus filling in some of the 
gaps in game studies research.
Research Methodology
I characterize my work not as coding texts, but as constructing them from 
the fragments of discourse I encountered throughout my analysis.  Therefore, I 
see the games, blogs, forum posts and scholarly articles I analyzed in this project 
not merely as texts to be coded, but as being “simultaneously structures of 
fragments, finished texts, and fragments themselves to be accounted for in 
subsequent discourse” (McGee, 1990, p. 279).
With the theoretical framework provided by these three bodies of 
academic literature in place, the first step in my project was to gather together 
materials on the culture of the videogame industry and the culture of videogame 
players, as well as information on the technological and organizational history of 
the videogame industry.  As previously mentioned, there already exists a sizable 
body of academic work on the culture of the videogame industry. Of particular 
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relevance is the anthropological research conducted by Casey O'Donnell (2008) 
on the culture of videogame developers, which focuses on the construction of 
developer culture and the inherent conflicts within that culture.  These sources 
also included other scholarly writing on developer culture, such as the work of 
Mark Deuze and Chase Bowen Martin,  accounts of industry professionals, such 
as postmortem articles posted on Gamasutra, a leading industry website, and 
statements of protest, such as the Scratchware Manifesto and the EA Spouse 
letter.
Most of the sources I compiled to analyze contemporary videogame 
culture consist of websites, blogs and other online sources dedicated to 
videogames and gamers.  Since this project is focused on marginalized groups, 
some of the sources I chose to describe gamer culture came from sources that 
deal specifically with minority interactions with mainstream gamer culture, such 
as The Border House, a blog dedicated to videogame culture and marginalized 
groups.  I also included many popular mainstream videogame websites, such as 
Kotaku, 1up and Joystiq.  This was further supplemented by articles on 
videogames   written by major media sites not directly associated with 
videogame culture.  These include sources such as Wired, Forbes and Salon.  In 
addition to analyzing these popular media sources, I again made use of the 
substantial amount of academic work written on videogame culture, looking at 
the work of scholars such as Erica Kubik, Jesper Juul and Henry Jenkins.
My information on the history of the videogame industry comes from books 
such as Stephen Kent's (2001) The Ultimate History of Videogames and Tristan 
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Donovan's (2010) Replay:  The History of Videogames.  The majority of these 
histories, including those of Kent and Donovan, are written from a perspective 
within videogame culture, or at the least, a provideogame stance.  Others, 
however, such as David Sheff's (1993) book,  Game Over:  How Nintendo 
Zapped an American Industry, Captured Your Dollars and Enslaved Your  
Children, are much more critical of the industry, its business practices, and its 
culture.  Part of the work of compiling these texts included examining the authors' 
relationship to the culture they were describing.
The second step in this project was analyzing these sources to find 
common discursive structures, with particular attention on antagonisms – the 
points at which the discourse being articulated by one group fails to mesh with 
the discursive reality of another group.  Many of the discursive structures I 
encountered while reading these texts were expected.  Few people who have 
had any experience with videogame culture would be surprised to find highly 
gendered constructions of player identity.  Other common discursive structures, 
such as the importance of secrecy within developer culture, were less expected, 
but no less important to creating a useful understanding of videogame discourse. 
By identifying these discursive structures and how they relate to one another, it is 
possible to see how different groups are perpetuating or resisting the hegemonic 
discourse of the videogame industry.
The final step necessary for exploring my research questions was to look 
at the technology itself and its relationship to the discursive structures previously 
identified.  Since I take an actor-network approach to technology in this paper, I 
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was not only interested in technological artifacts like consoles and game 
cartridges, but in technology as a system, encompassing artifacts, people, 
organizational structures and more.  In practice, this step overlapped 
considerably with the previous.  Many of the people who are most actively 
involved in articulating videogame discourse are also integral members of the 
sociotechnical system that is the videogame industry.  In a sense, discourse and 
technology not just connected, they are two sides of the same coin – a 
relationship which I hope to demonstrate in this paper.
There are a number of constraints with which I was faced in this project. 
First, my source materials were limited almost entirely to those written in English. 
Although English is often a common language among programmers, journalists 
and media critics, even in non-English speaking countries, this still limits my 
ability to consider the technical and rhetorical contributions to videogame culture 
outside of North America, particularly those by people in Japan, India and parts 
of Europe.
Despite this methodology's similarities to some qualitative research 
methods, particularly Adele Clarke's situational analysis, I do not consider my 
methods to be qualitative, but rather rhetorical.  Although my work shares with 
situational analysis inductive logic, materialist approaches, and postmodern 
perspectives (Clarke, 2005, pp. 5-7), referring to my methodology as such 
implies a commitment to certain standard approaches to qualitative inquiry, such 
as the coding of texts and transcripts, followed by the grouping and analysis of 
these codes.  Nevertheless, since both Clarke's project and my own involve the 
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erasing of boundaries between disciplines (p. xxiv), perhaps such similarities 
should not be unexpected.
Organization of the Thesis
This thesis consists of this introduction and five additional chapters. 
Chapter 2 deals with the history of videogames as a medium and how, over the 
course of time, it coalesced into the sociotechnological system that we now refer 
to as the Videogame Industry.  I will examine the way in which videogame 
discourse shifted in response to technological changes, as well as how cultural 
influences shaped the path of technological development.  Using approaches 
derived from both actor-network theory and articulation theory, I intend to show 
how the relationships between people, artifacts, ideas and discourse within this 
system played off each other, associating some elements while disassociating 
others.  I will show how certain actors within the network were able to set 
themselves up as obligatory points of passage, thus enabling themselves to 
shape the identity of videogame discourse.  Ultimately, the goal of this section is 
to show the articulation of an ideology within the videogame industry.
Chapter 3 looks at this hardcore ideology in greater detail, describing how 
it is manifest by both players and developers.  I intend to look at how this 
ideology marginalizes nonhardcore players by creating artificial distinctions 
between players who are real gamers and players who are not.  The artificiality of 
these distinctions becomes apparent at the limits of this discourse, where 
antagonisms become apparent.  I will also examine how these antagonisms 
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become points of resistance, both for marginalized players who want to be able 
to participate more fully in videogame culture, and for aspiring developers who 
want to take videogames in new directions.  I will do so by looking at two forms of 
resistance that are attempting to rearticulate videogame discourse, the turn 
toward casual gaming that Jesper Juul (2010b) has called a “casual revolution,” 
and videogame modding.  The discussion of these two forms of resistance will 
then lead into a third form of resistance and the focus of this paper, the 
independent games movement.
The independent games movement is the primary focus of Chapter 4. 
Using the model of the videogame industry developed in the first portion of the 
text, I will attempt to define what independence means in the context of 
videogame production.  Rather than taking a traditional Marxist approach at 
analyzing the discrepancies between the producers, consumers and owners of 
videogame technology and content, after the manner of Martin and Deuze, I 
intend to take an approach grounded in science and technology studies, 
specifically, the concept of technology- and product-oriented movements.  By 
looking at the indie game phenomenon as a technology-oriented movement, I will 
show how the practices of these rogue developers present a challenge to the 
hardcore ideology of the videogame industry by pointing out the antagonisms 
present in its articulation.  Through this process, I hope to create a new 
perspective on indie game culture, defining its values, goals and practices in 
relationship to the discourse of its members, rather than solely on the basis of 
comparison with existing alternative media.
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Chapter 5 of this thesis will attempt to integrate these two 
sociotechnological systems into a larger videogame ecology, showing the 
structure of the constituent systems and the ways in which different groups and 
discourses relate to each other.  This will allow me to look at videogame 
development through the lens of a number of different actor-network scripts, thus 
making possible new critiques of the videogame industry and its relationship with 
other communities of developers and players.  I will also attempt to integrate the 
discursive models discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 into these models in order to 
see the relationships between social, technological and discursive elements.  
The final portion of this thesis will discuss the theoretical implications of 
this study, as well as the more practical implications that it has for game 
developers and for videogame culture in general.  I will also discuss other 




It is significant that there is some debate as to what is considered to be the 
first videogame.  While Higginbotham's Tennis for Two is often given this 
distinction (see Bakie, 2005), there are a number of other possible contenders for 
the title, including A. S. Douglas' Noughts and Crosses and Steve Russell's 
Spacewar!  While Douglas' game predates Higginbotham's by several years,  it 
was created merely as an experiment in artificial intelligence on the University of 
Cambridge's EDSAC computer (Bogost, 2009, p xii) and was therefore never 
seen by as many people as Tennis for Two.  Spacewar!, on the other hand, came 
several years later than either of the other two games, yet it can boast as being 
the only one of the three that was designed specifically to be a game, rather than 
simply a novel demonstration of technical wizardry (Kent, 2001, p. 15).
Which one of these cultural artifacts (not to mention several others that are 
often included in this list) is given the title of “first videogame” is not particularly 
relevant to this text.  What is significant is that a debate exists in the first place. 
All three of these games were created with different tools, for different purposes. 
None of them are particularly close to what we think of as a videogame today. 
None of them were ever placed on a disk, played at home or even sold.  At the 
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time that these and other early videogames were being created, there was no 
discourse about videogames as a technology or a medium.  They would not even 
be grouped together in the same category for years to come.  At this time, the 
concept of the videogame had yet to be defined.
Although this roughly 10-year period of early experimentation can be 
thought of as the zero point on the timeline of videogame discourse, it would be 
misleading to say that nothing relevant happened before this point.  To truly 
understand any sociotechnical system, the social cannot be considered without 
the technical.  As Langdon Winner argued in his book, The Whale and the 
Reactor (1986), technology can embody specific forms of power and authority (p. 
19).  It is no coincidence, nor is it inconsequential, that all three of these early 
videogames were created in institutions with close ties to the military.  This 
association would affect the technological development of these games as much 
as it would influence the early developers who would take them from engineering 
novelties to a part of modern culture.
In the years following these innovations, the concept of the videogame 
would begin to coalesce  in the public mind, beginning with the player-developers 
of Spacewar! and slowly expanding outward.  One of the first and most influential 
discourse events was the “Intergalactic Spacewar Olympics,” an event organized 
and reported on by Stewart Brand for Rolling Stone Magazine.  In his article, 
Brand attempted to articulate his version of videogames as a countercultural 
force, with Spacewar! matches taking the place of acid trips and computers as 
the new drug for the masses (Turner, 2006, p. 116).  Though at the time, 
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computers were most often viewed as tools of oppression and dehumanization 
(p. 2), this discourse was not so strongly articulated that Brand was not able to 
rearticulate it to suit his own views.  Even today, we can see the influence of 
Brand's rhetoric in our discourse of digital technology, attributing much of it to the 
efforts of a few rebellious entrepreneurs (Halter, 2006, p. 79).
In order to make sense of this new technology, many people would make 
discursive links between videogames and similar entertainment technologies 
such as pinball machines, which had themselves become associated with slot 
machines, gambling and organized crime (Kent, 2001, p. 5).  Though the 
technological contributions of these early games would go unnoticed by the 
general public, they would be the seeds of a new sociotechnical system and their 
influence, though subtle, would help to shape the discourse that would form 
around that system.
Out of the Lab
Although there is much disagreement over the first videogame, there is 
little debate over who is considered to be the father of the videogame industry 
(Kent 2001, p. 48).  That man is Nolan Bushnell, the founder of Atari, perhaps the 
most successful early videogame company (Bakie, 2005, p. 6).
While attending the University of Utah, Bushnell became acquainted with 
Spacewar! (Kent, 2001, p. 30), which had spread from MIT to research 
universities around the country by means of the primitive Internet.  Ever the 
entrepreneur, Bushnell's first attempt to turn videogames, which until then were 
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only available to those who had access to huge computer labs, into a business 
was a version of Spacewar! built into a sleek fiberglass cabinet.  This version of 
the game, which he titled Computer Space, was a commercial failure (p. 34). 
This was due both to the game's prohibitive complexity and to the lack of a 
discursive structure that would allow players and distributors to relate to it.  No 
one knew what Bushnell's strange machine was, nor how it fit in with their 
existing notions of entertainment.  As a result, few people played it and few 
companies bought it.  Undaunted, Bushnell decided to leave his job to strike out 
on his own.  In 1972, he founded Atari (p. 38).
While Bushnell focused his efforts on ways to improve Computer Space, 
he set Al Alcorn, one of his new employees, on the task of creating a simple 
electronic version of ping-pong (Kent, 2001, p. 40).  Alcorn's game, Pong, was an 
instant success.  Unfortunately for Atari, Bushnell got the idea for the game from 
Ralph Baer, and his new home videogame system, the Magnavox Odyssey. 
Bushnell had seen a demonstration of the Odyssey and its simple table tennis 
videogame.   He even signed the guest book (Baer, 2005, p. 5).  When 
Magnavox sued Atari for infringing on Baer's patents, Bushnell knew that he 
could not fight them.  Instead, he agreed to settle the case and sign a license 
agreement with Magnavox, making Atari the only company that could legally use 
Baer's idea (Kent, 2001, pp. 46-48).  Based on this agreement, Pong and Atari 
would go on to turn videogames from a novelty into an industry.
Following the success of Pong, entrepreneurs and established companies 
all rushed to enter the newly formed videogame industry.  The background of 
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these companies ranged from electronic manufacturers, like National 
Semiconductor, to toy makers, like Mattel, to leather crafts, in the case of Coleco 
(which originally stood for the Connecticut Leather Company).  In a matter of just 
a decade, the market went from a single Pong cabinet in Andy Capp's Tavern to 
more than 1.5 million machines in the United States alone (Kent, 2001, p. 152).
Despite its success, problems were already beginning to appear in the 
fledgeling industry.  Under Bushnell's leadership, Atari was known for being 
disorganized and undisciplined.  Despite his laid-back policies, however, his 
game designers were well-educated and tech-savvy enough to keep producing 
hit games one after another (Dyer-Witheford, 2009, p. 12).  At this time, drug use 
was running rampant both among the assembly line workers (Kent, 2001, p. 52) 
and even among the executives (p. 58).  Bushnell, as well as many of those 
entering the field of game design, was an alumnus of the university research labs 
where Spacewar! was played.  Although these labs worked primarily on military 
projects, the students were long-haired drug enthusiasts who worked by day and 
played Spacewar! by night (Halter, 2006, p. 106).  Though this culture functioned 
well enough in the research labs, the laid-back party atmosphere of hot tubs, 
drugs and booze began causing problems for Atari.  An important business 
meeting after one such party that ended up causing a rift between Atari and their 
Japanese distributor, Namco, turning the latter into a new competitor (Kent, 2001, 
pp. 76-77).
While some aspects of the hacker culture of the university labs persisted 
in the early arcade industry, other aspects were abandoned as game making 
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became a business.  One of the defining characteristics of the hacker community 
is the idea of the “hacker ethic,” an unspoken set of values that places great 
importance on the sharing of information.  In his book Hackers, Steven Levy 
describes this value system:
Access to computers – and anything that might teach you 
something about the way the world works – should be unlimited 
and total.  Always yield to the Hands-On Imperative! 
(Levy, 2010, p. 28)
Spacewar! embodied this ethic.  Though it was Steve Russell who created the 
original program, it was constantly tweaked and improved by other programmers. 
The code was shared from lab to lab, with no strings attached.  For this reason, 
no one questioned Bushnell when he created Computer Space, which was 
nothing more than Spacewar! in an arcade cabinet.  After his encounter with 
Magnavox, however, Bushnell began trying to emulate the tighter control that 
Ralph Baer had shown with his meticulous notes and valuable patents (Kent, 
2001, p. 58).  Though his attempts to patent his Pong hardware were relatively 
ineffective, it set a precedent for the game industry.  To get ahead in the industry, 
you had to be a businessman, not a hacker.
Outside the industry, public discourse was beginning to form around 
videogame technology, though perhaps not the kind that Atari might have hoped 
for.  While arcades were at first seen in a positive frame, as places where 
children and adults from diverse backgrounds could come together, the more 
conservative turn in public opinion that accompanied the beginning of the 
Reagan administration began to frame arcades much more negatively.  Adults 
who frequented arcades were portrayed as deviants (Williams, 2003, p. 544). 
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Arcades became associated with sleazy pool halls and juvenile delinquency. 
Parent activists, such as Ronnie Lamb, denounced videogames for their violence 
and for the questionable locations that kids would frequent to play them (Kent, 
2001, p. 119).  For years to come, arcades would be seen by parents as paths 
leading their children to failure (Kushner, 2003, p. 3).
With the ever-increasing competition in the coin-op market and the 
negative associations made with arcades, Bushnell wanted to move into the 
home console market.  Though Atari had already created Home Pong, he had 
something much more ambitious in mind.  In order to fulfill his vision, however, he 
would need much more money than Atari had at the time.  To acquire the funds 
for his home system, Bushnell would sell Atari to Warner Communications for 28 
million dollars (Dyer-Witheford, 2009, p. 12).
After being sold to Warner, Atari had the money it needed to create its 
revolutionary home console.  This console, the Atari Video Computer System 
(also known as the Atari VCS or the Atari 2600), would change the home console 
industry as dramatically as Pong changed the arcade market.  It would set 
precedents in the industry such as the practice of selling consoles at a low profit 
margin (later manufacturers would sell them at a loss) in order to later make 
greater profits with the sale of games (Kent, 2001, p. 107); an approach that ran 
contrary to the way most computer developers operated, by giving away software 
to drive the sale of hardware (Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006, p. 122). 
Likewise, the acquisition by Warner would set precedents for the relationship 
between developers and their employers.
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From the beginning, relations with the new Warner executives were 
tenuous.  Ray Kassar, the consultant that Warner brought in to shape up the 
company disapproved of Bushnell's laid-back management style and was 
bothered by the drinking and drug use.  (Kent, 2001, p. 110).  Their goals for the 
company also came into conflict.  Bushnell wanted to innovate.  Kassar and the 
Warner executives wanted reliable profits.  When Bushnell proposed abandoning 
the VCS and moving on to a new project, they dismissed him and placed Kassar 
as Atari's new CEO (Kent, 2001, pp. 111-113).
After the removal of Bushnell, the culture of the developers was suddenly 
thrown into conflict with the corporate culture of Warner Communications.  As 
Kassar took control of Atari, major changes took place.  Their focus was shifted 
away from innovation and toward squeezing as much profit out of existing ideas 
as they could (Kent, 2001, p. 124).  Developers were forbidden from taking credit 
for the games they created and were generally hidden from the media (pp. 152-
153).  Though the official reason was to prevent jealousy between developers, 
others suspected that the real reason was to prevent other companies from 
stealing away their designers (Cohen, 1984, p. 71).
Warner had good reason to fear their designers going elsewhere.  As 
conditions worsened for developers, many of Atari's oldest employees began 
leaving the company.  Some followed Bushnell to join in his new ventures, while 
others formed their own companies, such as Activision.  When Activision began 
selling their own game cartridges for the VCS, games that were considered 
graphically superior to Atari's own games (Cohen, 1984, p. 92), Warner saw 
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Atari's entire business model threatened.  They sued Activision a number of 
times, but were unable to shut them down (Kent, 2001, pp. 192-194).  In a few 
short years, Activision's growth would exceed that of Atari (p. 227).
It was also during this time that the military's interest in videogames was 
once again piqued.  Though many of the early experiments into videogames had 
started with the premise of being some sort of military simulation, the flow of 
innovation and ideas rarely flowed the other direction.  This changed when Atari 
created Battlezone, a first person tank game that used crisp vector graphics. 
Several retired army generals were so impressed that they contacted Atari about 
making a version of the game for military training purposes.  Atari put the original 
game's creator, Ed Rotberg, in charge of the project.  Rotberg, who identified 
more with the counterculture than with the military-industrial complex, objected to 
the project.  In the end, he relented, and created Military Battlezone, a more 
realistic version of his popular arcade game (Kent, 2001, pp. 153-154).
Although the years under Kassar's leadership were the most profitable in 
Atari's history, it was also a time in which the game developers' culture clashed 
dramatically with the culture of the executives (Kent, 2001, p. 184).  During this 
time, Atari went from being a symbol of the free spirited hacker culture to being a 
large corporate entity known for its strict hierarchy (Turner, 2006, p. 134). 
Developers went from being treated like stars to being treated like children 
(Cohen, 1984, p. 71).  Though other companies like Activision would initially fight 




Arcades and home consoles brought videogames to a wide audience at a 
time when access to computers was extremely limited.  Though many of these 
games were inspired by games originally programmed on the mainframes on 
college campuses, these new media, the arcade machine and the home console, 
had different constraints than the old mainframes, both technological and 
cultural.  Arcade machines lacked the power of the university computers and 
each could run just a single program.  Consoles could play multiple games, but 
were even more technologically limited than their arcade counterparts.  Arcades 
and consoles were much more accessible for the general public than general 
purpose computers.  Not only were there more of them around, they were 
designed to be used by those with no technical skills whatsoever.  Computers, at 
this time, were still only operated by those who had spent considerable time and 
effort learning to operate them, often referred to as the “computer priesthood” 
(Levy, 2010, p. 5; Nelson, 2003, p. 304).  With arcades and consoles, however, 
everything came at a price, and games were designed to take as much money 
from their players as they could.  Computers demanded nothing more than effort 
and a willingness to learn.
Though arcade games were often the first videogames that people 
encountered, the arcade experience prompted some to dig deeper to find out 
more about how they worked.  Those who looked hard enough would eventually 
find their way to the university labs where videogames got their start.  Since the 
hackers who managed the labs only cared about skill, they would let almost 
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anyone in, even an 11-year-old John Romero, the future cofounder of Id Software 
(Kushner, 2003, p. 6).
While Nolan Bushnell's entrepreneurial flair inspired him to take 
videogames out of the labs and turn them into a billion-dollar industry (Kent, 
2001, p. 185), others would bring videogames to the public in more subtle ways. 
Marc LeBrun was a member of Stanford's Spacewar!-obsessed artificial 
intelligence (AI) lab.  After leaving the university, LeBrun would help start Dymax, 
a company founded to write instructional books on the BASIC programming 
language that became a hub of countercultural techno-evangelism (Levy, 1984, 
p. 171).  As part of their goal to bring computers to the masses, Dymax would 
open the People's Computing Center (PCC) in Menlo Park.  The Computing 
Center was designed to be a place that any person could come in and use their 
computers on a time share basis to learn how to program or simply to play 
games.  Though their computers were of the type that had previously been found 
only in labs, they were not nearly as powerful as the ones needed to play 
Spacewar!  They also lacked monitors, using a typewriter-like terminal to 
communicate with the computer.  The lack of processor power to calculate real-
time physics and the lack of monitors to display any graphics forced them to 
move into a new genre of videogame, the text-based adventure (Markoff, 2005, 
p. 184).
Text games became a hit at the PCC.  On Fridays, they would host game 
nights, to which local teenagers would flock with enthusiasm.  There were a 
number of games on their computer, including games about Star Trek.  With no 
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monitors, players read paper printouts that were reprinted after every move 
(Markoff, 2005, p. 266).  In 1973, Gregory Yob unveiled Hunt the Wumpus, a 
game that rather than drawing a crude maze of dashes and dots showing the 
player's position, described the scene in words, giving a sense of immersion that 
had never before existed in the text-onlygames of the PCC.  This new style of 
text adventure games would be refined and improved in later games like 
Adventure and Zork.  It would even find its champion in a game company that 
made nothing but text-based games, Infocom (Seegert, 2009).
Like their forebearers on university mainframes, these games were very 
open.  Aspiring developers would create games and share them with their 
friends.  Even those games that were “published” were rarely put on discs or 
cartridges.  More often, their code was printed out in a print publication, such as 
a magazine, line by line (Kushner, 2003, p. 13).  Those who wanted to play the 
game would have to painstakingly type in the code for the whole game before 
being able to play.
After a while, several of the regulars at the PCC wanted to learn more 
about computer hardware, not just software.  They decided to form their own 
group, the Homebrew Computer Club (Levy, 1984, pp. 199-200).  The most 
famous member of this club was Steve “Woz” Wozniak, with his computer, the 
Apple (and later Apple II).  Though he built the computer to satisfy his own 
hacker needs, it would go on to become a billion-dollar company in the space of 
just 5 years (p. 271).
For the first time, computers were available to those outside the hacker 
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elite.  Though they were praised for their business uses and marketed as 
machines for managing finances and storing recipes, the use that truly drove 
computer sales was gaming (Holmquist et al., 1999, Rehak, 2008, p. 76). 
Indeed, with color graphics, advanced audio and even game paddles, the Apple 
II was designed for games (Kushner, 2003, p. 11).  This new level of accessibility 
attracted a new and diverse crowd of entrepreneurs to game development, 
including Roberta Williams, the shy, daydreaming daughter of an agricultural 
inspector.  She was introduced to videogames when her husband showed her a 
copy of Crowther and Woods' text-based game Adventure.  Though she was no 
hacker, nor was she interested in computers to begin with, she would find in the 
Apple II a new outlet for expressing her imagination.  Together with her husband, 
Ken, a programmer, she would found On-Line Systems (Levy, 1984, pp. 295-
302).
Another newcomer to game design was Richard Garriott, the somewhat 
eccentric, swashbuckling son of an American astronaut.  Under the pseudonym 
of “Lord British,” Garriott had created the games Akalabeth and Ultima (Levy, 
1984, pp. 379-380).  Unlike the entrepreneurial Bushnell, who saw videogames 
as lucrative business opportunity, Garriott began creating games primarily for 
himself and his friends, with no intention to actually sell them (Donovan, 2010, p. 
62).  Nevertheless, these games would be some of the first and most influential 
examples of computer role-playing games (Barton, 2008, pp. 48-49).  They were 
so successful that in the span of a few short years, Garriott went from selling his 
games in Ziploc bags to selling them through On-Line to eventually forming his 
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own company, Origin Systems.  He would make eight sequels to Ultima, as well 
as a number of spinoffs (Bakie, 2005, p. 19).
Though Apple would single-handedly found the personal computer 
industry, many other companies would follow them.  As with the Apple II, one of 
the main selling points for these computers was the games.  Computers like the 
Sinclair ZX Spectrum, a British computer that became very popular in Europe, 
would attract huge communities of independent game developers.  These 
developers would go on to create a huge library of Spectrum games, ranging 
from surrealist humor in the style of Monty Python, to games satirizing current 
political events (Donovan, 2010, pp. 116-117).
Perhaps the most significant of these early competitors was the 
Commodore 64.  Whereas the Apple was designed to be a flexible system that 
those with curiosity could explore and expand upon, the Commodore 64 was 
designed to be affordable.  Selling for just $600 when the Apple II was still selling 
for $1000, it opened up the personal computer market to an even wider audience 
(Kent, 2001, pp. 251-252).  Computers were not just a high-tech gadget for 
technophiles, they were now becoming an alternative to home videogame 
consoles.  If a computer cost as much as a console, why settle for a game-only 
system when a computer could play games too (Tomczyk, 1984, p. 179)? 
Though it would not be nearly as influential as the Apple, the Commodore 64 
would claim the distinction of being the best selling computer of the twentieth 
century (Rehak, 2008, pp. 78-79).
Atari, already the king of the home videogame consoles, was also eager to 
48
enter the home computer market.  By this time, however, the culture of Atari had 
already gone through a major change.  The open hacker culture had been 
replaced by a secretive corporate culture, eager to maintain control over as much 
of the supply chain as possible.  With the release of the Atari 400 and 800 
computers, the company kept many of the technical details of the systems 
secret.  Without this information, programmers could not create software for the 
system.  Atari offered to provide them with this information only if they would 
enter into an agreement to make Atari brand software.  The PC developer 
community, however, still held much of the same hacker ethic that thrived in the 
university labs.  Instead of pulling talented programmers away from other 
systems, Atari's attempt to exert control over the personal computer industry 
drove programmers away.  By the time they realized their mistake, it was too late. 
The Atari home computers would be doomed to fade away into mediocrity 
(Tomczyk, 1984, p. 110).
Though the personal computer industry was at the center of the 
countercultural hacker scene, its overwhelming growth was causing cultural 
changes of its own.  The Homebrew Computer Club had swelled to hundreds of 
members at each meeting, though many of the early members no longer 
attended.  Among these absentees was Woz, now too busy with the  booming 
Apple Computers to attend.  The hacker ethic that so many had championed 
over the years now clashed with their companies' imperative to make money. 
The hacker community now had to make a choice:  Keep secrets or lose money 
(Levy, 1984, p. 269).
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Discursively, the articulation of the computer was changing.  Computers 
were no longer viewed as the mysterious tools of the military-industrial complex. 
Widespread acceptance of affordable computers had demystified them (Levy, 
1984, p. 277).  At the same time, since computers were being sold as complete 
systems, their owners no longer needed to be able to open the black box and 
look inside.  Computers were becoming self-contained systems (p. 278).  As the 
worldwide base of computer users grew dramatically, the die hard hackers that 
had once managed to dearticulate the discourse of computers and rearticulate it 
in their own terms found themselves greatly outnumbered.  Though they still had 
considerable influence over the discourse, they could not sway the masses, such 
as the ruthless executives at Commodore or the hip superstars of Apple.  For 
better or for worse, they had achieved their goal of bringing computers to the 
people.
For game designers, things were changing, too.  At On-Line, Ken and 
Roberta Williams' business model was changing.  The young hackers that had 
flocked to their company to make games were obsessed with making their 
programs perfect.  Though these high quality games had helped him establish 
On-Line as a leader in computer games, Ken Williams now saw them as a waste 
of time.  He found his money better spent on marketing than on his programmers' 
pet projects.  On-Line was becoming a bureaucracy (Levy, 1984, pp. 350-355). 
Though this shift in focus from creative vision to maximum profits was taking 
place across the industry, nowhere was it more apparent than at Atari, where 
bureaucratic meddling was about to initiate an economic disaster.
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The Crash
Although the explosion of personal computers had increased the sale of 
Apple software to tens of thousands of units, games for the Atari VCS were still 
being sold by the millions (Levy, 1984, p. 356).  Like On-Line, Atari had become 
more and more bureaucratic as it grew, but on a much larger scale.  By the early 
1980s, Atari was filled with marketers and other executives, and they, not the 
engineers, were the ones calling the shots.  They had the developers creating 
games for anyone who would make a deal, including movie studios, toy makers 
and even dog food companies  (Kent, 2001, p. 235).  The VCS had debuted with 
nine games, five of which were based on existing arcade games to some extent. 
By 1982, officially licensed games were everywhere, and some companies, like 
Parker Brothers, created nothing but licensed games (Montfort & Bogost, 2009, 
p. 123).  Many of these games, such as the VCS port of Pac-Man, were rushed, 
sacrificing quality to get the game on shelves more quickly (Kent, 2001, p. 236). 
Kassar and the other Atari executives had counted on the license to sell the 
game, regardless of its quality (Montfort & Bogost, 2009, p. 76).  Though the 
game sold relatively well, players were disappointed with its terrible quality.  Their 
faith in Atari would be deeply shaken, setting the company up for its most 
spectacular failure ever.
This failure would come in the form of another licensed game, E.T.  Based 
on the film by Stephen Spielberg, the game would be developed in a mere 6 
weeks in order to be out by Christmas.  E.T. became infamous for being one of 
the worst games ever created.  Already distrustful of Atari after Pac-Man, players 
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refused to buy the game (Kent, 2001, pp. 237-238).  
When Atari announced fourth quarter profits for 1982, they were 
substantially lower than projected.  The announcement set off a panic and 
Warner stock took a nosedive (Kent, 2001, p. 234).  So great was the fall of Atari 
that many of the other industry leaders were pulled down in its wake.  Coleco and 
Mattel would abandon the videogame industry that year (pp. 252-255).  Even the 
makers of gaming computers like Commodore, whose sales had skyrocketed as 
Atari's fell, would eventually be pulled down, suffering losses almost as bad as 
those of Atari (pp. 264-265).  In July of 1984, after months of trying to pull the 
company out of free fall, Warner sold off Atari, marking the end of an era (p. 268).
The “Crash of '83” would go on to become not only a significant event in 
the annals of videogame history, but a significant discursive tool in articulating 
the videogame industry.  Though it could be said that the fall of Atari was caused 
at least in part by power shifting away from the developers, who actually made 
games, to executives, who were disconnected from the development process 
and the final product itself, the Crash would be rearticulated as an excuse for 
even tighter corporate control and less power in the hands of developers.
Out of the Ashes
As iconic as the Crash has become in vidogame history, it was generally 
confined to the United States.  Although the US was and continues to be one of 
the most important markets for games, the videogame industry in other countries 
was able to survive the fall of Atari unscathed (Kent, 2001, p. 278).  In Japan, 
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Nintendo's new videogame console, the Famicom, was doing well.  Nintendo 
hoped to find even bigger profits by selling the Famicom in the US, but faced 
retailers and industry professionals who believed that videogames were dead (p. 
280).  Undaunted, Minoru Arakawa, then president of Nintendo of America, chose 
to test the market with a risky New York opening in which he persuaded retailers 
by offering to buy back their stock of unsold consoles (p. 297).  The New York 
release of the Famicom, renamed the Nintendo Entertainment System or NES for 
the American Market, was a success.  By the next holiday season, more than 1.9 
million homes in the US would have an NES (p. 346).
Despite having released games on the Atari VCS, Nintendo now tried to 
distance themselves from Atari (Donovan, 2010, p. 165; Kent, 2001, p. 350), 
portraying the Crash as entirely the fault of Atari and the incompetence of its 
management, despite the fact that by this time, it was under new management 
after being sold off by Warner (Sheff, 1993, p. 258).  In essence, the resurgence 
of the videogame market after the introduction of the NES was rearticulated to be 
viewed not as simply the ups and downs of the market, but as the death of the 
old industry and the birth of a new one.  Nintendo would go to great lengths to 
make this vision a reality.
One of the concepts that Nintendo would use to distance itself from the 
videogame industry of the past was quality.  Poor quality games such as Pac-
Man and E.T., though not the only cause of Atari's demise, were significant 
catalysts of the process.  To prevent this same fate from befalling the NES, 
Nintendo set up a complex system of “quality” control to protect their system. 
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The visual representation of this system was the “Nintendo Seal of Quality,” 
which was displayed prominently on every product released for the NES 
(O'Donnell, 2008, p. 151).  This seal was used to assure both consumers 
(Arsenault, 2008, p. 116) and retailers (Montfort & Bogost, 2009, p. 134) that 
buying Nintendo products was not the same risk that buying Atari products was. 
In order to get the seal, developers were required to enter into a licensing 
agreement with Nintendo, which limited each developer to making five games a 
year, as well as prevented them from releasing the game on other systems for 2 
years (Sheff, 1993, p. 215).  It also meant submitting their games to Nintendo's 
censors, who would ensure that the games had no content that was forbidden by 
Nintendo.  This forbidden content included, among other things, sexuality, 
excessive violence, drug use and religious symbolism (Arsenault, 2008, p. 111).
In order to enforce these licensing agreements and give weight to the seal 
of quality, Nintendo devised a three-tiered plan of defense to protect their new 
system.  This defense included a technological system, developed by Nintendo, 
as well as the existing patent and copyright systems already in place in the 
United States.  By explicitly linking their technological system with these legal 
systems, Nintendo was able to leverage the force of the State apparatus, 
dramatically changing the nature of the videogame industry (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 
154).
At the heart of the technological component of Nintendo's security 
measures was the 10NES chip (Figure 2.1).  This chip was built into every 
officially licensed NES cartridge, with a corresponding component located inside 
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the NES itself.  Upon powering up, the console looks for a specific code from the 
chip on the cartridge.  If the code is received, the console functions normally.  If 
the cartridge does not transmit the correct code, the console will not play the 
game (O'Donnell, 2008, pp. 189-190).  This also meant that all cartridges for the 
NES had to be manufactured by Nintendo, giving additional control over third-
party developers by dictating manufacturing prices and production numbers 
(Kent, 2001, p. 308).
Nintendo has kept the nature of the 10NES chip a closely guarded secret. 
So close, in fact, that the only official record of its existence is the patent that 
Nintendo would file to protect it (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 188).  Such was the 
importance of their patent in this system of control that Nintendo was willing to 
open up a small hole in their wall of secrecy in order to tap into the State-backed 
power of the patent system.  They would open a similar hole in their defenses in 
order to invoke the copyright system, as well.  Once again, the object in question 
was the 10NES chip.  While the patent protected their physical system of chips 
Figure 2.1: Nintendo's 10NES chip (Edwards, 2007)
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and circuitry built into the cartridges and consoles, the copyright would protect 
the code that signaled to the console that a licensed cartridge was inserted (p. 
191).  While there would be a certain amount of tradeoff involved in this process, 
Nintendo was giving up a small portion of its secrecy in exchange for the 
protection of the State.  This tradeoff, however, would prove to be a beneficial 
one for Nintendo.  
Near the end of 1987, Tengen, a company created from the remnants of 
Atari's arcade division, became a Nintendo licensee.  Unhappy with the restrictive 
nature of the agreement, Atari engineers began trying to reverse engineer the 
10NES chip.  When this proved to be a rather slow process, a lawyer (or possibly 
a paralegal) working for Atari took advantage of the small hole in Nintendo's 
defenses that they had opened up by copyrighting the 10NES code.  A false 
copyright infringement case was invented to gain access to the documents 
describing the code.  This was then handed off to the Atari engineers, who were 
able to use it to create a way to bypass the 10NES protection on the NES 
console (Kent, 2001, pp. 371-373).
Although Atari and Tengen were able to overcome the technological 
system that protected the NES, the legal system that Nintendo had made a part 
of their network proved much more formidable.  After an extensive series of legal 
battles, the courts sided with Nintendo (Kent, 2001, pp. 374-377).  Nintendo's 
victory in the Atari case would set a precedent for all other battles over control of 
the means of production of videogames (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 192).  In the 
following years, Nintendo would use the legal system to their full advantage.  By 
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1990, Nintendo's legal fees would amount to $20 million per year.  According to 
one of its employees, Nintendo's business had become “video games and 
litigation” (Sheff, 1993, p. 259).
With both 90% of the home console market (Evans, Hagiu & 
Schmalensee, 2006, p. 126) and the power of the State-backed legal system, 
Nintendo had the ability to drastically change the way that videogame companies 
did business.  On one hand, making third-party developers enter into licensing 
agreements and pay Nintendo 20% royalties on their games transformed them 
from the jackals and parasites that plagued Atari to valuable allies who brought in 
even more money for Nintendo (p. 125).  On the other hand, these license 
agreements relegated independent studios to virtual serfdom, with significantly 
limited control over their games' pricing, distribution and even content.  Also, 
because the cartridges had to be created by and purchased from Nintendo, 
developers and publishers had to take on a greater portion of the risk associated 
with releasing a new game.  Whether the game sold or not, Nintendo would 
make a substantial profit (Sheff, 1993, pg. 62).  Many studios, including 
Activision, who had left Atari to escape such bureaucratic control, found 
Nintendo's  demands unreasonable and refused their licensing agreements 
(Kent, 2001, p. 308).  
Despite the unfavorable situation that Nintendo had created for 
developers, it soon became apparent that Nintendo was the only game in town. 
Japanese companies that had signed license agreements early on were already 
making hundreds of millions of dollars a year (Sheff, 1993, p. 217).  After several 
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years of massive success, American developers began entering into licensing 
agreements with Nintendo, beginning with Acclaim in 1988 (Kent, 2001, p. 309).  
In order to compete with Nintendo, other console manufacturers would 
also adopt their model of tight control.  Sega's Genesis console would employ 
similar lockout technology backed by trademark law.  As with Nintendo's system, 
Sega's technological barriers would be compromised and its legal network 
invoked to punish the offender, Accolade.  Though the initial ruling in Sega's favor 
was eventually overturned (though not entirely), the lengthy legal process took its 
toll on Accolade, which chose to simply license future games rather than risk 
another legal conflict (Kent, 2001, pp. 382-388).
The constant flurry of lawsuits being filed by Nintendo and the other 
console manufacturers had a significant chilling effect upon all other parts of the 
videogame industry, developers, publishers, distributors and retailers alike. 
Although it was not illegal for developers to make unlicensed games for consoles 
(unless they had already entered into a licensing agreement), very few 
developers were willing to take that risk.  Those few who did and were able to 
circumvent console security measures without breaking the law were dealt with in 
other ways.  Accusations were made of Nintendo intimidating distributors and 
retailers with threats of legal action if they supported these independent 
developers (Donovan, 2010, pp. 168-169; Kent, 2001, p. 375; Sheff, 1993, pp. 
288-290).  Though many of these accusations could have been exaggerated, it is 
likely that retailers would not need any threats on the part of Nintendo.  Since 
console manufacturers controlled the vast majority of the games for their 
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systems, there were already huge incentives in place for brand loyalty and 
virtually no incentives for taking risks on obscure titles (Sheff, 1993, p. 290).
It should be noted that the Famicom, the original Japanese version of the 
NES console did not contain the 10NES lockout chip.  Though Nintendo still had 
their seal of quality and their associated licensing agreements, the technological 
and legal systems that compelled licensing agreements were not present.  The 
seal was purely a rhetorical device, encouraging players to choose games that 
were approved by Nintendo, though this approval lacked the severe restrictions 
and censorship to which NES developers were subject (Arsenault, 2008, pp. 111-
112).  This more open system did result in some degree of piracy and a much 
higher number of unlicensed games, it also resulted in the console having a 
much longer lifespan than the more restrictive NES (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 191). 
Despite these advantages of a more open system, the changes in the console 
market over the next decade would almost all be toward more closed systems 
and greater control by the manufacturers.
Arising out of the ashes of Atari, console games established themselves 
as the most lucrative and influential part of the videogame market.  During this 
time, personal computers continued to become more commonplace, with sales 
exceeding 40,000 units by 1994 (Reimer, 2005).  Despite their prevalence, as 
well having nearly ten times more game titles available, console games outsold 
PC games two-to-one during the 1990s and earned four times as much revenue 
(Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006, p. 128).  Also, since games on consoles 
face much less competition than PC games did (p. 149), status as a console 
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developer began to be seen as a position of privilege (Sheff, 1993, p. 214) and a 
sign of prestige.  From this point on, console games would become the core of 
the videogame industry, both economically and culturally.
Graphics and Gore
While videogame consoles were taking the world by storm, personal 
computers were slowly but surely becoming a part of many people's everyday 
lives.  Many of the computer manufacturers of the early 1980s had disappeared, 
leaving the Apple Macintosh and the IBM PC, with all its clones, as the dominant 
platforms (Rehak, 2008, p. 79).  For years, Apple computers had been the 
premier gaming machines (Freiberger & Swaine, 1984, p. 155).  With the 
Macintosh, however, Apple tried to project a more practical image, doing little to 
encourage game development on their platform (Kent, 2001, p. 455).   Though 
IBM compatible PCs were originally less suited to games than even the older 
Apple II (Kushner, 2003, p. 36), the open architecture of the IBM PCs 
encouraged the development of new hardware such as sound cards and CD-
ROMs that made them a more attractive target platform for game developers 
(Kent, 2001, pp. 455-456).  By the early 1990s, the market for both PCs and PC 
games was growing rapidly (Kushner, 2003, p. 93).
Much like the console market, the PC game market had become 
dominated by a few large companies.  Ken and Roberta Williams' On-Line 
Systems, now renamed Sierra On-Line, was an early adopter of the IBM PC 
platform, and had huge successes with games like King's Quest (Bakie, 2005, p. 
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18).  Electronic Arts, which was founded by former Apple employee Trip Hawkins 
in 1982, had grown to a billion-dollar business by 1991 (McMahan, 2008, p. 89). 
Unlike the console market, however, independent developers had alternatives to 
the big publishers like Sierra and EA.  Computer magazines would still publish 
the code in print format, as well as pay the developer for their work (Kushner, 
2003, pp. 13-14).
Though independent developers could make modest profits by regularly 
submitting games to magazines, there was relatively little money to be made by 
this method of distribution.  Hoping to increase both their income and the reach 
of their games, many of these developers would embrace a new distribution 
model known as “shareware.”  Originally developed as a way to distribute simple 
business applications, shareware offered users a trial version of a program that 
could be freely distributed.  Users who liked the software were encouraged to 
buy the full version from the developer (Camper, 2008, pp. 151-152).  This 
distribution method, which began as an experiment in trust by Andrew 
Fluegelman, the first editor of PC World magazine, became a small movement. 
Users who felt neglected by larger software companies flocked to these small 
shareware publishers (Kushner, 2003, p. 30).  Within a few years, shareware 
users were giving back millions of dollars to the developers whose work they 
valued (Donovan, 2010, p. 255).
Among the hobbyist game developers that were drawn to the shareware 
movement were John Carmack and John Romero.  Both had started off by 
creating their own games at home.  Romero submitted his games to magazines 
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(Kushner, 2003, p. 14) while Carmack found small publishers who were willing to 
pay him (pp. 24-25).  The two eventually found themselves working at Softdisk – 
a small software developer and publisher that had grown immensely with the 
spread of home computers – where they and a small team formed Softdisk's new 
computer game division, Gamer's Edge (pp. 36-37).
Although Al Vekovius, the owner of Softdisk, had allowed the team to 
pursue their passion, game development, he also demanded results.  Softdisk's 
business model was  publishing diskettes containing several programs as a 
monthly subscription.  Vekovius wanted the Gamer's Edge team to follow the 
same model.  This meant having two games ready to ship in a month.  With this 
extremely tight deadline looming overhead, the programmers entered crunch 
mode, working incredibly long hours on little more than caffeine and adrenaline in 
order to port some of their previous games from the Apple II to the PC (Kushner, 
2003, p. 39).
The Gamer's Edge developers proved more than competent, especially 
Carmack, who was particularly skilled at creating graphics.  After porting one of 
his older games for the first Gamer's Edge disk, he began working on a system to 
create smooth scrolling graphics in a PC game.  Such scrolling graphics had 
already been created in arcade games like Defender and console games like 
Super Mario Bros.  PCs, however, lacked the power to perform such intensive 
graphical tasks.  Late one night, Carmack was able to devise a more selective 
method of scrolling that was able to perform the operation on a PC.  By the next 
morning, he and Tom Hall, another Softdisk employee, created a PC version of 
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the first level of Super Mario Bros. 3, using one of their own characters as a 
substitute for Mario.  When Romero saw the game, which they had entitled 
Dangerous Dave in Copyright Infringement, he knew that they had the potential 
to achieve much more than Softdisk had to offer (Donovan, 2010, pp. 254-255).
During this time, the shareware distribution model was beginning to 
change.  What  began as a method for independent developers to distribute their 
work outside the mainstream software publishing system was quickly becoming 
dominated by its own type of publisher.  While many small publishers enjoyed a 
great deal of success, two of these publishers, Apogee and Epic MegaGames, 
soon grew to dominate the shareware market.  Both were founded by 
independent developers as a means to promote their own games, but as the 
shareware market grew, they eventually moved away from game development 
and became merely publishers of other developers work.  Although the 
shareware market in the early 1990s was at the peak of its popularity, it was also 
beginning to have little meaningful distinction from the mainstream computer 
game industry (Camper, 2008, pp. 155-156).
Armed with his new sidescrolling engine, John Carmack joined with John 
Romero, Tom Hall and several other Softdisk employees to create their own 
company, Id Software.  They first pitched the idea of making a PC port of Mario 3 
to Nintendo, who was not interested in the PC market.  Soon after, they were 
contacted by Scott Miller, the founder of Apogee, who was hoping to publish 
some of Romero's old games as shareware.  Romero instead pitched an idea for 
a game called Commander Keen, which used Carmack's new engine.  Apogee 
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both funded the development of Commander Keen and published it, quadrupling 
their monthly sales in the process  (Donovan, 2010, pp. 254-256).
With the success of the Commander Keen series, Id quit Softdisk and 
struck out on their own (Donovan, 2010, p. 256).  They also began taking their 
games in new directions.  Their next major game, Wolfenstein 3D, was notable 
for both its fast, first person gameplay and its initial shock value.  Where most 
enemies in videogames would simply disappear when killed, the Nazi soldiers 
that the player killed in Wolfenstein would fall to the ground in a pool of their own 
blood (Kent, 2001, p. 458).  Even one of their publishers was worried, due to the 
levels of violence and game's incredible realism for the time (Kushner, 2003, p. 
110).  Despite these concerns, Wolfenstein 3D became the new best selling 
shareware game of all time, selling more than 100,000 copies by the end of 1993 
(Donovan, 2010, p. 258).  The PC, which had always been graphically inferior to 
dedicated game consoles, was finally beginning to break free of its “business 
machine” stigma and be viewed as a videogame platform comparable to 
consoles (Camper, 2008, p. 156).
The success of Wolfenstein sparked a great deal of controversy.  Though 
large companies like Nintendo had censored games on their own systems for 
years, this was largely done behind closed doors.  Wolfenstein brought these 
issues to the public sphere when the game was banned in Germany (Kushner, 
2003, p. 115).  This controversy, however, did little to diminish the popularity of 
Wolfenstein.  Even Nintendo approached Id about porting the game to their new 
Super NES console, provided they removed some of the blood and gore (pp. 
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120-121).
One of the most surprising things that Id did with their success was offer to 
license the use of Carmack's revolutionary new game engine to other 
developers.  Ever since the days of Atari, the videogame industry had been 
becoming more and more protective of their development process, particularly of 
their in-house tools.  To give other developers access to a complete game 
engine, especially one as groundbreaking as Wolfenstein, was unheard of 
(Donovan, 2010, pp. 258-259).  Although he was still a small child when the first 
hackers were sharing Spacewar! between university labs, John Carmack 
identified with the hacker community and believed strongly in the hacker ethic 
(Kushner, 2003. p. 22).  For him, the sharing of information was part of being a 
programmer.  Though other companies might have tried to squeeze as much use 
out of their new technology as possible, Carmack and the rest of Id were ready to 
move onto the next big project, Doom.
Everything that had made Wolfenstein 3D stand out from other 
videogames was taken to the extremes in Doom.  Carmack created an even 
more versatile game engine, capable of dynamic lighting and slopes (Kushner, 
2003, p. 121).  Uninterested with storytelling, he reduced the plot to the basic 
premise of killing demons with guns (pp. 128-129).  Adrian Carmack, Id's lead 
artist, was given free reign to create all the blood, gore and satanic images he 
could imagine (p. 134), while their audio engineer filled the levels with animal 
grunts and a heavy metal soundtrack (p. 145).
As the developers refined their game, they also continued to challenge 
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standard industry practices.  Unsatisfied by Apogee's handling of Wolfenstein, 
they decided to publish Doom themselves, eliminating the middleman and 
making themselves completely independent (Kushner, 2003, pp. 125-126).  Once 
again, Id would distribute the game as shareware, with no marketing other than 
word of mouth and the occasional blurb on the rapidly growing Internet (Kent, 
2001, p. 459).   As with Wolfenstein, the developers would license their game 
engine to other developers, but would go one step further by releasing many of 
the development tools to players as well, spawning the growth of the Doom 
modding community.  While mods, or player-made modifications to the original 
game, had been created for other games before Doom, the developers of these 
games often fought against modders, accusing them of copyright infringement. 
Id took the opposite approach, encouraging and supporting the modders 
(Donovan, 2010, p. 260).  They even went so far as to separate out all the media 
data into external WAD files, allowing modders to simply swap their own artwork 
and sounds into the game (Herz, 1997, pp. 89-90; Kushner, 2003, p. 166).
Doom would go on to become one of the most popular and culturally 
influential games of all time.  Though at the time of its release it did not reach the 
same mainstream audience that traditionally distributed games did (Kushner, 
2003, p. 162), it would go on to be downloaded 15 million times, with 150,000 
copies of the full version being purchased directly from Id (Herz, 1997, p. 84). 
Doom would grow to become a phenomenon, popularizing the first person 
shooter genre (Bakie, 2005, p. 32; Donovan, 2010, p. 262; Kent, 2001, p. 459) 
and defining the hardcore gamer community.  Eventually, its cultural influence 
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would extend well beyond videogame culture, impacting other media and cultural 
practices (Manovich, 2001, p. 244).  Doom would leave its mark on the 
videogame industry, as well.   For the rest of the 1990s, the videogame industry 
would be dominated by a race to create more photorealistic 3D graphics 
(Järvinen, 2002, p. 125).
While game developers had always influenced gamer culture indirectly 
through the medium of their games, Id became a much more direct influence on 
that culture through John Romero.  After the release of Doom, Romero became 
the public face of Id and the embodiment of the hardcore gamer.  He became an 
object of “nerd worship,” sometimes being approached by fans for autographs. 
He would attend tournaments of Doom's multiplayer or “deathmatch” mode, 
casually flinging boasts, insults and other “smack talk” in a constant stream 
(Kushner, 2003, pp. 172-174).  By the time Romero returned to the same 
tournament the next year, the other players would all be emulating his over-the-
top style, insults and all (p. 187).
Romero's flamboyant style would eventually bring him into conflict with 
another key member of Id, John Carmack.  The two founders of Id had opposing 
philosophies.  Romero loved fame and wanted a bigger company, making games 
with epic stories.  Carmack preferred a simpler approach, placing far more 
importance on the technology than on the design.  After the release of their next 
game, Quake, Carmack would force the issue.  Ultimately, the rest of Id's board 
would side with Carmack, and Romero was forced to resign (Kushner, 2003, pp. 
218-220).
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After leaving Id, Romero would found his own company, Ion Storm with 
Tom Hall (who had been forced out of Id during the development of Doom). 
Romero's fame was such that he could land million dollar deals with established 
publishers and set the terms himself.  Unlike Id, whose company culture reflected 
Carmack's minimalism, Romero's company would embody his own philosophies. 
Ion Storm would be irreverent and over-the-top, with developers making the 
games they wanted with no one to stand in their way. (Kushner, 2003, pp. 228-
232).
Although Id was able to successfully resist many of the established 
industry practices, such as traditional developer-publisher relationships and tight 
control of proprietary software, Ion Storm, for all its hype, would fail spectacularly. 
Rather than freeing developers from the creative constraints that he felt at Id, 
Romero's approach would lead to uncontrolled excesses and conflict among the 
developers.  As the party atmosphere began to give way to the realities of 
business, disgruntled developers would begin to leave the company (Kushner, 
2003, pp. 260-261).  Romero's game, Daikatana, which had caused an uproar 
among gamers with its now infamous advertising campaign (Figure 2.2),  would 
become mired in the chaos that had enveloped Ion Storm.  By the time the game 
shipped, nearly 2-and-a-half years late, the company's mounting debt had forced 
Romero to allow their publisher, Eidos to buy a majority share of the company 
(pp. 278-280).
Daikatana would not live up to its hype.  In the end, it would become little 
more than the butt of Internet jokes (Donovan, 2010, p. 352).  With his 
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masterpiece in shambles and his celebrity spent, John Romero, along with Tom 
Hall and the remainder of the Daikatana team, would be unceremoniously fired 
by Eidos (Kushner, 2003, p. 286).  The fall of Romero would mark the end of the 
era of superstar game designers.  Though many respected designers such as 
Shigeru Miyamoto, Richard Garriott and Will Wright would continue to make well-
received games, they would never again achieve the cultural and economic 
influence that Romero held at his peak.
Although Romero's dream of a videogame industry where designers have 
complete control over their games did not last, he and the rest of Id software had 
Figure 2.2: The infamous Daikatana "Bitch" ad reflected the hyper-masculine  
culture that developed around games in the 1990s.
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a significant effect on the videogame industry. The technical wizardry of John 
Carmack would allow the personal computer to compete with consoles as a 
viable platform for action games.  Also, as previously mentioned, the success of 
Doom would spawn an industry wide obsession with 3D graphics, leading to a 
reductionist and empirical method of evaluating game quality, measuring it in 
polygon counts and frames per second.  Doom (along with several of its 
contemporaries, such as Mortal Kombat) would also prove the existence of a 
market for more adult-oriented videogames, challenging the established 
“censored” model championed by Nintendo.
Id would also impact the culture of the players.  The fast action and 
hyperviolence of Doom and Quake, combined with the ability for player 
interaction through multiplayer deathmatches, made these games both an 
identifying symbol for the the hardcore gamer subculture and a channel through 
which interpersonal interactions were mediated.  The construction of Romero as 
the “ultimate gamer” further increased the prevalence of confrontational 
interaction and scatological humor within this subculture as members attempted 
to emulate Romero's personal style.  As the hardcore gamer subculture deviated 
farther and farther from social norms, games such as Doom would become the 
target of public outcry against the industry (Kent, 2001, p. 460).
While Id would most often be remembered for its technological advances 
or its controversial subject matter, it also made many more subtle, but no less 
influential, contributions to the videogame industry.  Foremost among these were 
Id's resistance to the accepted industry philosophies of secrecy with regard to 
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proprietary technology and legal protection in order to maintain market 
dominance.  Both of these contributions were based upon John Carmack's 
adherence to the hacker ethic.  As Nintendo and the rest of the videogame 
industry were enclosing themselves in their protective walls of patents and 
copyrights, Carmack refused to patent his technology (Kushner, 2003, p. 205).  Id 
would take the opposite approach, licensing their powerful engines to other 
companies and later releasing them as open source.  This openness would make 
the Quake Engine and its derivatives one of the most widely used family of game 
engines among both hobbyists and industry professionals.  It would become the 
base for engines such as Valve's GoldSrc and Source engines, used in the 
games Half-Life and Half-Life 2, respectively.  Valve, in addition to adopting Id's 
Quake Engine, adopted its attitude toward modders.  Valve encouraged modding 
of its own engines and even hired new employees from the modding community 
(Valve, 2004, pp. 45-46).
Although Id was often seen as makers of alternative or underground 
games, they were able to achieve the influence necessary to significantly 
rearticulate the discourse of the videogame industry.  By addressing such 
antagonisms as the modding community, they were able to break the hegemonic 
discourse that portrayed them as destructive and potentially criminal (Donovan, 
2010, p. 260), rearticulating them as legitimate users of their programs and 
important members of the gaming community as a whole.  Many of the groups 
that are currently challenging established videogame discourse and practices 
owe a great deal to the actions of Id Software.
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The Political Game
Despite the success of PC games such as Wolfenstein and Doom, the 
console market remained the most lucrative part of the videogame industry, and 
it was being fiercely contested.  Although the NES had managed to control 
between 86% to 93% of the home console market (Kent, 2001, p. 360), the next 
generation of home consoles would be far from one-sided.  Their next console, 
the Super NES, would face tough competition from Sega's new console, the 
Genesis.  By the end of 1991, the Super NES would control 45% of the market to 
the Genesis' 55 (Donovan, 2010, p. 220).
The competition between the two companies was fierce.  Sega attacked 
Nintendo in ads, stating that “Sega does what Nintendon't” (Kent, 2001, p. 405). 
Although Sega had adopted Nintendo's strategy of controlling the hardware and 
forcing developers into licensing agreements, Sega's licenses were much less 
restrictive than Nintendo's, which began slowly attracting developers that were 
previously developing games for the NES (Sheff, 1993, p. 356).  Even important 
Nintendo licensees like Acclaim began signing licensing agreements with Sega 
(Kent, 2001, p. 440).
Nintendo's business strategy, which had once given them total control of 
the industry, was now beginning to cost them sales.  This problem would be 
compounded with the September 1993 release of the home version of Mortal  
Kombat.  With its copious amounts of blood and exaggerated killing moves 
performed by digitized actors, Mortal Kombat could not pass through Nintendo's 
strict censorship policy.  When the game was released, the Super NES version 
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was toned down, with the blood and many of the excessively violent moves 
removed, while the Genesis version remained true to the arcade version.  Not 
only did the Genesis version sell three times more copies than the Super NES 
version, the latter provoked thousands of angry letters, some from parents, 
concerning the censorship, which had previously gone unnoticed (Kent, 2001, p. 
466).
Two months after the release of Mortal Kombat, Senator Joseph 
Lieberman called a congressional hearing to address the issue of videogame 
violence.  There is some debate over what prompted the senator's interest in the 
issue.  Although the official account of the events leading up to the hearings says 
that the senator was made aware of videogame violence by a member of his staff 
whose son wanted a copy of Mortal Kombat, many people accused Nintendo of 
encouraging the hearings as a desperate attempt to stop Sega's increasing 
success in the home console market (Kent, 2001, pp. 466-469).  Whether or not 
they had tried to initiate the hearings, Nintendo would try to use them to their 
advantage.  As demonstrated in a number of court cases throughout the 1980s 
(See Kent, 2001, pp. 371-390), they had already managed to create a complex 
sociotechnical system capable of leveraging the power of the State in order to 
overcome their rivals.  While the senate hearings threatened the entire 
videogame industry, they also held the potential to allow Nintendo to crush Sega 
just as it had Atari and Tengen.
During the first day of the hearings, after a number of expert witnesses 
had spoken, members of the videogame industry were called to testify, beginning 
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with Howard Lincoln, senior vice president of Nintendo of America.  When asked 
about violence in videogames, Lincoln brought up the sanitized version of Mortal  
Kombat as an example of Nintendo's commitment to combating violence in 
videogames, citing its poor sales and public backlash as the sacrifices that 
Nintendo was willing to make in order to live up to this commitment (Donovan, 
2010, p. 231).  Lincoln would even allude to the 10NES chip, Nintendo's key to 
enforcing its licensing agreements, as a tool for protecting children from violent 
content (Kent, 2001, p. 474).
Following Lincoln's remarks, Bill White, the representative from Sega of 
America took the stand.  White countered the accusations from Nintendo by 
claiming that Sega's target audience was much older than that of Nintendo.  He 
also brought up the fact that while the rest of the industry was scrambling to 
develop a ratings system to answer the current controversy, Sega already had 
their own ratings system in place (Kent, 2001, pp. 474-475).
After White's testimony, as well as that of several others, Senator 
Lieberman once addressed Nintendo's Howard Lincoln.  Lincoln quickly seized 
the opportunity and changed the subject back to Sega, calling White's testimony 
misleading, if not an outright lie.  White countered by showing a videotape of 
violent games on the Super NES that had gotten past Nintendo's censors.  The 
hearings turned into a heated battle between Lincoln and White, while Senator 
Lieberman watched in surprise as his hearing began spinning wildly out of control 
(Donovan, 2010, p. 232; Kent, 2001, pp. 476-477).
After more debate between Sega and Nintendo, the hearings were 
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adjourned for 3 months.  During this time a number of important changes took 
place in the videogame industry.  These changes were directed as much toward 
protecting themselves from future political action as they were toward actually 
addressing videogame violence.  Unsatisfied by the representation of the 
Software Developers Association, the leading members of the videogame 
industry withdrew to form their own organization (Donovan, 2010, p. 234). 
Despite the numerous power struggles that took place during this time between 
Sega and Nintendo, they, along with five other industry leaders, compromised in 
the creation of the Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA), which would 
later be renamed the Entertainment Software Association (ESA).  They would 
also create the Entertainment Software Ratings Board, or ESRB, in order to 
provide an industry wide ratings system.  When the hearings resumed, the ESRB 
ratings would be highly praised by Senator Lieberman and the other committee 
members (Kent, 2001, pp. 479-480).
The congressional hearings on videogame violence suffered from a 
number of problems.  Perhaps the most significant of these was the lack of 
understanding of videogames and the videogame industry that the committee 
had when the hearings began.  Although Mortal Kombat was supposedly the 
game that prompted the hearings, the game most referenced throughout the 
question and answer period was a very obscure game known as Night Trap, a 
game for the Sega CD that featured prerecorded clips of full motion video (Kent, 
2001, p. 272).  In Night Trap, the player is tasked with protecting a house full of 
girls having a sleepover from vampires, in what amounted to an interactive B 
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movie.  Most of the people on the committee's panel of experts misrepresented 
the basic premise of the game, stating, rather, that the player's goal was to kill 
the girls (p. 273).  With such limited information on the very videogames that they 
were investigating, the committee lacked the ability to confirm or deny the claims 
and accusations that Lincoln and White began flinging at each other.
The hearings would not have the effect that Senator Lieberman intended. 
Night Trap, which had been largely overlooked at its initial release, began selling 
tens of thousands of copies during the hearings, gaining enough popularity to be 
released for the PC the following fall.  Mortal Kombat also received a boost to its 
sales (Donovan, 2010, p. 234).  Even Id Software, whose games were not 
mentioned during the hearings, saw increased popularity from the hearings 
(Kushner, 2003, p. 171).  Nintendo, unable to break Sega, chose to abandon 
their censorship of violence.  When Mortal Kombat II was released, the Nintendo 
version would have just as much blood and gore as all the others (Kent, 2001, p. 
480).  In the end, Senator Lieberman's crusade to stop the violence would do 
little more than legitimize its presence in videogames.
Perhaps more than any other event, the 1993 congressional hearings 
would solidify the videogame industry into a single, monolithic entity.  Although 
competition would continue to be fierce among console manufacturers, they now 
had a banner a banner to rally behind, should the need arise.  That need would 
arise before the end of the decade, when Senator Sam Brownbeck would call for 
another round of hearings in the wake of the Columbine school shootings.  This 
time, the IDSA spoke for the videogame industry.  There was no squabbling or 
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posturing by industry executives, just the single voice of a united industry. 
Despite the more urgent tone of these hearings, nothing significant resulted from 
them.  The videogame industry emerged virtually unscathed, due in large part to 
the testimony of the IDSA (Kent, 2001, p. 555).
The Monolithic Industry
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the videogame industry would go 
through a number of major changes, especially in the console market.  After a 
failed deal with Nintendo to develop a CD based peripheral for the Super 
Nintendo, Sony would enter the market with its own console, the PlayStation 
(Kent, 2001, p. 504). Microsoft would follow in 2001 with the release of the Xbox 
(p. 574).  Together with Nintendo, these three manufacturers would become the 
dominant forces in the console market for the next decade.
The turn of the century would also see the demise of a number of console 
manufacturers, most notably Sega.  The company, which had once stood toe-to-
toe with Nintendo, had a number of significant failures following the Genesis 
(Kent, 2001, pp. 493-509).  Their last console, the Sega Dreamcast, was an 
ambitious project.  Unfortunately, it was soon eclipsed by the release of Sony's 
PlayStation 2 in March of 2000.  Within a year, Sega had been forced out of the 
console market (Donovan, 2010, p. 334).  Atari, 3DO, Commodore and NEC 
would meet similar fates with their consoles (See Kent, 2001).  The chaotic and 
unpredictable console wars of the 1990s would give way to a much more orderly 
form of war between the new console superpowers, with all three coexisting in an 
77
Orwellian state of stable conflict.
This equilibrium among the three major console manufacturers has 
endured for a number of reasons.  Unlike the personal computer market, there 
has been little demand for standardization across systems.  Since videogame 
consoles are not used for the same kind of collaborative work that PCs are used 
for, compatibility for the purposes of file sharing is not an issue for consumers. 
To the contrary, many consumers value the product differentiation between the 
competing platforms (Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006, p. 139).  This same 
incompatibility also ensures that console manufacturers have no common 
interests beyond the general health of the industry, discouraging any kind of 
cooperation between them (Williams, 2002, p. 44).
As the console market settled into its current state, innovation and 
creativity within the industry began to stagnate.  While development practices of 
the time were certainly a factor in this process, the driving force behind this 
stagnation was not videogame developers, but videogame publishers.  The 
consolidation of ownership within the industry had already reduced the field down 
to a small number of multinational “super publishers” who were faced with the 
dilemma that 90% of their profits came from 10% of their games.  The effect of 
this situation was that publishers became increasingly conservative, focusing 
more and more on sequels to popular game franchises and licensed games and 
moving away from the creation of original intellectual property, or IP (Dyer-
Witheford & Sharman, 2005, p. 190).  While this move is often characterized as 
justifiable, at least from a business standpoint, some scholars question if it is 
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even economically sustainable.  Matthew White has argued that this kind of 
system not only disrespects players, but is setting the industry up for another 
crash (White, 2009, p. 5).  While highly derivative games are safer investments 
than new IP, they also generally bring in far smaller returns than the original title. 
White suggests that the combination of general diminishing returns for sequels 
and certain franchises coming to an end as they become unprofitable could 
potentially initiate another crash like the one in 1983 (p. 9).
This period would also be the lowest point in the quality of life of 
videogame developers.  It would see both the drafting of the Scratchware 
Manifesto and the filing of the “EA Spouse” lawsuit.  A number of factors, both 
technical and social, contributed to the worsening of conditions.  Part of it 
stemmed from the very advances in videogame technology that developers were 
striving for.  As the technical complexity of the games increased, the number of 
artists and programmers required to make a standard console title also 
increased.  Super Mario World had a development team of 15 people (Kent, 
2001, p. 432).  Mario 64 had a development team of more than 50 (p. 530).  By 
the time that Halo 3 was in development, its team had over 100 members 
(Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006, p. 144).  With creative control being shifted 
toward publishers and away from developers, individual programmers and artists 
were becoming little more than cogs in a huge industrial machine.  The increased 
cost of development and restrictive licensing agreements meant that unlike the 
founders of Activision, who simply left Atari to make their own games, this 
generation of developers were faced with incredibly high barriers to entry into the 
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market.
Perhaps most detrimental to the well-being of developers during this time 
were elements within developer culture.  Despite the sweatshop conditions in 
which many developers were working, they were inclined to endure this 
mistreatment because of the shared cultural understanding that game work was 
somehow different than normal work (O'Donnell, 2008, pp. 85-86).  As Erin 
Hoffman, the infamous EA Spouse noted in her original blog post, game 
developers enter the industry because they love games and have a strong desire 
to make their product the best it can be, in spite of poor work conditions. 
Working in the industry is seen as a privilege, which could easily be revoked by 
an employer (Hoffman, 2004).  Other toxic cultural elements include the concept 
of crunch time.  While the concept of crunch time made sense in the context of 
solo developers pushing themselves or of small studios trying desperately to stay 
afloat, huge studios like EA adopted the concept as standard practice. 
Developers, who often began their careers in small studios or with their own 
projects would rarely question the necessity of crunch time.  In fact, most 
developers would come to feel that they could not critique the system at all 
(O'Donnell, 2008, p. 10).
Hegemonic Videogame Discourse and its Limits
Throughout the development of the videogame industry, there are a 
number of common themes.  The technological systems themselves have grown 
more complex.  The associated sociopolitical systems have also grown in 
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complexity.  As these networks grow in size and complexity, the power dynamics 
within these systems have fairly consistently shifted away from developers and 
toward publishers and manufacturers.   The latter are then able to establish 
themselves as obligatory points of passage within these networks, imposing 
hegemonic control over other nodes within the network, including both 
developers and players.
These trends are directly related to the attitude of technological 
determinism that permeates the videogame industry (Bittanti, 2004).  Because of 
the perception that quantifiable technological improvements signify quantifiably 
better games, developers have been willing to sacrifice their position and 
influence within their networks in order to achieve such incremental advances. 
This often means a willingness to trade broad freedoms in exchange for access 
to proprietary technology (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 194).  The fact that these freedoms 
are willingly given shows the hegemonic forces at play within the industry.  By 
doing what they consider to be most beneficial to their own interests, developers 
put themselves in a position in which they can be easily exploited, as in the EA 
Spouse case.
Up until the last few years, this fixation on technology could be justified in 
the fact that the most technologically advanced platforms were also usually the 
most popular.  This is perhaps not surprising, as console manufacturers rarely 
made any attempt to differentiate their product from the competition except in 
terms of technological achievement and price.  Consoles that failed in these two 
categories were not focused on excelling in a third.  This pattern, however, 
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changed after the 2005 Game Developers Conference.  While Microsoft and 
Sony extolled the improved graphics on their new systems, the Xbox 360 and the 
PlayStation 3, Nintendo unveiled their next console, the Wii.  Of the three 
systems, the Wii was technologically inferior to the other two by a significant 
margin.  Despite its apparent lacking, the Wii would go on to be by far the most 
popular of the three, based not on easily quantifiable technical specifications, but 
on its innovative new control scheme (Juul, 2010b, pp. 13-16).
The success of the Wii demonstrates a fact that until then could only be 
speculated, that players do not share the industry's overly deterministic view of 
technology being the driving force behind videogames as a medium.  Perhaps it 
would be more accurate to say that within the set of all potential players, this 
view is held by a relatively small group.  Even as the Wii was becoming a gaming 
phenomenon, many developers, players and journalists were outspoken in their 
disdain for the new system (Miller, 2007; Taft, 2007).  Notable among these 
critics was Chris Hecker, a well-known developer from Maxis, who boldly stated 
at the 2007 Game Developers Conference that “the Wii is a piece of shit” and 
that it was little more than two GameCubes duct-taped together (Pfister, 2007). 
Even if the majority of players did not share the industry's vision of what 
videogames were and what they ought to be, there were still those who did, the 
hardcore gamers.
While the Wii challenged long-held preconceptions about what players 
really wanted, it also questioned the industry's ideas about who the players really 
were.  While the Wii appealed to many traditional players, it also attracted 
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millions of new players who had never owned a console before (Donovan, 2010, 
p. 341).  Why had such a large market gone untapped for so long?  Why does an 
industry that is frequently compared to the motion picture industry in scope 
(Williams, 2009, p. 41) focus so much of its efforts on such a small segment of 
the population?  Why does that small population feel threatened by a console 
that is directed at this larger market?
I suggest that the answer to these questions lies in understanding the 
hardcore gamer ideology, which could be considered to be the dominant ideology 
in the videogame industry.  Over the last 40 years the videogame industry has 
slowly articulated this ideology, with powerful actors, such as Nintendo, exerting 
considerable influence over this process, often rearticulating key events, such as 
the Crash in such a way as to serve their own interests.  The result is a system in 
which millions of potential players have been marginalized for years, with no 
games being created to serve their needs.  In the next chapter, I will attempt to 
examine this ideology in greater depth as it currently exists by mapping the 
discourse of the hardcore gamer.  By doing so, I intend to show the limits of this 
discourse and demonstrate how it can be challenged.
CHAPTER 3
HARDCORE IDEOLOGY
The monolithic nature of the videogame industry, which is reflected in the 
prevalence of the hardcore gamer ideology, sets it apart from other forms of 
mass media.  While other industries, such as the Hollywood film industry, have 
been accused by many critics of reinforcing an ideology that legitimizes dominant 
institutions and values, they exhibit a much more complex relationship between 
competing ideologies (Ryan & Kellner, 1988, pp. 1-3).  Indeed, the film industry 
has gone through a number of transformations, from conservative to liberal, with 
power shifting from the powerful studios to influential directors and back again 
(Waxman, 2005, pp. ix-x).
The videogame industry, by contrast, has followed a fairly consistent 
pattern of development, with console manufacturers and huge 
megaconglomerates consistently gaining more power while very rarely being 
forced to relinquish it.  Even the infamous Crash, which was influenced in no 
small part by the corporate mismanagement of Atari by its Warner executives, not 
only failed to weaken the corporate grasp on developers, but allowed Nintendo to 
gain even greater control over developers through their technologically and 
legally enforced licensing system.  The result of this continual consolidation of 
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power is a videogame culture that is more ideologically homogeneous than any 
corresponding “film culture” or “television culture.”
The homogeneity of videogame ideology has ensured that dissenting 
voices within videogame discourse have been minimized.  Many of the 
antagonisms to this discourse have been exposed through external influences, 
such as the congressional hearings begun by Senator Lieberman.  Because 
these forces are seen to be outside the network, the antagonisms they reveal 
rarely become sites of resistance.  On the contrary, these efforts often have the 
unintended effect of strengthening the existing hegemonic forces, just as Senator 
Lieberman's vilification of Night Trap had little effect on gamers other than 
encouraging them to buy the game (Kent, 2001, p. 478).
Despite the videogame industry's resistance to change, antagonisms are 
beginning to appear in the discourse of videogames.  They come from exploited 
developers and marginalized players.  Even Nintendo, which has more often than 
not been a conservative force within the industry, has created new antagonisms 
by challenging traditional gamer demographics through the success of the Wii 
console.  The nature of videogames as a medium is not set in stone.  In fact, it is 
in the process of undergoing a major change.
Hardcore Players
The hardcore videogame ideology is most apparent in the culture that has 
grown up around players.  Some of the identifying traits of this ideology include 
an obsessive time commitment to playing games (Kubik, 2010, p. 59) and a 
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desire for high difficulty in their games (Juul, 2010a, p. 29).  Despite the often 
negative associations with this stereotype in mainstream culture (Bogost, 2006a, 
p. 4; Nichols, et al., 2006, pp. 44-45), most hardcore gamers self-identify as such 
(Carr, 2005, p. 468).
The appellation “gamer” itself says something about videogame culture. 
Most people do not label themselves according to their media consumption. 
Despite the popularity of their respective media, few people would self-identify as 
“televisioners” or “book readers.”  As Ian Bogost noted in a 2011 interview:
In some ways, the concept of the gamer is one of the worst ideas 
that proponents of games have advanced. It signals it as sort of a 
lifestyle –that gaming is something that you do and you identify with 
primarily. We don’t do that with other mature media and we don’t do 
that with other activities. You don’t think of yourself as a “pubber” 
because you go to the tavern after work.  (quoted in Ewalt, 2011)
By discursively constructing the playing of videogames as a lifestyle or as a 
characteristic of a particular social group, it forces people into a false dichotomy 
between being a gamer or being a nongamer.  Again, due to the negative social 
stigma that is often associated with gamer stereotypes, many people who would 
otherwise enjoy videogames are pushed away.
While the insulated and withdrawn nature of this culture has had a 
detrimental effect on the development of the videogame industry, it also has 
much broader social consequences.  Chief among these is the marginalization of 
certain social groups, including women.  
In July of 2011, the website PowersGaming began organizing a launch 
party for Battlefield 3, a first person shooter.  Despite the fact that Battlefield was 
a game already targeted toward men, the organizers of the event chose to 
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explicitly ban women from attending the event.  News of the ban quickly spread 
through websites like Reddit, eventually appearing on the popular videogame 
culture blog Kotaku.  Responding to the negative publicity, the organizers of the 
event made a number of rapid revisions to their site, reframing the event as a 
“gentlemen's retreat” and later as an event to help them “become better men” 
(Good, 2011).  Although the text of their message was changed, their policy 
remained unchanged throughout the controversy.
While instances of misogyny are rarely so blatant or so widely publicized, 
the  PowersGaming incident typifies the attitude held by many hardcore gamers, 
as well as the resistance that women often face when attempting to participate in 
online spaces.  This can be seen as continuation of the long-standing tradition of 
the alienation of women by male game-oriented socializing (Carr, 2005, pp. 468-
469).  Similar resistance is met by racial minorities, homosexuals and many other 
social groups.  Discrimination is also not limited to large events, but exists in a 
wide range of game-related activities, including in-game hate speech (Garaniols, 
2010) and harassment in online forums (Kesler, 2010, Everett & Watkins, 2008, 
155).
Though specific acts of discrimination, such as the PowersGaming ban, 
are usually condemned by the mainstream media, attempts to change or redefine 
videogame culture are often met with skepticism by the popular press.  The 
concept of feminist gamers, for instance, is often dismissed, with feminists and 
real gamers being defined as two mutually exclusive groups (Jenkins & Cassell, 
2008, p. 10).  Although many journalists, especially in the years since the release 
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of the Nintendo Wii, openly acknowledge that gamers and gamer culture is 
indeed broader than the gamer stereotype might suggest, these concessions are 
made in a manner that does not challenge the stereotype itself, but rather 
confirms it (Shaw, 2010, pp. 407-408).  In this way, media attitudes toward 
videogame culture serve to justify and normalize its current ideology in the minds 
of those who are a part of it, while simultaneously portraying it as deviant to 
those on the outside, thus widening the gap between gamers and nongamers.
Hardcore Developers
Unlike players, who tend to express their culture in relatively public 
settings, game developers tend to be more secretive about their culture.  In fact, 
during his study of work practices within the videogame industry, Casey 
O'Donnell noted that secrecy is a significant element of developer culture 
(O'Donnell, 2008, pp. 37-38).  The result is a culture that is even more insulated 
from the mainstream than that of gamers in general.
There is no formal “discipline” of game development.  Most developers 
enter the industry with little or no knowledge of how games are made (in part due 
to the aforementioned secrecy) and learn the actual process of of game 
development in their first development studio (O'Donnell, 2008, pp. 57-58).  With 
no common frame of reference as developers, members of development teams 
appeal to each other's identity as a gamer in order to establish working 
relationships and communicate ideas.  In the culture of game developers, games 
are the lingua franca (p. 42).  Thus, to be an effective game developer, one must 
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first be a gamer.
The consequences of game development studios being an extension of 
gamer culture are directly or indirectly related to many of the problems that game 
workers face.  It conflates the concepts of work and play, giving the industry a 
“mystique,” leading to the view that game work is fundamentally different from 
other forms of work (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 37).  While this can be productive, 
creating a “fun” environment that motivates employees, it can easily collapse into 
destructive work practices (p. 19).  Nowhere is this better or more dramatically 
illustrated than in the collapse of John Romero's studio, Ion Storm, during the 
development of Daikatana.
In spring of 2000, as Daikatana was approaching the end of its troubled 
development, the online magazine Salon published an article by David Kushner, 
in which he describes the developers at the Dallas offices of Ion Storm:
Since Daikatana's inception, elite and obsessive gamers have road-
tripped from around the world to work with their hero, Romero. 
They've quit school, left relationships and literally built beds under 
their desks to live and breathe nearly every breath in the house 
Romero built. Their commitment to a self-described "death 
schedule" -- the final, endless rush to perfect their game -- isn't just 
some start-up novelty, it's a way of life. (Kushner, 2000a).
The epitome of the hardcore gamer, John Romero became a videogame 
developer because he loved playing games.  He had coined the term “death 
schedule” at his first full-time job as a game developer, working for Softdisk in 
1989 (Kushner, 2003, p. 39).  Over the course of the next decade, the death 
schedule, more commonly referred to as crunch time, would become a “way of 
life” not just for the Daikatana team at Ion Storm but for the videogame industry 
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as a whole (Deuze, Martin and Allen, 2007, p. 349; Hoffman, 2004; O'Donnell, 
2008, p. 13).  Destructive work practices such as this are tolerated, at least to a 
certain point, due to the perception of game developers that their work is different 
than other industries.  While these practices have a number of negative effects, 
one of these effects is that many potential developers are driven away from work 
within the videogame industry, leaving only those hardcore enough to pull up 
their roots and sleep under their desks.
Luke "Weasl" Whiteside is the newest level designer to join the 
Daikatana team and, in a way, the most enigmatic. Since he came 
to the company just a few months before my visit, Weasl managed 
to miss out on Ion Storm's tempestuous back story. He's still so 
awed to be working here that sometimes he doesn't leave. 
Underneath his desk there's a pillow. On some nights, he hunkers 
down below his computer, munches some M&M's and goes to 
sleep. For Romero, who dreamed of populating a company with 
gamers as intense as himself, Weasl is as hardcore as it gets.” 
(Kushner, 2000b).
While the members of the Daikatana team are certainly an extreme 
example of hardcore game developers, their situations are not unlike many other 
game developers who got into the industry because of their love of games; they 
endure the harsh working conditions because of their sense of awe or privilege at 
being game developers.  Although there is a certain logic to the relationship 
between player culture and developer culture, this link is essentially a feedback 
loop, reenforcing the status quo.  As videogames embody ideology on a 
fundamental, procedural level (Bogost, 2006b), the ideology of players becomes 
the ideology of the developers, which influences the production of games, which 
then instills itself more deeply within the players.
In addition to reenforcing destructive work practices, the cyclical nature of 
90
player and developer culture reproduces the prejudices that exist within it, 
including the misogynous attitudes that are frequently expressed by male players 
online.  Although these attitudes among developers can usually only be assumed 
by analyzing unfavorable portrayals of women in completed games, they can 
occasionally be exposed in less subtle ways.
Such a case occurred after the release of the game Dead Island on 
Steam.  Shortly after its release, a Steam user discovered an unused portion of 
code that referred to a skill for one of the female characters named “Feminist 
Whore” (T. John, 2011).  This code was not used in the final version of the game, 
although the skill to which it refers was most likely renamed as the “Gender 
Wars” skill, which remained in the finished product (Farr, 2011).  In any case, this 
choice of naming convention illustrates the attitudes and beliefs held by game 
developers that guide their decisions throughout the development process, thus 
reproducing these attitudes in a new generation of games and players. 
This system of feedback affects not only the nature of videogame culture, 
but also helps to determine who can participate in that culture.  Playing 
videogames serves not only as a catalyst for inspiring an interest in game 
development, but as a starting point for an interest in computer culture in general 
(Brunner, 2008, p. 41).  Thus, groups that are marginalized by videogame culture 
and less likely to take an interest in videogames are at a significant disadvantage 
within the videogame industry, as well as in many other technology-oriented 
fields.
Those from marginalized groups who are still able to “break in” to the 
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industry face additional resistance in a number of forms.  The videogame 
industry is noted for being a hostile environment for women (Jenkins & Cassell, 
2008, p. 13), who often must cope with the situation by making themselves “one 
of the boys” (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 52).  Racial, class and gender diversity is also 
extremely limited within the industry (p. 49), leading to the common assumption 
that videogames are a space created by White males for other White males 
(Leonard, 2003, p. 2; O'Donnell, 2008, p. 50).  Indeed, the “typical” videogame 
developer, based on a study conducted by the International Game Developers 
Association (IGDA), is a White male in his early thirties (Everett & Watkins, 2008, 
p. 160).  Additionally, the women who are employed by the videogame industry 
are primarily found in roles such as human resources or marketing, leaving the 
core development tasks such as programming, design and art as almost 
exclusively male professions (Deuze Martin & Allen, 2007, p. 346; Fullerton et al., 
2008, p. 164). This lack of diversity has a direct impact on industry-made games, 
as the developers both imbue these games with their own ideologies (Bogost, 
2006b) and tend to unconsciously view themselves as being representative of 
the end users of their product (S. John, 2006; Kerr, 2006, p. 97).  Thus, the “for 
White males by White males” view of videogames is not entirely inaccurate.
The Casual Other
Due to the male dominated discourse that permeates videogame culture, it 
is easy to make the assumption that videogame culture is made up almost 
exclusively of young White males.  According to the ESA, however, this is far 
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from the truth.  According to its published figures for 2010, over 40% of those 
who play videogames are female, with videogame purchasers being 48% female 
(ESA, 2011).  Between the ages of 24 and 35, some studies have shown that 
women actually outnumber men two-to-one (Fullerton et al., 2008, p. 163).  Over 
a quarter of all players are over the age of 50 (ESA, 2011).  Additionally, studies 
on race and media consumption suggest that Black and Latino youth are likely to 
spend more time playing console videogames than their White counterparts 
(Roberts & Foehr, 2004, p. 128).  In essence, every aspect of the “young, White 
male” gamer stereotype is far from representative of the gamer community as a 
whole.  Players who fit all three attributes would be an even smaller subset.  If we 
were to expand our view beyond North America to look at videogame culture on 
a global scale, this group would likely become a very small minority.  If there is 
really this much diversity among players, why is this not reflected in videogame 
discourse?
In the realm of videogame discourse, the term hardcore is used to set the 
boundaries of legitimate gaming (Kubik, 2010, p. 57).  Those who are hardcore 
gamers are viewed as legitimate authorities on gamer culture, while those who 
are identified as being not hardcore are instantly dismissed as being, at best, 
ignorant.  This process is what Göran Therborn refers to as “excommunication,” 
in which those who go against the hegemonic groups are “excluded from further 
meaningful discourse as being insane, depraved, traitorous, alien, and so on” 
(Therborn, 1980, pp. 82-83).  Indeed, although much hardcore videogame 
discourse can be considered hyperbolic in nature, it often consists of aggressive 
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ad hominem attacks and inflammatory accusations, condemning nonhardcore 
players as malignant threats that need to be dealt with (Kubik, 2010, p. 72).
Also significant to videogame discourse is the term “casual gamer.”  The 
term, which originally was meant to refer to the growing demographic of 
nontraditional players who played games that required a lower time investment, 
was quickly appropriated by the existing hegemonic group to simply mean the 
opposite of hardcore (Juul, 2010a, p. 8; Kubik, 2010, pp. 58-59).  As the term 
“casual” made the transformation from a marketing demographic to a rhetorical 
device, it was gendered as female (Juul, 2010a, p. 28; Kubik, 2010, p. 59).  It 
also became associated with a lack of knowledge about games and game 
conventions, a dislike of difficulty in games, a small amount of time spent actually 
playing games (Juul, 2010a, p. 29), and a smaller financial investment in 
purchasing new games (Kubik, 2010, pp. 56-57).  In practice, these distinctions 
were not so much a definition of what casual was as they were a negative 
definition, defining what hardcore was not.  For the ideology of the hardcore 
gamer, the casual gamer became the alter ideology, the way in which members 
of the community were meant to view the Other (McKerrow, 1989, p. 95).
While acknowledging the fact that large numbers of videogame players 
and potential players are currently being marginalized by the dominant ideology 
of the industry, it is important not to essentialize these groups.  For example, 
although gender is a factor in media consumption and videogame culture (as well 
as cyberculture in general) is typically gendered as male, this often leads to the 
assumption by scholars that there is an essential difference in the ways that men 
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and women play games (Shaw, 2010, pp. 408-409).  This ignores the fluid nature 
of individual game preferences and playing styles, as well as the often ill-defined 
boundaries of these groups.  Many women identify as hardcore gamers (Kubik, 
2010, p. 90), while many men do not.  Additionally, many gamers who at one 
point in time identified as hardcore may change their gaming preferences due to 
changing circumstances in their lives or simply by discovering new games 
outside their previous areas of interest (Juul, 2010b, pp. 51-52).  Even broad 
statements about women who do not identify as hardcore gamers can be 
problematic, as game preferences within this group can be very broad and are 
not necessarily feminine (Kerr, 2003).
The Limits of Hardcore Discourse
The complexity of gamer play styles and preferences makes any attempt 
to map these qualities onto specific races, genders or sexual orientations 
extremely problematic.  Indeed, when such claims are made by hegemonic 
groups within videogame culture, we begin to see the limits of the hegemonic 
hardcore discourse.  These limits can be seen when comparing the discourse 
concerning casual gamers to the way in which self-identified casual gamers 
describe themselves.
In his book, A Casual Revolution (2010a), Jesper Juul examines the 
common portrayals of casual gamers and how these images compare to the 
actual players who are identified as such.  The stereotype suggests that casual 
gamers have little game knowledge (and thus need more explicit instructions and 
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simplified interfaces), are not willing to make large time investments, and prefer 
low difficulty in their games (p. 29).  Upon interviewing self-identified casual 
gamers, however, Juul found that all three of these descriptions were misleading, 
if not completely false.  In general, casual gamers do have considerable 
knowledge about games, even if only about the games that they play (though the 
same qualification could be applied to many hardcore gamers).  They do invest 
large amounts of time playing games and tend to enjoy difficulty, often preferring 
a game to be too difficult rather than too easy (p. 50).
Of the gamers interviewed by Juul, those whose play style most fit the 
stereotype of the casual gamer were those hardcore gamers who had shifted to 
more casual play.  These players still had a high level of videogame knowledge, 
but usually preferred easier and less time consuming games, often due to time 
constraints placed upon them in their personal lives (Juul, 2010a, p. 52). 
Although their play style more closely resembles the casual gamer stereotype, 
the fact that these are exhardcore players suggests that the majority are still 
young White males.  Thus, even this group challenges the way in which casual 
gamers are articulated as the alter ideology for hardcore gamers. 
The hardcore gamer discourse also begins to break down when it deals 
with game developers.  Discourse within the industry tends to emphasize how 
game work is different from other forms of work.  By classifying the entire 
industry as a space of exception, new forms of exploitation can be introduced 
into situations in which they would not normally be tolerated (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 
13).
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While this discourse of videogame exceptionalism is meant to inspire pride 
in developers and remind them of the privilege that they have been granted to be 
part of the industry, it also brings with it the seeds of its own counter-discourse. 
Indeed, when not framed by the assumption that the videogame industry is 
fundamentally different from other forms of work, many narratives of videogame 
development cease to be examples of dedication, playfulness and achievement, 
becoming, instead, tales of abuse, excess and adversity.
In the infamous Scratchware Manifesto, a developer known as “Designer 
J1” uses several segments from David Kushner's Salon article on the Daikatana 
team to illustrate the terrible working conditions that exist in the industry.  Among 
other things, Designer J1 critiques the construction of Luke "Weasl" Whiteside as 
the epitome of the hardcore programmer:
Sounds like poor Weasl is suffering from a case of vampiric 
possession. Concentration camp victims identified with their 
oppressors, too. Not to say that the much (and probably accurately) 
maligned Ion Storm is the only company where this happens -- no, 
not at all. It's all over. Doesn't that make you feel better about the 
games you buy? It's a good thing that CDs don't carry bloodstains 
well. (Designer X, et al., 2000)
In this discourse, studio heads are no longer heroes being worshiped, but 
oppressors, controlling their subordinates through deception and force.  The 
description of Weasl and others sleeping under their desks and surviving off 
candy becomes a somber example of employee mistreatment, rather than a 
quirky story about the adventures of working with videogames.
By distancing game work from the traditional workplace, the industry is 
able to sidestep many of the rights that workers would normally expect to be 
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granted by their employers.  This distancing, however, means that when the 
mystique of the industry is pushed aside, it becomes apparent how far the 
industry has strayed.  This allows the discourse being articulated by the industry 
to be appropriated by marginalized groups and reframed as counter-hegemonic 
discourse. 
Unlike the case of Senator Lieberman's hearings, many of these 
antagonisms have become sites of resistance.  Perhaps the most apparent of 
these is the turn toward casual games that has occurred in the last decade.  In 
many ways, this shift has had the broadest reach of any of these counter-
hegemonic forces, yet is also perhaps the least revolutionary.  This is largely due 
to the fact that the growth of casual games has been economically driven as 
entities within the videogame industry have realized the potential market for 
casual games (Juul, 2010a, p. 7).  Although the involvement of many influential 
agents within the industry, such as Nintendo, has allowed videogame discourse 
to be dramatically rearticulated in many ways, it has also rearticulated it in a way 
that continues to reinforce the interests of the hegemonic powers.  While the turn 
toward casual games has begun to broaden the types of games that are being 
produced, thereby serving many groups that are typically marginalized, it has 
done little to change the existing structure of the videogame industry.  Rather 
than solving the problems that exist within the industry, casual games simply 
reproduce them in a new form.  The sense of disappointment in the current state 
of casual games is expressed by game designer Eric Zimmerman:
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There was an idea that downloadable games could be a 
renaissance for innovation...But in fact, the downloadable casual 
games industry has evolved into something more clone-driven and 
genre-bound than the so-called hardcore game industry that it 
sought to make an end-run around.  So, the downloadable casual 
games industry has become a parody of itself.  (quoted in Juul, 
2010a, p. 101)
Just as the hardcore production model has been reproduced in the growing 
category of casual games, so too have many of the problems that come along 
with it.  Even the fact that these games are labeled as casual automatically 
devalues both the game and the player (Kubik, 2010, p. 73).  Although the move 
toward casual games has allowed more people to participate with videogame 
culture, they do so as second-class citizens.
While I do not believe casual games to be the cure-all for the videogame 
industry's problems, I do not wish to undervalue the contributions made by casual 
games.  Indeed, the success of the Nintendo Wii, which was arguably designed 
around the idea of casual gaming (Kubik, 2010, p. 69), destabilizes videogame 
discourse by challenging many of the fundamental assumptions about who plays 
games, what aspects of games are valued by players and what constitutes a 
profitable game.
A second form of resistance can be seen in the popularity of videogame 
modding.  Modding, which gained popularity in the 1990s, largely due to the 
support of developers like Id Software, lowers the barrier of entry for game 
development, allowing those who would not normally be able to create a game to 
do so (Sief El-Nasr & Smith, 2006).  This allows groups that have been 
marginalized by the industry to create content for themselves.  One of the best 
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examples of this can be seen in the “FinnWars” mod for the game Battlefield  
1942, a first person shooter set in World War II (Postigo, 2007, p. 309). 
“FinnWars” places the game in the middle of the Finnish Wars, a series of wars in 
which Finland fought against both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in order to 
maintain its independence (ModDB, 2006).  Though culturally significant to the 
Finnish people, the relative obscurity of these wars outside of Finland makes 
such a game an unlikely choice for a large development studio.  The “FinnWars” 
mod thus became a way to provide content to a group that could otherwise have 
gone underserved.
Although modding opens up opportunities for new content and new forms 
of empowerment for players, it also creates new forms of exploitation (Postigo, 
2003, p. 597).  Modders create massive amounts of free content for commercial 
games, yet receive no compensation for their work, despite extending the lifetime 
of the games they mod and driving the sale of more copies of these games, 
thereby generating a considerable value for the industry (Postigo, 2007, p. 302). 
Modders are also limited in their creative expression by the constraints placed 
upon them by the game engine that they choose to mod (See Figure 3.1).  While 
some engines give the modders more control than others, any mod is, by 
definition, a derivative work.  Thus, mods are imbued with much of the same 
procedural rhetoric as the games they are based upon, limiting the degree to 
which they can be seen as sites of resistance.
The form of resistance with which this paper is most concerned is the 
growing independent games movement.  This movement shares many 
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similarities with both the industry's shift toward casual games and the mod scene. 
Indeed, there is a certain amount of overlap between the three.  Many of the 
most influential casual game developers, such as PopCap, began as 
independent developers (Donovan, 2010, pp. 360-361).  Modding has also 
served as a point of entry for aspiring independent developers.  Groups of 
modders have even gone on to form their own independent studios, as was the 
case of the “FinnWars” mod team, which formed Iceflake Studios in order to 
create a commercial sequel to their mod (Iceflake Studios, 2010).
The key difference between the independent games movement and the 
other two forms of resistance I have mentioned is its relationship with the 
videogame industry.  Independent games are not limited to derivative works, nor 
Figure 3.1: Development tools like Valve's Hammer Editor allow modders  
access to many of the same tools that developers used in creating the original  
game.
101
are independent developers bound by the same corporate structures as other 
developers.  Through various websites, forums, and other organizations, 
independent developers have created their own subculture within the larger 
videogame culture.  Of course, this culture is not insulated from the videogame 
industry, nor from hardcore gamer culture.  Its relationship to these, however, 
allows it to become a site of resistance to the hardcore gamer ideology.  In the 
following chapter, I argue that this resistance is achieved in the form of a 
technology-oriented social movement.
CHAPTER 4
THE INDIE GAME MOVEMENT
As the number of independent game developers increased in the late 
1990s, organizations began to arise to showcase this new talent.  Just as 
independent films have the Sundance film festival, independent videogames 
have the Independent Games Festival and IndieCade.  In describing the mission 
of the festival, the IndieCade website says the following:
The decline of innovation in the game industry, combined with the 
rapid growth of what can appropriately be called the “independent 
game movement” creates not only the opportunity but the demand 
for a public event that showcases the best work of international 
independent game developers, artists, modders, and alternative 
creators. In spite of high demand, E3 has traditionally not admitted 
non-game-industry attendees; the Game Developer's Conference is 
equally off limits to the general public. Yet the success of such 
products as Whyville and Food Force would indicate that the 
general public is interested in being exposed to new games 
produced outside the mainstream game publishing infrastructure. 
(Indiecade, n.d.)
On videogame blogs, online forums, and on the official websites of organizations 
like IndieCade, there are references to independent game developers, artists and 
modders being not just part of a niche market or hobbyist subculture, but part of 
a social movement (see Indiegames, 2010; Jenkins, 2006). This discourse begs 
the question:  Does the rising popularity of independent games constitute a social 
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movement?
When looked at through the lens of traditional social movements, this 
claim seems dramatically overstated.  There are no rallies held to protest the lack 
of innovation in the videogame industry, nor does anyone boycott new games 
because of the industry's inaccessibility.  Indie developers do not organize 
themselves into mass political parties in order to realize their agenda.  The indie 
games movement does not even have traditional political reform as its underlying 
goal.  How then could something like this be a social movement?
Although the independent games movement does not meet the traditional 
criteria of a social movement, it does fit into the category of a product- or 
technology-oriented social movement (TPM).  Rather than having large-scale 
political change as its goal, this form of social movement has as its goal a 
change in the way that products or technologies are used by creating alternatives 
to their common or popular forms.
Independent Games as a Technology-Oriented Movement
David Hess (2005) has suggested that there are three processes or 
stages that are particularly pronounced in TPMs:  Private-sector symbiosis, 
incorporation and transformation, and object conflicts.  Private-sector symbiosis 
is the process by which the goals of a social movement and those of inventors 
and entrepreneurs are brought to coincide, creating a cooperative relationship 
between the two groups.  Incorporation and transformation occurs when the 
existing industry begins to adopt these innovations and transform them to fit with 
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their own technologies and interests.  The final stage, object conflicts, refers to 
the conflicts between actors that arise out of these design transformations (p. 
516).
Private-sector symbiosis can be seen as a driving force not only for the 
independent games movement, but for many of the early innovators in the field of 
videogames.  As the early days of videogames were dominated primarily by 
independent developers, this parallel is not surprising.  The primary source of 
motivation during this early period was the hacker movement, as part of the 
broader countercultural movement of the 1960s.  The hacker imperative to bring 
computers to the masses drove early experiments such as the People's 
Computing Company, the Homebrew Computer Club and even Atari.  These 
organizations would later prove essential in the rise of the videogame industry.
The hacker movement would continue to be a source of motivation long 
after the industry had become established.  The hacker ethic of information 
sharing would go on to influence the rise of shareware as a distribution model, 
especially among game developers.  The most influential of these, John 
Carmack, John Romero, and the other Id developers, would further articulate 
their goals with hacker discourse by incorporating modding tools into their 
games.  This would go on to make modding a significant component of the 
independent game movement.
As modding became incorporated into the mainstream industry, following 
the success of Doom, a complex system of legal rights and restrictions would 
grow up to regulate it.  Whereas modding before Doom was generally not 
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sanctioned by the original game's creators and thus remained, like many hacking 
practices, in an area of ambiguous legality, games that supported modding 
required licensing agreements in order to protect developers from potential legal 
action.  Even the defiant developers at Id were grudgingly forced to place some 
basic restrictions upon their overzealous modding community (Kushner, 2003, p. 
169).  Thus, the process of incorporation is inseparable from that of 
transformation (Hess, 2005, p. 523).
The end-user license agreements (EULA) associated with modding tools 
would eventually become sites of object conflict as modders found themselves 
confronted with intellectual property law.  Early unsanctioned modding frequently 
involved the remixing of IP, such as Castle Smurfenstein, a parody of the Smurfs 
created by modifying the popular Apple II game Castle Wolfenstein (Nevins, 
1999), which would later be the inspiration for Id's Wolfenstein 3D.  This tradition 
of IP remixing continued with the creation of the Barney mod for Wolfenstein 3D 
(Kushner, 2003, pp. 115-116) and Doom mods featuring characters from Star 
Wars (pp. 165-166) and Aliens (p. 193).
While many of these mods would proceed unhindered, others would be 
shut down by developers.  Mods such as “Duke it out in Quake,” a mod of Quake 
3 that incorporated elements of Apogee's Duke Nukem franchise, and the “GI 
Joe” mod for Battlefield 1942 were halted due to copyright issues (Nieborg, 2005; 
Postigo, 2008, p. 61).  Although these mods, like much fan-generated content, 
were noncommercial in nature and may not have been subject to copyright 
litigation, the move to shut them down was made by the developers, based on 
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the restrictions laid out in the EULA, rather than through any actual legal action. 
Thus, these groups of modders were prohibited from using mod technology in the 
way it had historically been used and were left with few means of recourse.
The independent games movement has clashed with established 
companies on other issues in addition to modding.  One such issue is digital 
distribution.  Distribution channels are vital for independent developers as it is 
their ability to avoid the costly and tightly controlled mainstream publishing 
process that allows them to remain independent.  Throughout the history of 
videogames, independent games have been distributed through a variety of 
digital means, such as bulletin board systems (BBS), university networks and 
eventually services such as Valve's Steam.  The growth of the Internet in the 
1990s was accompanied by a growth in the number of independent game 
developers.  This growth, however, was mostly limited to PC games, as 
proprietary devices, such as consoles, were kept under lock and key by legal 
structures and technological barriers, such as the 10NES chip.
As small, downloadable games became more popular and more profitable, 
industry players like Microsoft and Sony began developing methods of delivering 
this content to their own devices.  In 2005, Microsoft unveiled Xbox Live Arcade, 
a digital store and downloading service that allowed players to download games 
using Microsoft's latest console, the Xbox 360.  Both Nintendo and Sony would 
follow with their own services the next year (Donovan, 2010, p. 365).  Soon, 
other hardware manufacturers like Apple and BlackBerry would create similar 
services for their own devices, creating even more channels through which 
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independent developers could sell their games without incurring heavy 
manufacturing and publishing costs.
As with other examples of incorporation, the adoption of digital distribution 
by hardware manufacturers dramatically transformed it.  Whereas BBS and other 
systems were free and unregulated, these new services were tightly controlled 
with licensing agreements and had lengthy review processes that games and 
other programs had to pass through in order to be listed.  Apple in particular 
became notorious for their restrictive and seemingly arbitrary App Store review 
process, which often rejected submissions without explaining the decision to the 
developers (Raphael, 2009).
Not surprisingly, these policies quickly became sites of object conflicts. 
One highly visible example occurred with the game Phone Story, released in the 
Apple App Store in September of 2011.  Phone Story, a game created by the 
independent development team Molleindustria, was created as a satire of Apple's 
own corporate practices.  The game tasked the player with such jobs as 
overseeing the mines that produced the raw materials for creating iPhones and 
catching suicidal factory workers as they hurled themselves off the roof of a 
manufacturing plant that supplies Apple.  Although the game managed to pass 
Apple's review process, it was removed from the store several days later for 
violating App Store policy (Brown, 2011).
Object conflicts have also arisen around issues much broader than the 
censorship of a single game.  When Amazon launched their own app store to sell 
programs for Google's Android operating system, their distribution terms gave the 
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company broad control over the pricing of individual apps and games.  These 
rules discouraged developers from offering discounts in competing app stores, 
yet allowed Amazon to discount the price of the app in its own store, even if it 
was selling well.  While these terms had the potential to help Amazon draw 
consumers away from competing stores, they seriously jeopardized the profits of 
the developers.  This prompted the IGDA Board of Directors to issue warning to 
developers, urging them not to use the new app store (IGDA Board of Directors, 
2011).
Thus, with regard to digital distribution, object conflicts occur in at least 
three different forms.  First, developers must choose which platforms to target 
with their games, which often forces them to censor themselves in order to better 
meet the guidelines of that system.  Second, object conflicts occur at the point of 
consumption, when consumers have the option to purchase the same game on a 
number of different platforms.  Finally, object conflicts can occur when the 
corporate owners of these distribution channels choose to use the broad powers 
given them through their own policies to ban, restrict, or otherwise interfere with 
the ability of developers to use these channels.  
Independent Games as Resistance to Hegemonic Discourse
As the independent games movement can be seen as a TPM, offering 
alternative games to those being produced by the mainstream videogame 
industry, these games become part of the process of disarticulation and 
rearticulation of videogame discourse.  The games that are most effective at 
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doing so are those that deal most directly with the various antagonisms that exist 
in that discourse.  In this case, the struggles that result in disarticulation are 
those in which consumers are faced with both accepted mainstream products 
and the alternative products offered by the TPM.  This provides the opportunity to 
question the ideology behind the existing products, challenging hegemonic 
discourse.
One of the most common motivations of indie developers is, as was 
mentioned in the quote from IndieCade, to address the lack of innovation within 
the videogame industry.  Developers do this to differing degrees, with some 
making incremental changes to accepted design conventions and others creating 
games that lie far beyond the industry's view of what is acceptable.  This is often 
done by drawing a connection between the views and goals of the developers 
and videogame culture as it was before the consolidation of the major videogame 
industry, when most developers were independent.
One group of developers who took this route was Introversion Software. 
Founded in 2001, Introversion's goal was to revive the eccentric culture of the 
early UK videogame industry that thrived during the time of the ZX Spectrum 
(Donovan, 2010, p. 364).  That year, as major videogame publishers were 
releasing big budget titles such as Diablo II and Grand Theft Auto III, the three-
man studio released Uplink, a game that simulated computer hacking.  Instead of 
3D graphics and expansive virtual worlds, Uplink featured simple text boxes, 
icons and progress bars with a monochromatic blue style.  Though the game was 
virtually unknown among mainstream audiences, reviewers praised its 
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minimalistic graphics as well as its unconventional gameplay, calling it “perverse 
and brilliant” (Gillen, 2002, p. 85).
Introversion's most successful game, DEFCON, would be even more 
provocative.  Inspired by the movie WarGames, the game put the player in the 
role of a military commander waging a nuclear war.  According to Mark Morris, 
one of the game's developers, it was a game that would not have been able to 
pass industry gatekeepers:
I don't think DEFCON would ever have got commissioned by a 
publisher.  Never in a million years.  Publishers always want to be 
mass market, they look at things and ask what is going to be the 
turn off in this game.  How many people are we going to offend by 
calling it a genocide 'em up?  Why would you want to play a game 
that's miserable?  My response is look at all the melancholy albums 
that are out there and sell in massive numbers.  How many weepy 
films?  There's absolutely no reason why games can't evoke that 
same kind of slightly depressed, contemplative emotional state in 
the player that other mediums do.  (quoted in Donovan, 2010 p. 
367)
By self-publishing DEFCON, Introversion was able to create a game that was not 
only unconventional, but also overtly political.  
A second antagonism to videogame discourse is the marginalization of 
players through gendered hardcore-casual dichotomy.  Although the female 
demographic has grown substantially, this has not translated into cultural power 
for women (Kubik, 2010, p. 131).  When women are portrayed in videogames, it 
is often in a highly sexualized manner (Taylor, 2006, p. 118).  Even strong female 
protagonists, like Tomb Raider's Lara Croft, are designed with the male gaze in 
mind (Schleiner, 2001, p. 222;  see also Kennedy, 2002;  Peck, Ketchum & 
Embrick, 2011, pp. 216-217).
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As a counter example to these mainstream depictions of women, I point to 
the game Aquaria (Figure 4.1), a collaboration between indie developers Alec 
Holowka and Derek Yu (who formed the company Bit Blot in order to create this 
one game).  Although by no means as popular as Tomb Raider in terms of overall 
sales, Aquaria is one of the most well-known games in the independent scene 
and was awarded the Seumas McNally Grand Prize at the Independent Games 
Festival in 2007 (IGF, 2011).  The gameplay of Aquaria focuses on exploration, 
similar to other action-adventure titles such as Metroid and Zelda.  The game's 
main character, an aquatic creature named Naija, finds herself alone in a vast 
ocean, full of life yet devoid of companionship.  The game's narrative focuses on 
Figure 4.1: Screenshot of Aquaria. Taken by the author.  (Bit Blot, 2007)
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Naija's search for others like herself.  As the game has almost no words other 
than Naija's occasional monologue, the story is told through the world of Aquaria 
itself, making the game one continuous “narrative environment” or “navigable 
narrative” (Fullerton, Moire & Pearce, 2007).
Although there is combat in Aquaria, it is significantly downplayed as a 
secondary skill, which is not even available at the beginning of the game when 
Naija is in her normal form.  Her two primary skills, which are used to overcome 
the majority of the game's obstacles, are singing and cooking.  Singing allows 
Naija to open doors, move heavy objects, transform into an offensive or 
defensive form, and interact with the environment.  Combat is both a means of 
protecting yourself from dangerous creatures and a way of collecting ingredients 
with which to cook.  Recipes are learned both by finding new dishes and by 
simply experimenting in the kitchen (Bit-Blot, 2007).  Through this cross-
pollination of the domestic and wild, the mundane and the fantastic, traditional 
action-adventure conventions are not replaced, but rather reframed to more 
closely resemble traditional girls' stories in which play and adventure are situated 
within domestic spaces (Fullerton et al., 2007; Jenkins, 1998, pp. 280-281).
The Border House, a blog that focuses on issues of race, gender and 
sexuality in videogames, offers a feminist reading of Aquaria.  The author notes a 
number of differences between Aquaria and other games, notably that the main 
character did not seem to be over sexualized or designed for the male gaze.  The 
author also expressed a greater deal of identification with the main character 
than in mainstream games, comparing the central narrative and the element of 
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exploration to the experience of discovering feminism and piecing together an 
understanding of social dynamics, power and oppression (Blake, 2011).
While some games, like Aquaria, attempt to leave behind the common 
androcentric elements present in mainstream games, others take a more active 
approach, dealing with issues of gender and sexuality as central themes.  One of 
the most well-known indie developers to deal with these issues is Anna Anthropy, 
who publishes her games under the title of Auntie Pixelante.  Known for titles 
such as Calamity Annie, REDDER and Lesbian Spider-Queens of Mars, many of 
her games deal with BDSM (which encompasses bondage and discipline, 
dominance and submission, sadism and masochism, and similar practices), 
homosexuality and transgender issues.
Perhaps her most interesting treatment of sexuality, as well as one of her 
most critically acclaimed games, is Mighty Jill Off (Figure 4.2).  This game 
explores the relationship between the protagonist, Jill, and her “Queen.”  The 
player begins by being cast out of the Queen's chamber at the top of her tower to 
the dungeons beneath it (Aunte Pixelante, 2008).  The basic premise of the 
game is a variation on the standard “save the princess” game.  Just as in Super 
Mario Bros, the game is won by getting the hero to the Princess (Queen) at the 
end of the castle.  In Mighty Jill Off, however, the Queen is not a passive 
character being kept against her will.  Rather, it is her will that compels the hero, 
Jill, to embark on the quest in the first place.
The game itself is a relatively difficult platform game, based loosely off the 
arcade game Bomb Jack.  Playing the game requiring precise jumps to avoid the 
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numerous traps scattered throughout the tower.  Although a skilled player could 
complete the game in under fifteen minutes, new players will most often die 
frequently, repeating certain rooms over and over again as they perfect their 
timing and reflexes.  Upon reaching the top of the tower, Jill is greeted by her 
Queen, who promptly tosses her back out to do the same task again.  With a final 
wink to the audience, Jill lets the player know that all the trials of the game were 
merely a part of her role as the submissive member of their relationship.
What makes the narrative of Mighty Jill Off so successful as a narrative is 
that it does not simply rely on the textual, or even the visual to do the storytelling, 
but rather takes advantage of the procedural.  The BDSM themes of the game 
are not simply communicated to the player through its framing fiction, but through 
the very mechanics and logic of the game.  By struggling through the various 
Figure 4.2: Screenshot of Mighty Jill Off. Taken by the author. (Aunte Pixelante,  
2008)
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obstacles and challenges that the game presents us with, we, as players, enact 
the experience of a submissive “bottom” role as the traditional Mario-Princess 
relationship is reframed not as one between hero and damsel, but between 
submissive and dominant.  Thus, Mighty Jill Off is not about showing BDSM 
culture, it is about performing BDSM culture.
This performative aspect of the game is both fitting, as role play is often 
considered an important aspect of BDSM practice (Bardzell & Bardzell, 2006), 
and necessary for the subject matter.  Examples of BDSM in mainstream media, 
including videogames, have been criticized for being merely representational, 
commodifying the BDSM aesthetic without dealing with it in meaningful ways 
(Bardzell & Bardzell, 2006; Weiss, 2006, p. 121).  Mighty Jill Off does the exact 
opposite, eschewing the standard depictions of kinky sex (the game does not 
actually include any sexually explicit images) in favor of exploring other aspects 
of the relationship.  Also, as this relationship is expressed as much through the 
player's effort and frustration as it is through that of the player character, there is 
a certain physicality to the experience that other media fail to achieve.
Contrasting Organizational Structures
While the goal TPMs is to create alternative technologies and products to 
fulfill the same needs as those being created by existing institutions, they tend to 
have organizational structures that differ dramatically from those institutions. 
Although they can take the form of unified organizations, such as the Danish 
Organization for Renewable Energy (Hess, 2005, p. 526) they are more often 
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loose collectives of smaller organizations, such as the open source software 
movement (p. 528).  If we look at TPMs as a subset of traditional social 
movements, this tendency toward less rigid structure fits the conceptualization of 
social movements as "an uninstitutionalized collectivity" (Stewart, Smith & 
Denton, 1994, p. 5).
The organizational structure of the independent games movement leans 
heavily toward the “open” end of the spectrum.  Although there are certain 
overarching organizations, such as IndieCade and the Independent Games 
Festival, that tie much of the community together, it remains a community made 
up of many different studios, teams and collaborations.  These vary in size and 
composition from large, influential companies, like Id Software, to small, often 
temporary teams, like Bit Blot, to individual developers, like Locomalito.  As these 
loose, malleable structures contrast sharply with the huge and increasingly 
hierarchical structures of the mainstream industry, they also provide solutions to 
many of the problems inherent in the industry.
O'Donnell (2008) notes a number of cultural patterns that exist in the 
videogame industry which undermine the creative collaboration of developers. 
The roots of these problems, he argues, are “in the industry's emphasis on 
secrecy, closed networks of access, and the use of the State to discipline those 
networks” (p. 5).  Although these aspects of the industry became most 
pronounced during the late 1990s when it transitioning into its present 
oligopolistic state, many of them originated in earlier periods of corporate growth, 
such as the rise of Atari or Nintendo's entry into the home console market.
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As I have previously mentioned, secrecy is a part of almost everything in 
the videogame industry.  The number of patents, copyrights, nondisclosure 
agreements and other contracts is such that industry workers often have the 
fallback position of assuming that everything is secret (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 62). 
One of the effects of this policy is that developers have very little work-related 
communication with other developers outside their company, even when working 
on the same project.  Advice that developers do share with one another is often 
discounted, as each development studio assumes itself to be so unique that such 
advice would not apply.  The result is that teams often repeat the mistakes of 
others, only realizing this fact in retrospect (pp. 234-235).
This pervasive level of secrecy also helps keep the networks within the 
industry closed, keeping others out.  This can be seen in the difficulty that 
aspiring game developers encounter when trying to become part of the industry. 
The secrecy of those within the network prevents sufficient information from 
reaching those who want to join (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 235).  Additionally, as these 
networks continue to shrink through corporate consolidation, risk and labor 
continue to be shifted onto those on the fringes of these networks.  Rather than 
promoting creative collaboration between different members of the network, 
these constraints serve primarily to “shore up existing sites of power and control” 
(p. 293).  Thus, barriers to entry remain high, and many of those within the 
industry are prevented from fully participating.
Maintaining these closed networks requires a significant amount of 
discipline.  While they can be, and to a certain extent are, disciplined through 
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technological means, the videogame industry has turned instead to the power of 
the State and its ability to wield violence to control and maintain these networks 
(O'Donnell, 2008, p. 294).  Thus, even if someone is able to hack the 
technological barriers of the videogame industry, such as lockout chips and other 
security measures, they are then faced with the power of the State, in the form of 
copyright and patent law.  This combination of technology and legislation 
effectively dictates who can and who cannot make games.
To say that independent developers are immune from these elements 
would deny the complex relationship that independent developers have in 
relationship to the industry, as well as apply a false sense of homogeneity upon 
the independent game community.  Attitudes toward the industry among 
independents range from the more revolutionary discourse of scratchware 
developers (Anthropy, 2009; Designer X, et al., 2000) to developers who make 
games independently only to break into the industry (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 55). 
Although independent development teams may embrace or reject industry 
practices and values to varying degrees, I argue that the independent developer 
community offers models of alternative organizational structures that are capable 
of overcoming many of the problems that contemporary videogame development 
faces.
While the culture of the videogame industry is characterized by secrecy, 
the independent development community is notable for its culture of openness. 
Indie developers congregate on online forums, such as The Independent Game 
Source (www.tigsource.com),  the Super Friendship Club 
119
(www.superfriendshipclub.com), The Bit Collective (bitcollective.ca), and many 
others.  Each of these sites was created by independent developers and is open 
to the public.  Developers routinely post tutorials, coding questions, and project 
logs.  The very things that most development studios are most reluctant to share 
become the cultural capital of the indie games community.
Perhaps the greatest contributions to the independent developer 
community have been from developers who have created entire game engines 
and then released them as open source projects.  Examples include the Flixel 
engine, which was used to create the popular Flash game Canabalt, and the 
Monocle Engine (see Figure 4.3), which was started by Alec Holowka, the 
programmer behind Aquaria.  Once again, this points to the considerable overlap 
that exists between the independent games movement and the open source 
software movement.
Figure 4.3: GitHub network graph showing development on the Monocle Engine.  
Colored lines show the different developers involved and different branches of  
the project.
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closed networks and high barriers to entry, the openness among independent 
developers fosters a system with very low barriers to entry.  A great deal of forum 
contributors confess to having little or no experience in game development and 
many developers on the forums self-report as being teenagers.  Indeed, many 
forum topics, such as tutorials, are designed specifically for the benefit of those 
who are outside the existing support networks.
Although the independent community draws in a large number of new 
people to the field of videogame development, it is also drawing an increasing 
number of professional developers away from established studios.  Indeed, many 
of the most successful independent developers became independent after 
working in the industry for years (Kohler, 2010).  Such was the case with Kyle 
Gabler and Ron Carmel, the developers of World of Goo.  Both were working for 
Electronic Arts, where they felt constrained by the conservative corporate culture. 
After calculating how long they could live off their savings, the pair quit their jobs 
and formed their own studio, 2D Boy (Donovan, 2010, pp. 357-359).  World of  
Goo would become their first game, and would go on to win numerous awards 
and become one of the the best selling independent games of the decade (p. 
366).
Many other industry veterans have found themselves in a similar situation 
to that of Gabler and Carmel.  According to a survey published on Gamasutra, 
creative freedom is the primary reason that developers want to leave the industry 
and become independent (Fedor, 2011).  Another common motivation for leaving 
the industry is the acquisition of a small studio by a larger one.  Although these 
Just as the culture of secrecy within the videogame industry leads to 
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buyouts occasionally preserve the culture of the original studio, they more often 
mean the assimilation of the developers into the corporate culture of the larger 
one (Kuchera, 2011).  As such acquisitions have become standard industry 
practice (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 170), the exodus of veteran developers is unlikely to 
slow in the foreseeable future.
This constant influx of industry talent suggests a corollary to O'Donnell's 
concept of “breaking in” to the industry.  Just as breaking in has become a 
significant cultural aspect due to the closed networks of the mainstream industry, 
“breaking out” may become another standard element of the game developer 
narrative.  This, of course, has significant implications for independent game 
development, as it means a greater influx of mainstream processes and 
attitudes.  As Sean Murray, one of the founders of Hello Games notes:
You get into this mentality that it takes 50 people to do anything. 
When people say, ‘Should I work in the industry first?,’ I say they 
should. But if you want to do your own thing, you need to keep that 
alive, because it can become very hard to break away. (Kohler, 
2010).
This movement between mainstream and independent development could 
perhaps be seen as a form of incorporation and transformation, albeit in the 
opposite direction.  In this case, rather than the established industry incorporating 
aspects of the TPM into its own existing practices, we see the indie games 
movement incorporating aspects of the existing industry that developers bring 
with them as they leave.
The differences in structure between the independent games movement 
and the mainstream industry also mean that independent developers have a 
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different relationship to the State.  Unlike huge corporations such as Nintendo, 
most small studios lack the resources to leverage the power of the State. 
Although they can apply for the same patents and copyrights that larger 
corporations can, these documents mean little without the ability to fight for them 
in the courts.
One notable exception to this rule is Mojang, the small Swedish 
development studio founded by Markus “Notch” Persson, the creator of 
Minecraft.  In August, 2011, Mojang was sued by the ZeniMax Media, the 
publishers of the Elder Scrolls series over the title of their upcoming game, 
Scrolls (Webster, 2011a).  Due to the massive success of Minecraft, the nine-
man studio was able to hire lawyers in order to fight the case and managed to 
prevent an interim injunction against them (Knapp, 2011).  In typical indie disdain 
for secrecy, Notch has been very public about the entire process, even going so 
far as to post the legal documents served by the ZeniMax lawyers on his blog 
(Persson, 2011b).  Many other independent developers have criticized the 
lawsuit through Twitter, blog posts, and, quite appropriately, a satirical game, 
entitled The Elder Scrolls V:  Sky Edge (Auntie Pixelante, 2011).
Given the negative reaction that many independent developers have 
toward the use of the State to stifle competition, it may not come as a surprise 
that many developers attempt to remove the State from the equation completely. 
Whereas most commercial game titles now come loaded with digital rights 
management (DRM) software, the digital successors to physical technologies 
such as the 10NES chip, many independent games are released DRM-free 
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(Doctorow, 2009;  Hyman, 2009).  Thus, the State apparatus, which enforces the 
closed networks and unspoken rules of secrecy in the mainstream industry, is left 
with relatively little power to discipline the independent developers.
Alternative Economic Models
As O'Donnell (2008) notes, the interactive, collaborative practices of 
videogame industry exemplifies the work of the “new economy.”  These practices, 
however, are tightly controlled and disciplined by the organizational structure of 
the industry itself, limiting, to a certain extent, the ability of major studios to 
diverge from the traditional economic model of development studios, publishers, 
distributors and retailers (Schoback, 2005, p. 856; Williams, 2002, p. 46).  With 
less restrictive organizational structures, independent developers are more able 
to experiment with new economic models, taking advantage of technological 
advances in computing and communications to get their games to their players 
through nontraditional channels.  
One of the most significant technologies for the independent games 
movement is the development of digital distribution (Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 
280).  As previously mentioned, the centrality of digital distribution to the 
independent games movement has made it a common place for object conflicts 
as the videogame industry has attempted to incorporate and transform it to suit 
the needs of existing organizations.  Thus, many online and downloadable 
games are monetized through models such as ad-supported content, 
advergaming, subscriptions, and microtransactions (IGDA, 2009, pp. 12-13), 
124
models that favor large organizations with established infrastructures capable of 
regulating and managing large networks of players, advertisers, databases, and 
payment services.
Although digital distribution in many cases reproduces the existing 
economic models of the videogame industry, it also allows independent 
developers to create new models that bypass many of the traditional sites of 
industry control.  By circumventing publishers and distributors, it has become a 
viable model of distribution for small independent studios with .  One of the first 
studios to take advantage of this was Introversion Software.
With the success of Uplink, which was sold directly from their website, 
Introversion began receiving offers from publishers, all of whom offered the trio 
far less for the publishing rights than they were making on their own.  Not only 
did Introversion reject these offers, they went on the road to try and convince 
other small development studios to abandon the standard industry model (p. 
365).  Thus, digital distribution became articulated as a liberating technology, 
offering developers a path to freedom from the industry publishing model.
As more developers began selling and distributing their games over the 
Internet, services began arising to facilitate these transactions.  Among these 
was Valve's Steam service.  Steam, which evolved in part from a canceled 
massively-multiplayer online (MMO) project (Valve, 2004, p. 10), originally sold 
only Valve games.  Valve soon opened it up to outside developers, transforming it 
into the most successful PC downloading service on the Internet (Donovan, 
2010, pp. 362-363).  Despite the success of Steam, many large developers and 
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publishers have had difficulty modifying their existing business practices to take 
advantage of the service.  Indeed, many publishers have refused to put their 
games on Steam, with some even creating their own competing online stores 
(Coldewey, 2011; Peckham, 2010; Wingfield, 2011).  Not surprisingly, many of 
the first non-Valve games to appear on Steam were independent titles (Donovan, 
2010, pp. 363-364).  Although some developers still choose not to use services 
like Steam for technical reasons (Persson, 2011a), they are generally not 
burdened by the rigid organizational structures and traditional supply chains that 
are found in the industry.
Soon after the release of Steam, Microsoft created a similar service for 
their Xbox console, Xbox Live.  Sony and Nintendo followed with their own 
services for their own consoles (Donovan, 2010, pp. 365-366).  This made it 
possible to create small, affordable games for consoles by bypassing the 
expensive manufacturing and distribution costs associated with traditional 
console games.  Of course, each of these services remain connected to 
proprietary networks, thus maintaining the strict level of control that all post-
Crash console manufacturers have held over their systems (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 
175).
Independent games have taken advantage of all three of these services, 
with games like Braid and Limbo on Xbox Live, Flow on the Playstation Network 
and Cave Story Wii on WiiWare.  Again, since most independent developers 
have no contractual obligations to publishers or platform holders, many indie 
games are released across multiple platforms and services.  Tristan Donovan 
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(2010) has referred to this proliferation of independent games across consoles as 
“a turning point for the commercial viability of indie games” (p. 366), specifically 
citing successes such as Jonathan Blow's Braid and 2D Boy's World of Goo. 
Indeed, opening up the console market to independent developers has removed 
one of the major distinctions between the reach of indie games and the reach of 
traditional industry games.
Although these services allow independent developers access to the 
resources of industry networks, this is not to say that such access is open or 
unregulated.  Rather, the access that independent developers are granted to 
consoles is as tightly controlled as other forms of access within the industry.  In 
order to develop for these platforms, developers are often forced into the use of 
proprietary technologies, such as the case is with Microsoft's XNA Studio for 
Xbox Live development (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 176).  Small developers are often 
discouraged from developing for certain systems due to the prohibitively high 
cost of development kits, which can cost several thousand dollars each (p. 178). 
Companies can also discourage developers more directly, as Nintendo has in 
attempting to create a distinction between independent and hobbyist or “garage” 
developers (Morris, 2011).  Thus, the vast majority of independent game 
development remains restricted to the PC.
While the flexibility of independent developers allows them to more quickly 
and effectively adopt new economic models, it also allows them to adopt 
economic models that larger organizations are incapable of adopting, such as 
freeware.  As the name implies, freeware games are distributed online at no cost 
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whatsoever.  Unlike shareware, freeware games do not have a commercial 
version that players are encouraged to purchase.  The full game is made 
available to the public and can be redistributed freely.  Freeware also differs from 
other “free to play” models in that the developers do not monetize their games 
through other means, such as advertising or microtransactions.  Aside from some 
developers accepting donations from players, freeware games do not generally 
earn any money whatsoever.
Since most freeware developers have another job as their primary source 
of income, they are often categorized as hobbyist developers (MacDonald, 2005) 
or as not being “true” independent developers (Schreier, 2011).  Such 
distinctions, however, are problematic, as a number of the most critically 
acclaimed independent games, including Locomalito's 8-Bit Killer, Bay 12 
Games' Dwarf Fortress, Daisuke Amaya's Cave Story (Figure 4.4), are freeware 
titles (though commercial versions of Cave Story would eventually follow on 
WiiWare, Steam and other platforms).  Additionally, Amaya, who has to date 
released all of his games as freeware, was a speaker at the 2011 Game 
Developers Conference (Parish, 2011).
Developers cite a number of reasons for releasing their games as 
freeware.  Most often, these reasons have more to do with creative freedom and 
personal ethics, rather than lack of experience.  Some, like the Spanish 
developer Locomalito, make their personal philosophies public.
Free indie game developers like me have no ties with [sic], we dont 
[sic] look for the masses, we often invest in ideas that are 
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commercially unacceptable, we believe in the culture of 
videogames beyond money, so we just make games for love. 
(Locomalito, n.d.)
The choice to release a game as freeware, more often than not, is a deliberate 
one on the part of the designer in order to achieve a goal other than profits.  It is 
also an option that is generally not available to traditional development studios, 
which have much higher operating costs.
Independent developers have also experimented with even more unusual 
economic models.  One of the most unique and successful of these models is 
that of the Humble Indie Bundle.  The Bundle, which consisted of a number of 
Figure 4.4: Screenshot from Cave Story.  Taken by the author. (Studio Pixel,  
2004)
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critically acclaimed games, including Aquaria and World of Goo, was sold on a 
“pay what you want” basis.  The games were also provided DRM-free, meaning 
that there were no technological restrictions to prevent a purchaser from 
installing the games on multiple computers, nor any kind of system to prevent 
piracy.  This rejection of DRM technology is a move that contrasts sharply with 
the industry's tendency toward greater control over their products and their 
customers.
Although experimental in nature, the first Humble Bundle earned over $1.2 
million (Masnick, 2010).  It would be followed by three additional humble bundles, 
earning $1.8 million (Thompson, 2010), $2.1 million (Bradford, 2011), and $2.3 
million (Humble Bundle, 2011), as well as several smaller bundles.  A significant 
portion of the earnings was also donated to the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
and Child's Play charity.  The incredible success of the Humble Bundle would go 
on to inspire other bundles, some of which, like Indie Royale, would have even 
more unusual economic models (Orland, 2011).
CHAPTER 5
AN INDIE GAME ECOLOGY
Having discussed the way in which the videogame industry evolved as a 
sociotechnical system, the discourse that was articulated during that process and 
the ways in which the independent games movement resists that discourse, it is 
now possible to look more clearly at the medium of videogames as a whole.  The 
goal of this chapter is to construct a model of videogames not as a single 
monolithic industry, but as a larger ecology, including both traditional game 
developers and independent developers.
It should be noted that the boundary between the industry and 
independents is far from clear.  Id Software, for example, has been a well-known 
and influential figure in the videogame industry since the 1990s.  Despite its 
position within the industry, it was technically an independent company until its 
acquisition by ZeniMax in 2009 (Remo, 2009).  As mentioned in Chapter 3, Id 
was one of the major forces behind the legitimation of modding and the official 
distribution of modding tools.  This helped to lower the barriers to entry for game 
making and served as a training ground for many future independent developers. 
At the same time, the culture of Id included many problematic elements such as 
the conflation of work and play and the infamous death schedule, which would go 
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on to influence many of the unhealthy corporate practices in the mainstream 
industry.  Since Id has both resisted and contributed to the corporate culture of 
the videogame industry, it defies attempts to categorize it into one group or the 
other.  Thus, while a bipolar model of videogames may be somewhat more useful 
than the monopolar model, my intention is not to essentialize games and 
developers as being either independent or not, but to convey the complexity of 
structure and subtlety of variation within what could be termed the “greater 
games industry” (Martin & Deuze, 2009, p. 278).
Articulation and Actor-Network Theory
The two overarching concepts that I have dealt with in this paper are 
technology and discourse.  It should be noted that even when referring to these 
concepts individually, there is considerable overlap between the two.  Indeed, 
many of the connections that I hope to draw in this chapter are dependent upon 
the fact that scholars on both sides realize that these two concepts are not 
mutually exclusive.  In order to describe the technological side of videogames, 
my primary tool has been actor-network theory, which looks at technologies not 
as a single artifact or “black box,” but as a complex system comprised of physical 
mechanisms, intended users, technical knowledge, established infrastructure and 
so forth.  Each of these nodes within the network are presumed to have some 
level of agency, or the ability to exert an influence on other nodes, though certain 
critical nodes, such as “obligatory points of passage” which connect local 
networks, such as a company or a development team, with the larger global 
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network, exert greater influence (Law & Callon, 1994).
One of the significant theories leading to the development of actor-network 
theory is Law's theory of heterogeneous engineering, which moved away from 
both purely social constructivist approaches to technological development and 
pure technological determinism (Law, 1987).  To illustrate this point, Law gives 
the example of the role of Portuguese galley in their expansion around the coast 
of Africa.  The technological advancements that made possible this expansion 
were not simply the result of a single technological artifact improving 
incrementally over the course of time, but the result of a number of different 
technologies interacting together as a complex system capable of associating 
wind and manpower in a way that enabled ocean travel (p. 115).  This system 
consisted of basic technological artifacts, such as the development of the 
magnetic compass, developments in design, such as the mixed-rigging ship, and 
the creation of new technical knowledge, such as the Portuguese sailors' 
discovery of the volta, a route that maximized their use of wind and ocean 
currents (pp. 118-119).  When the ship, the emergent object created by the 
heterogeneous engineer, encountered a stronger adversary, such as the Atlantic 
Ocean, the system fell apart and the individual elements were dissociated. 
Where once there was a ship, there was nothing more than a pile of wood, sails 
and men at the mercy of the elements (p. 117).
The same methodology that Law applied to Portuguese expansion can be 
applied to the development of the videogame industry.  Atari, for example, can be 
seen as an emergent object created by the association of various other actors by 
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a specific heterogeneous engineer, Nolan Bushnell.  Bushnell was able to take 
existing computer technology and simplify it down to the bare minimum 
necessary to run a game.  This allowed the computer technology behind games 
like Spacewar!, which would not be available to consumers for years to come, to 
be produced on the mass scale necessary to make videogames into a cultural 
force.  Legal associations, like the licensing agreement with Magnavox, protected 
the company from lawsuits and allowed them to make use of profitable game 
designs, such as Pong.  Economic associations, such as the sale of Atari to 
Warner provided the company with the resources it needed to take on more 
ambitious and profitable projects, like the Atari VCS.  Although all of these 
elements contributed to the success of Atari, none of them were particularly 
innovative on their own.  Even the VCS, which established the home console 
market that continues to be the core of the industry today, was neither the first 
home console nor the first to use interchangeable game cartridges.  It was only 
the association of these heterogeneous elements into a single network that 
allowed Atari to bring videogames from their relative obscurity in university labs 
to mainstream Western culture.
Heterogeneous engineering can also be used to analyze the fall of Atari. 
Just as early Portuguese galleys were unable to maintain their network stability 
when they left the calm waters of the Mediterranean for the open waters of the 
Atlantic, the system that Bushnell had built was unable to cope with the transition 
to the Warner corporate culture.  The drugs, booze and hot tub board meetings 
that were acceptable, or at least a negligible cause of damage, during Atari's 
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early years caused considerable conflict with Warner executives.  It also caused 
rifts with other business partners, like Namco, turning them into competitors 
(Kent, 2001, pp. 76-77).  Talented designers and programmers who felt 
appreciated by Bushnell and had been loyal to him were pushed away by the 
Warner executives, eventually leading to their disassociation from Atari and their 
reconstitution as even more competitors, such as Activision.  In the end, Atari 
ceased to exist as the industry powerhouse it once was and became merely a 
collection of individual programmers, intellectual properties and fragmented 
divisions, all of which would go their separate ways and become part of new 
networks.
While actor-network theory has allowed me to analyze the technical 
systems that make up the videogame industry, articulation theory allows me to 
analyze the creation of the discourse and ideology of videogames that was 
constructed alongside these technical systems.  Articulation theory also uses the 
network as its basic model, but uses it to describe the way in which ideas and 
concepts are given meanings and how these meanings come into conflict with 
one another.  As different perspectives on these concepts are expressed by 
individual actors, different discourses are articulated, forming a basis for a more 
general understanding by the public.  Dominant discourses shape the way that 
people understand different issues, leading to the interests of certain groups 
being served at the expense of others.  
Resistance to these hegemonic discourses or ideologies can be achieved 
through the process of disarticulation.  This generally occurs at the points in 
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which the dominant discourse begins to break down, known as antagonisms. 
Antagonisms can be considered flaws in or contradictions to a discourse.  Just as 
an actor must articulate a discourse to begin with, other actors can illuminate 
these antagonisms and disarticulate the same discourse.  Once disarticulation 
has occurred, a new discourse can be rearticulated, providing a new method of 
understanding that challenges the dominant ideology.
Using articulation theory, we can return to the days of Atari and see how 
videogames developed not as a technology, but as a concept.  By the time of the 
founding of Atari, the general public had already been exposed to videogames 
through Stewart Brand's article in Rolling Stone.  Brand had articulated 
videogames as a part of the 1970s counterculture, more like a digital 
hallucinogen than a form of entertainment for the masses (Turner, 2006, p. 116). 
This was not a particularly useful discourse for Atari (despite the young 
company's affinity for recreational drugs) and Bushnell, who was less concerned 
with videogames as tools of social change and more concerned with their 
potential for profitability.  Atari's discourse would distance videogames from the 
hackers who created Spacewar! and instead associate them with the more 
familiar amusement park midway games that Bushnell had run during the 
summers when he was in college (Kent, 2001, p. 29).  This discourse firmly 
located videogames as belonging in taverns, bowling alleys and arcades, rather 
than in university labs.
While this discourse had many advantages for Atari, it also brought with it 
a considerable amount of baggage.  The arcade games like pinball with which 
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videogames were now associated had at one time been associated with money 
laundering, organized crime and gambling (Kent, 2001, p. 50).  Although much of 
that stigma faded over time, many people still associated videogames with sleazy 
environments and vagrancy among the youth.  This limit to the discourse that 
Atari had articulated would allow for resistance in the form of antivideogame 
activism, such as that of Ronnie Lamb.  Through an active campaign that took 
her on talk shows like The Phil Donahue Show, Lamb was able to rearticulate 
videogames as an unwholesome activity that encouraged children to waste time 
and money and exposed them to violence.  This movement achieved a 
reasonable amount of success, with several small cities banning arcades and 
most shopping mall owners disallowing arcades on their property at the time (p. 
119).  While most of these successes were temporary, perhaps the more lasting 
effect of her movement would be the creation of an antivideogame discourse that 
articulates videogames as a corrupter of the youth and a contributor to idleness.
In order to combat the negative image that videogames has acquired, Atari 
needed to rearticulate videogames as a more wholesome, family activity. 
Bushnell founded the Chuck E. Cheese restaurant chain in order to create a 
more wholesome, family-oriented environment for videogames to be played 
(Kent, 2001, pp. 119-121).  Atari's new Warner executives shifted the company's 
focus away from arcade games and toward the VCS, porting many of their 
popular arcade games to the home console (p. 133).  Many parents were willing 
to purchase the home consoles simply to keep their children away from arcades, 
an attitude that was reinforced by many of Atari's marketing campaigns at the 
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time (Whitworth & Iverson, 2003).  Both the development of the Chuck E. Cheese 
franchise and the shift toward home consoles are examples of how discourse is 
materialized.
This new discourse, too, faced a number of antagonisms.  One of these 
antagonisms came in the form of a series of crude pornographic games created 
by third-party studios.  The most infamous of these games was Custer's 
Revenge, the premise of which was to help a naked General Custer escape the 
battlefield in order to rape a captive Indian woman (Kent, 2001, p. 226).  These 
games generated a significant amount of public controversy, undermining Atari's 
attempts to articulate home videogames as wholesome family activities.
Although major controversies like pornographic games challenged the 
credibility of Atari's discourse among parents, perhaps the more damaging 
antagonisms were those that were closer to the actual players.  While Atari's 
discourse promised parents a way to bring their children back from smoke-filled 
arcades and into the home, it also promised players the experience of their 
favorite arcade games on their own televisions.  While some games, like Space 
Invaders, were converted from arcades to the VCS quite successfully, others 
were not.  The Atari VCS version of Pac-Man was noted for being a 
disappointment for many players (Kent, 2001, p. 236).  In addition to being 
constrained by the technology and rushed during production, Pac-Man lacked 
much of the cultural context that framed the arcade version (Montfort & Bogost, 
2009, pp. 78-79).  The loss of confidence created by Pac-Man would set the 
stage for even greater failure with E.T., which would lead to the downfall of the 
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company (Kent, 2001, p. 239).
The example of Atari shows the interrelated nature of both the technical 
sphere and the discursive.  The shift in focus from arcade games to console 
games was indicative of both the changes in videogame discourse at the time as 
well as the changing organizational structure of the company itself.  Similarly, the 
fall of Atari and subsequent Crash is best understood as not simply a technical 
phenomenon, but a discursive one as well.
If the technical and the discursive are so intimately linked, it makes sense 
to analyze these two spheres not in isolation, but together.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, I take a Foucauldian approach to looking at discourse, treating it as 
being fundamentally linked with social practices and institutions (Foucault 1984, 
pp. 9-10).  Thus, it makes sense to explicitly link the social and technical systems 
examined with actor-network theory with the discursive systems described with 
articulation theory, resulting in the formation of a single sociotechnical-discursive 
network.
Although such a move may seem unorthodox from both an STS 
standpoint and a critical rhetorical one, it in many ways follows the lead begun by 
Foucault in his theorization of governance and governing apparatuses.  He states 
that governing apparatuses, or apparatuses of security, are the essential 
mechanisms for governing a population (Foucault, 1991, p. 102).  Although the 
concept of governmentality is generally applied to national governments, it can 
be applied more generally to in other situations, as well.
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What does it mean to govern a ship?  It means clearly to take 
charge of the sailors, but also of the boat and its cargo; to take care 
of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it 
consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors 
who are to be taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care 
of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port, and all those 
eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is what 
characterizes the government of a ship.  (Foucault, 1991, pp. 93-
94).
Foucault's “government of a ship” is strikingly similar to Law's analysis of 
Portuguese shipbuilding technology.  Law argues that the technology is not just 
the physical artifacts, but their relations to people and knowledge as well. 
Foucault approaches the topic from the opposite direction, arguing that issues of 
power and government deal with physical objects as well as with people.  This 
position is perhaps most effectively and succinctly put in Foucault's statement 
that “one governs things” (Foucault, 1991, p. 93).
Greene (1998) connects the concept of governance more explicitly with 
articulation theory, describing a governing apparatus as a system that “polices a 
population, space, and/or object by articulating an ensemble of human 
technologies into a functioning network of power to improve public welfare”  (p. 
22).  He goes on to describe rhetoric not as a separate aspect of or approach to 
these systems, but as a technology itself – a technology of deliberation. 
Articulation, then can be seen as a way to map the effectivity of rhetoric as a 
technology of deliberation within a Foucauldian apparatus (p. 39).  By taking 
such an approach, mapping out discourse and technology geographically, 
criticism is able to take on a greater materiality, connecting ideology and affect to 
real-world action, rather than simply to representation (Greene, 2010, pp. 107-
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108).
In the rest of this chapter, I intend to describe the current state of the 
videogame industry and videogames as a medium by mapping out the 
relationships between individual actors and discourses.  By doing so, I hope to 
draw attention to significant structures within the network, such as antagonisms, 
obligatory points of passage and other critical nodes.
Mapping the Industry
When attempting to describe an actor-network, it is important to 
understand that a configuration of a network is not necessarily universal.  As 
Akrich (1994) notes, the way in which the developers of a technology perceive its 
network may be considerably different from the way that the users of that 
technology perceive the same network.  This can lead to technologies that do not 
meet the end users' needs.  Akrich refers to these different perspectives on the 
same actor-network as scripts (pp. 207-209).  Thus, the process of mapping the 
videogame industry will consist of “de-scribing” of a number of different actor-
network scripts and then attempting to combine them into a more nuanced map.
As noted in the introduction, many actor-network theorists might take 
exception to this seemingly literal interpretation of the network metaphor.  Indeed, 
Latour has argued against the use of such graphs noting that  they fail to capture 
the “movement” or the dynamic nature of nodes and connections and that their 
simplicity belies the complexity of their objects of study (Latour, 2005, pp. 132-
133).  He does, however, concede that the simplicity of such illustrations makes it 
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simple for the observer to distinguish between the abstraction of the map and the 
complexity of reality.  As he puts it, “the map is not the territory” (p. 133).  Indeed, 
despite the aversion that some actor-network theorists have for such visual 
representations, network maps in one form or another have been a part of actor-
network studies for quite some time (for examples, see Akera, 2007, p. 421; Law 
& Callon, 1994, p. 48). Thus, it is important to remember that the following maps 
(like all maps) are abstractions.  The nodes depicted do not encompass all 
possible actors in the network, nor do the connections depicted preclude 
interactions between nodes lacking an explicit link between them.  Those 
elements that have been mapped were included because of the significance of 
their influence upon the rest of the the network.  In other words, those nodes that 
had the most easily observable influence upon other nodes were the most salient 
actors for the purposes of this analysis.
A natural starting point, then, is to describe the basic industry model from 
the perspective of the industry.  Such a model is common both in industry 
settings and among many academics who have studied videogame production 
(See Schoback, 2005, p. 856; Williams, 2002, p. 46).  As shown in Figure 5.1, 
The local network, where the bulk of the development occurs, generally consists 
of the development studio and the publisher (for clarity, people and organizations 
have been depicted as elliptical symbols while artifacts and other primarily 
technical nodes have been depicted as rectangles).  The global network consists 
of groups like platform owners, IP holders, outsourcing studios and players.  In 
most cases, the publisher serves as an obligatory point of passage between the 
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two networks.  The publisher ensures the flow of resources to the developers, 
including money, rights to intellectual property, and access to manufacturing and 
distribution channels.  The publisher also imposes a structuring influence on the 
developers, creating deadlines, milestones and other expectations on the local 
network.  Upon completion of the game by the developers, the publishers 
generally handle all of the marketing and publicity, as well as game's journey 
through the remaining “vertical levels” of the industry, from manufacturing to 
distribution to retail (Williams, 2002, p. 46) and ultimately to the players 
themselves.  The publisher's involvement generally isolates the developers from 
these processes.
While such a model of the industry is consistent with the views of scholars 
Figure 5.1: Actor-network map of a typical videogame.
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and analysts, it is also important that this structure is consistent with the views of 
those that it seeks to describe, rather than simply being imposed upon these 
groups by outsiders.  To achieve this, I once again turn to O'Donnell's (2008) 
ethnographic work with game developers.  He notes that “as far as developers 
are concerned, publishers and manufacturers control the video game industry” 
(p. 145) and that “the publisher is their interface with other networks in the game 
industry” (p. 161).  These statements seem consistent with the above model and 
the role of the publisher as an obligatory point of passage, controlling the access 
that developers have to the global network of platform owners, manufacturers 
and players.
Depending on the nature of the development studio and its relationship to 
its publisher, the actual network could be more or less complex.  Many 
development studios are wholly owned by publishers or platform owners, 
combining certain nodes or at least strengthening their relationship.  Other 
games may require complex AI or physics engines that must be provided by 
middleware developers, such as Havok Physics.  Developers may also choose to 
outsource the production of art assets or other parts of the project in order to 
reduce development times and focus their team on core development tasks.
An example of this typical development cycle is the game Star Wars 
Rogue Squadron II: Rogue Leader, created by Factor 5 for the Nintendo 
GameCube.  In a 2002 postmortem in Gamasutra, Factor 5 cofounder Thomas 
Engel reflected on the development process of the game, highlighting aspects of 
the process that were successful and aspects that were more problematic. 
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Throughout the article, the influence of their relationship with LucasArts, their 
publisher, is apparent.  Since LucasArts is a subsidiary of Lucasfilm, holder of the 
Star Wars IP, the developers had a high level of access to the property, as well 
as access to assets from the films themselves (Engel, 2002).  Also, having 
worked together previously, Factor 5 and LucasArts had strong connections 
between one another, making LucasArts particularly effective as an obligatory 
point of passage between Factor 5 and the global network.
While the analysis shown in Figure 5.2 explains much of the success of 
Rogue Leader, a more complete understanding of the game's development 
requires taking a closer look at the development studio itself and “opening the 
black box,” treating the studio not simply as a node, but as a subnetwork within 
the greater system (Callon, 1986, pp. 28-30).  This reveals other influential nodes 
Figure 5.2: Actor-network map of Rogue Leader.
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and connections.  The map in Figure 5.3, then is a more detailed view of the 
Factor 5 node in Figure 5.2.
In addition to having a close relationship with LucasArts, Factor 5 had a 
close relationship with the GameCube hardware, having some degree of 
influence during its development (Engel, 2002).  This allowed their programmers 
to create their own in-house tools, such as the MusyX audio system, to take 
better advantage of the console.  The developers also had in-house tools for 
level editing and scripting, allowing their level designers to work efficiently, 
despite having limited programming abilities.
Engel goes on to discuss even more specific details of the development 
process, such as the ways in which the GameCube's two-part memory structure 
Figure 5.3: Actor-network map of Factor 5 during the development of Rogue 
Leader.
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influenced the development of the project.  With sufficient technical information 
about the system, it would be possible to unpack the GameCube into another 
subnetwork, just as with Factor 5.  Indeed, if it were useful in our analysis, it 
would be possible to unpack many of the other nodes as well, allowing us to see, 
for example, the way in which lead artists and technical artists interact with the 
rest of the network.  For the sake of this analysis, however, I find our current level 
of detail to be sufficient to describe the game's development.
Just as decreasing the level of abstraction can be useful in exposing 
subtle interactions between nodes, increasing the level of abstraction can allow 
us to see more general trends and macrolevel interactions.  Moving from the 
specific to the generic, we can use our basic model of game development to 
describe the videogame industry as a whole, shown in Figure 5.4.  In many 
cases, generalizing this basic network topology across a number of different 
organizations is unproblematic.  The three major console owners, for example, 
have very similar economic models and business policies.  All three maintain 
tight control over their consoles through technological and legal systems, all 
three enter into licensing agreements with outside publishers in order to procure 
more games for their consoles, and all three take large percentages of the profits 
from the sale of these games.  
In other cases, however, such generalizations cannot be made accurately. 
Unlike console owners, development studios vary greatly in size, in 
organizational structure and in their relationships with other entities within the 
game industry.  First-party studios are usually wholly owned by either console 
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manufacturers or larger publishers.  They can be created by the parent company, 
such as Nintendo EAD, or they can be third-party studios that the parent 
acquires, as in the case of Lionhead Studios.  Larger third-party studios, such as 
Valve, often have the ability to self-publish their games and some of these may 
even publish games from other third-party studios.
These different types of development studios also create the need for 
Figure 5.4: Actor-network map of the mainstream videogame industry.
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other organizations to fill in the gaps in the development process.  For example, 
large publishers generally have marketing departments that handle media 
relations and advertising for upcoming games.  A smaller developer trying to self-
publish a game may find it more effective to hire an advertising agency or public 
relations firm rather than hiring new employees to take on these responsibilities.
A final aspect of the videogame industry that I consider significant for my 
analysis is the relationship between the industry and players.  While players are 
certainly already part of the network as the end user of the technological artifacts 
themselves, players are not only consumers, but are also the main source of new 
labor for maintaining the system over time.  Most developers are recruited from 
among the ranks of hardcore gamers who want to work on other “triple-A” titles. 
These aspiring developers often, but not always, become part of the modding 
community as part of their attempts to break in to the industry.  This source of 
potential labor, as well as the considerable value that mods can add to a 
commercial game, become part of the motivation for developers to release 
development tools for many popular, often hardcore games (Postigo, 2007, p. 
311).
With a reasonable model of the videogame industry's sociotechnical 
structure, we now have a base structure on which to attach the discursive and 
ideological elements discussed in Chapter 3 (these primarily discursive elements 
have been depicted as rounded boxes).  For the purpose of clarity, some parts of 
the network in Figure 5.5 have been abstracted or “black boxed” in order to 
emphasize others.  Additionally, antagonistic relationships between discourses 
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and other actors have been noted by the use of dotted lines connecting them, 
allowing for a visual representation of antagonisms in the network.
This map suggests that there are two main areas of antagonism within 
videogame discourse.  The area in the upper-left portion of the map corresponds 
to problematic aspects of developer culture, such as those noted by O'Donnell 
(2008).  The area lower in the map corresponds to more general antagonisms in 
Figure 5.5: Map of the videogame industry as a sociotechnical-discursive  
system.  Antagonistic relationships are shown with dotted lines.
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videogame discourse relating to players.  More specifically, these antagonisms 
relate to players outside the core demographic of players that videogame makers 
actively target (Kohler, 2008).
The developer-focused area of antagonism has much to do with the 
developers' relationship to the publisher.  Discursive concepts like crunch time, 
though originating in small development studios like Id, are now largely enforced 
by publishers' deadlines.  While crunch time is theoretically only for the end of a 
game's development when a project becomes more involved than originally 
planned for, unrealistic deadlines imposed by publishers in order to increase 
profitability have normalized perpetual forms of crunch time, as in EA before the 
EA Spouse case (Hoffman, 2004).  Other discursive concepts, such as the need 
for secrecy, are articulated not just by publishers, but by developers themselves, 
who may fear others  poaching their ideas or software (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 228). 
Nevertheless, these elements contribute to other antagonisms, making projects 
in crunch time collapse and maintaining closed networks within organizations. 
Other discursive elements, such as the conflation of work and play, evolve out of 
more generalized discourses, such as the basic discourse that videogames are 
fun to play.  Institutional secrecy, however, prevents many aspiring developers 
from understanding the nature of videogame work.  Thus, inaccurate 
expectations are brought in as new developers enter the industry, and such 
problems remain largely unaddressed.
The more player-focused antagonisms, as previously mentioned, have to 
do primarily with groups of players outside the videogame industry's target 
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audience.  Although these players still play videogames, few if any games are 
created with them in mind and their concerns are often ignored by game makers. 
In addition to marginalized players, much of the hardcore discourse alienates 
potential players, who may not play because of the negative social stigma or 
simply because they do not find the majority of videogames compelling.  This is 
not to say that the videogame industry has made no attempts to bring in new 
players.  Indeed, the huge growth of casual gamers in the last 10 years 
demonstrates the success of one such move by the industry.  Nevertheless, with 
the exception of Nintendo, who have focused both their console and handheld 
lines on new markets (Donovan, 2010, pp. 337-338), most major videogame 
companies have dedicated relatively few resources to these players, establishing 
small casual games divisions or purchasing existing casual game companies, as 
with Electronic Arts' acquisition of Pogo (Sandoval, 2001).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, these player-focused antagonisms constitute 
part of a feedback loop as hardcore gamers enter the industry to become 
hardcore developers.  Just as the industry sees the relatively small subset of 
hardcore gamer as their most important audience, this same group is also 
implicitly seen as their most natural source for recruitment.  It should not be 
surprising, then, that while development tools are often released for the purpose 
of modding hardcore triple A games, few developers spend the time to provide 
modding tools for games directed at girls (Kafai, Heeter, Denner, & Sun, 2008, p. 
xvi).  This further increases the barriers to entry into the videogame industry and 
strengthens hegemonic power structures.
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Mapping the Indie Scene
Unlike mainstream videogames, which are made with fairly similar 
production models, independent games vary greatly in all aspects of their 
production.  While some games roughly follow the standard industry model, other 
games may consist of nothing more than a single developer, self-publishing a 
game with little outside support.  In order to illustrate these differences, I have 
chosen the game Super Meat Boy as a contrasting example to Rogue Leader, as 
shown in Figure 5.6.  As with Rogue Leader, a postmortem of Super Meat Boy 
was published in Gamasutra following its release.  Being an independent game, 
however, Super Meat Boy faced different challenges during production, which 
ultimately shaped the final version of the game.
While Rogue Leader was based on intellectual property licensed from an 
existing franchise, Super Meat Boy was an original concept, starting out as a 
basic prototype developed in Adobe Flash.  The game was a joint collaboration 
between Edmund McMillen, who did the design and artwork, and Johnathan 
McEntee, who did the programming.  The game grew in popularity on several 
Flash game websites, spreading primarily by word of mouth.  When McMillen 
was approached by Microsoft and Nintendo to create a game for their respective 
download services, McMillen assembled a new team with Tommy Refenes as his 
new programmer and Danny Baranowsky providing music (McMillen and 
Refenes, 2011).
Toward the end of the end of the development cycle, pressure from 
Microsoft to be part of their “Game Feast” fall promotion pushed the team into 
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crunch time.  By this time, they had abandoned the WiiWare version of the game 
due to size restrictions and had been turned down by several publishers with 
regard to a retail Wii version.  This made the game's release on the Xbox even 
more crucial to their financial success.  Although they were able to complete the 
game on schedule, Microsoft failed to promote Super Meat Boy to the same 
extent that they had promoted the other games in the Game Feast.  Despite the 
lack of advertising, news of the game spread by word-of-mouth, much of which 
stemmed from the popularity of the original Flash prototype.  In the end, the 
game out-performed all the other Game Feast titles by a substantial margin 
(McMillen and Refenes, 2011) and would go on to be ported to the PC and Linux 
and be part of the fourth Humble Indie Bundle (Humble Bundle, 2011).
While there are certain aspects of the development of Super Meat Boy 
Figure 5.6: Actor-network map of Super Meat Boy.
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that follow the typical industry model, these aspects brought with them many of 
the problems that the industry faces.  Although Team Meat was not dependent 
upon a publisher for funding, as many development studios are, their reliance 
upon Microsoft for advertising and promotion forced them into an unwanted 
crunch time just the same.  While their relationship with platform holders was 
restrictive, their independence did give them the freedom to drop the WiiWare 
version when it clashed with their vision of the finished product.  Thus, Super 
Meat Boy gives us an example of the complex and often tenuous relationships 
that independent developers have to the mainstream videogame industry.
Super Meat Boy also highlights many of the unique aspects of 
independent game development, such as the importance of digital distribution 
channels.  As popular as the game was, the developers were still unable to 
negotiate a retail version with traditional publishers.  The game's success was 
based purely on downloadable versions, through Xbox Live, Steam and other 
such services.  The game's development also illustrates the malleability of 
developers and development teams.  Lone developers will often collaborate 
temporarily with other developers for the duration of a single project.  These 
collaborations could become more permanent teams, or they could simply end 
with the completion of the project.
While the development model used in the production of Rogue Leader 
could be fairly effectively generalized to the industry as a whole, it is much more 
difficult to make such claims about independent developers as a whole.  In 
addition to developers who develop for more mainstream audiences, there are 
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also “serious game” developers who develop games for purposes other than 
simply entertainment and “scratchware” developers, like Auntie Pixelante, who 
often make games specifically for marginalized groups (Anthropy, 2009).  Like 
many other aspects of independent development, these distinctions are quite 
malleable, as many successful commercial game developers have released free 
games as well, often as prototypes for future games or as part of their 
participation in videogame competitions like Ludum Dare (Persson, 2011b) 
Independent developers seeking to create commercial games also have a 
number of additional publishing options.  While developers may work with 
industry publishers, like Microsoft, or independent publishers, like the Humble 
Bundle, many developers publish their games with nontraditional publishers, 
such as Adult Swim, a cable television station (Webster, 2011b).
In order to construct a map of the independent games scene similar to the 
previous map of the industry, I have taken the basic model of Super Meat Boy 
from Figure 5.6 and added many of the variations mentioned above.  The 
resulting map in Figure 5.7, while still an abstraction, seeks to address the 
complexity of these variations in a useful manner.  Perhaps the most salient 
feature of this map is the sheer number of connections between nodes, 
particularly among developers.  Unlike the industry, which lives by its code of 
secrecy, independent developers freely exchange ideas, code and even tools on 
a regular basis.  This is generally facilitated by online spaces such as websites, 
forums, blogs and Twitter.  This open exchange can spawn new collaborations, 
new games, or even larger open source projects.  It also drastically changes the 
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way in which aspiring game developers enter the field.  Whereas breaking in is a 
significant part of entering the videogame industry, the distinction between “in” 
and “out” is blurred among independent developers.  While many developers 
have industry experience and may have “broken out” of the industry, others get 
their start as independent developers and never work in the industry.  Through 
the use of open source tools, online communities and ad hoc collaborations, the 
Figure 5.7: Actor-network map of the independent games scene.
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barriers to entry are lowered to the point that dedicated individuals can begin 
creating games with little or no experience.
As in the case of Super Meat Boy, digital distribution technologies remain 
critical nodes in the system, as nearly all commercial games created by 
independent developers require some form of digital distribution in order for the 
game to be sold to players while bypassing traditional publishers and 
manufacturers.  Even freeware games require at least a website or a file hosting 
service in order to reach their audience.  Although these forms of distribution tend 
to be much more accessible than traditional publishing methods, the dominance 
of several key services make many independent games vulnerable to 
censorship, as in the case of Apple's censorship of Phone Story (Brown 2011). 
As new services arise, however, new avenues are made available for bypassing 
corporate censorship.
Having mapped out both the independent games community and the 
mainstream videogame industry, it is now possible to assemble a vision of the 
greater games industry mentioned by Martin and Deuze.  Again, as in previous 
examples, many aspects of the various networks in Figure 5.8 have been 
simplified in order to focus on some of the broader connections between these 
networks.  One such connecting node between independent and industry 
developers is that of aspiring developers.  Though I have already identified 
aspiring developers as a significant node connecting players and developers, the 
availability of new paths that lack or at least circumvent the process of breaking 
in dramatically changes the nature of this group.  While the discursive 
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construction of breaking in prioritizes qualifications and workplace connectivity 
above other values, such as diversity (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 54), many segments of 
the independent games scene place a great deal of value on creating games 
from diverse perspectives, as mentioned in Chapter 4.  This expands the field of 
aspiring developers from the Ion Storm vision of the most “elite and obsessive 
gamers” (Kushner, 2000a) to simply anyone with the drive and creativity to 
Figure 5.8: Map of the greater games industry as a sociotechnical-discursive  
system.
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undertake a game project.  The openness of the independent community also 
provides access to information about game development practice that is not 
generally available from secretive industry sources.  With the addition of the 
voices independent developers who have “broken out” of the industry, much of 
the negative cultural influences from the industry's institutionalized secrecy can 
be mitigated.
Independent developers are also able to take antagonisms and use them 
as sites for articulating an explicitly anti-industry or antihardcore discourse. 
Some groups may articulate a very broad anti-industry discourse, such 
scratchware developers who embrace  most of the anti-industry rhetoric of the 
Scratchware Manifesto.  Other groups may focus on more specific issues, such 
as feminist gamers who may focus on issues of gender inequality.  These 
counterhegemonic discourses are often articulated through the use of 
microblogging services such as Twitter and Tumblr, as well as on blogs and 
websites. 
Following the Maps
Although the visual maps that I have presented in this chapter have some 
intrinsic value simply in that visual aides are useful in understanding complex 
systems, the true value of these maps is in their application.  Many of the 
problems that I have addressed so far in this thesis are perpetuated (or even 
caused) by a limited understanding of the structure of the videogame industry. 
Groups that could benefit greatly from a more nuanced understanding of these 
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systems include aspiring developers, industry professionals and even players.
Aspiring developers are the most obvious group that would benefit from an 
greater understanding of the structure of the videogame industry.  As O'Donnell 
(2008) notes, there are a number of myths that the videogame industry 
perpetuates about itself, such as the myth that game workers are able to make 
the games that they want or that they have infinite time and resources to do so 
(p. 166).  These misconceptions lead to employees entering into unfavorable and 
unsustainable work relationships (pp. 167-169).  Indeed, the concept of the naïve 
young programmer who wants to get a job in the industry to make his dream 
game has become almost as cliché as the young writer who goes to Hollywood 
to get his dream script turned into a movie.
While one side of this problem is the culture of secrecy and conflation of 
work and play that O'Donnell has critiqued, the other side is the misconception 
that in order to make videogames, one must break in to the videogame industry. 
This view corresponds roughly with the limited view of the industry depicted in 
Figure 5.4.  Although some aspiring developers may be aware of modding as a 
potential stepping stone to entering the industry, the industry remains the goal 
because it is equated with the power to make games.  While some aspiring 
developers may simply have the goal of working on someone else's game, the 
goal of many (if not most) is to make their own game on their own terms. 
Although myths may make the industry seem like the perfect place for them, their 
goals may actually correspond more closely with those of indie developers, 
whether as a solo developer, as a member of a small team, or even as a 
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freeware developer.  A more complete understanding of the greater games 
industry, such as that depicted in Figure 5.8, would allow many aspiring 
developers who do not want an industry lifestyle to realize that there are many 
other options available for them to make games.
A better understanding of the structure of the industry is also beneficial to 
those who are already a part of the industry.  While many industry professionals 
still believe in the myths discussed above, even those who are more familiar with 
the reality of the industry are often not aware of the options available to them. 
The high rate of burnout and turnover within the industry (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 81), 
suggest that many veteran developers still see their options as making games in 
the industry or not making them at all.  The influx of new indie developers 
breaking out of the industry suggests that industry workers may be more likely to 
be aware of their options than other groups, though increased awareness of 
these options would benefit those game workers who are disillusioned with the 
industry, perhaps giving them another option than simply burning out.
Although those who benefit most from a greater understanding of industry 
structure are those who are marginalized or exploited by the system, even those 
who are in favorable positions could benefit from this knowledge.  Understanding 
an organization's position within the industry system allows it to more effectively 
target potential employees who actually want to be there, thus reducing turnover 
among employees.  Also, knowing the limits of discourse and where antagonisms 
exist allows an organization to adapt and evolve as the market and culture 
change, rather than merely reacting after the process of rearticulation has 
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rendered its discourse ineffective.
In addition to impacting content creators, understanding the structure of 
the videogame industry is also helpful for consumers.  Although independent 
games have become considerably more prominent in recent years, many players 
are only vaguely aware of them, particularly when it comes to games that are not 
available through large commercial channels such as Steam and Xbox Live.  The 
more that players (and potential players) are aware of the large and diverse indie 
game scene and how it relates to the videogame industry, the more that the 
stereotypes and prejudices that exist in and around videogame culture can begin 
to be broken down.  As more people begin to make games for groups traditionally 
marginalized by the mainstream industry, it becomes important for these creators 
to be able to connect with their audience, many of whom may still consider 
videogames to be a medium exclusively for white men or young boys.
Videogames, as a medium of communication and creative expression are 
part of a large and complex sociotechnical-discursive system.  The ability of this 
medium to thrive depends on the creative collaborative practice of the individual 
actors within this system.  This creative practice in turn is founded upon the 
ability of these actors to access the underlying social and technical systems and 
make use of them (O'Donnell, 2008, p. 297).  By understanding the topology of 
these systems and identifying critical nodes that shape the flow of resources 
throughout them, it is possible to help game makers more effectively navigate 
these networks in order to to maximize their ability to harness the medium of 
videogames for their own purposes.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The videogame industry as it exists today is a product of specific 
technologies and discourses that shaped it during the last 50 years.  General 
improvements in computing, such as advances in 3D graphics in the 1990s, 
allowed for new kinds of games, but also brought the scope of videogame 
development beyond the reach of many of the hombrew independent developers 
of the previous decade.  Other technological artifacts, such as the 10NES chip, 
were designed specifically as technologies of control, with no other purpose than 
to prevent actors from accessing the rest of the system except through certain 
key actors, effectively rendering these actors as obligatory points of passage.
Discourse played an equally important part in shaping the industry.  Some 
of this discourse came from outside, such as the conservative antivideogame 
discourse of the early 1980s which pushed companies like Atari away from 
arcade development and toward the more family friendly home consoles.  Other 
times, these discourses were articulated from within the industry, such as Id 
Software's rearticulation of modders as an important part of their audience, rather 
than as mischievous hackers defacing their games.
Throughout this process, with very few exceptions, the social and 
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technical barriers to entry into the videogame industry continuously rose, 
preventing many aspiring developers from breaking into the industry.  At the 
same time, the audience on which the videogame industry was focusing shifted 
to hardcore gamers, to the exclusion of many other groups.  Both of these effects 
contributed to some of the institutional crises that occurred during the early 
2000s, such as the Scratchware Manifesto and the EA Spouse lawsuit.  
As the decade progressed, however, new technological systems and new 
discourses appeared that made resistance possible in the form of the 
independent games movement.  This resurgence in independent game 
development has made possible the appearance new developers, players and 
games that would not have fit with the traditional industry model.  Although at one 
point unknown to anyone but a small subset of PC gamers and other 
independent developers, indie videogames have grown in exposure to the point 
that their recognition extends beyond even the boundaries of traditional gaming. 
At the 2012 Sundance Film Festival, Indie Game: The Movie, a crowdfunded 
documentary following the experiences of a number of prominent independent 
game developers, made its debut.  Not only did the film bring independent games 
to the attention of a whole new audience, it won an award for best editing and 
was optioned for a potential series by HBO (Watercutter, 2012).  It seems as 
though independent games are here to stay, and perhaps not a moment too 
soon.
On January 26, 2012, just days after the premier of Indie Game: The 
Movie, THQ, one of the largest publishers in the videogame industry, filed a 
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report to the Securities and Exchange Commission indicating that they were 
laying off 240 of their employees and slashing the pay of many of their 
executives by 50%.  The report also indicated that the company would be 
discontinuing many of its existing lines of games in order to focus on “its core 
video game franchises” (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012).  A few 
days later, on February 8, the annual DICE (Design, Innovate, Communicate, 
Entertain) Summit, a conference geared toward gaming executives, opened with 
a debate over whether or not the videogame industry publishing model is broken. 
The debate dealt substantially with the problem of THQ and what it means for the 
industry when a company that makes $800 million in annual revenue still finds 
their business model unsustainable (Lee, 2012).  Michael Pachter, a financial 
analyst who focuses on the videogame industry, claimed that the current industry 
model stifles creativity, citing publishers' reluctance to take risks on nonsequels. 
He predicted that several of the major videogame publishers would die off, 
leaving only two or three remaining (Kohler, 2012).
Later that day, Tim Schafer, founder of the small development studio 
Double Fine, announced his plans to crowdfund his latest adventure game using 
Kickstarter, the same crowdfunding website used to fund  Indie Game: The 
Movie.  Although the $400,000 he asked for was ambitious, the project managed 
to gain over a million dollars worth of funding in the first 24 hours alone (Tassi, 
2012).  Since the funding for the game's development was  raised through 
Kickstarter rather than being provided by a publisher like THQ, Double Fine is 
free from the normal concessions that come along with funding.  Double Fine can 
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maintain complete creative control over the game and will own the IP once the 
game is completed.  In the end, its only real obligations are to its fans that made 
the game possible.
With established companies beginning to crumble and experimental 
projects becoming overnight successes, many people have speculated that we 
are approaching a turning point in the history of videogames.  The question is, 
what does this mean for the future of videogame studies and for videogames in 
general?
Ideology, Resistance, Articulation and Actor-Networks
My focus throughout this thesis has been on the intersection of technology 
and discourse as they relate to videogames as a medium of communication. 
Chapter 2 described how the interplay between technology and discourse 
shaped the cultural landscape that we are familiar with today.  Although the 
development of technological systems shaped discourse, as in the example of 
the Apple II rearticulating computers as a useful tool for the masses rather than a 
mystical relic of the techno elite, discourse was just as important in shaping the 
development of technological artifacts.  This influence can be seen in 
technologies such as the Atari VCS, which attempted to distance videogames 
from the negative discourse associated with video arcades.  The VCS, in turn, 
began to rearticulate videogames as a medium for children, thus showing the 
complex interrelation that exists between technological and discursive systems.
The creation of these systems inevitably creates flows of power toward 
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certain groups and away from others.  In Chapter 3, I analyzed the current 
hegemonic videogame ideology that was created from the processes described 
in Chapter 2.  This ideology is associated with the concept of the hardcore 
gamer, and dominates the discourse of both players and developers.  It privileges 
young White males and certain forms of games while marginalizing other groups 
and devaluing other games (and those who play them) as being merely casual. 
As this discourse reaches its limits and antagonisms begin to arise, resistance to 
this ideology becomes possible in the form of casual games, modding, and 
independent games.  This third form of resistance, the independent games 
movement, becomes the subject of Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 looks at the independent games movement as a technology-
oriented social movement, which has as its goal a change in the way that 
videogames as a technology are used.  Independent developers are able to 
rearticulate videogame discourse by creating new organizational structures and 
economic models that challenge the accepted industry practices.  Many of these 
developers directly challenge the hardcore videogame ideology by creating 
games that target groups and topics that are considered to be outside the 
bounds of videogame normalcy.
Finally, Chapter 5 takes the interconnected nature of technological 
systems and discursive structures discussed in Chapter 2 and and explicitly 
maps their relationships.  By building off of actor-network theory's materiality and 
structure and adding articulation theory's ability to look at network dynamics like 
antagonisms and disarticulation, I was able to create sociotechnical-discursive 
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maps of the various aspects of the videogame industry, allowing the visualization 
of the antagonisms discussed in Chapter 3 and the various ways in which 
independent developers are rearticulating videogame discourse at those points, 
as discussed in chapter 4.
Theoretical Implications
The work presented in this document suggests a number of implications to 
existing theory, particularly to Hess' theory of technology- and product-oriented 
movements.  Hess theorizes that TPMs arise out of traditional social movements 
as the goals of entrepreneurs and the movement begin to align (Hess, 2005, p. 
517).  These entrepreneurs are able to harness the energy of the social 
movement in order to create an alternative technology or product that opposes 
existing technologies and products that are problematic to the goals of the 
movement.  Hess identifies nutritional therapeutics, wind energy, and open 
source software as examples of TPMs.
My analysis of the independent games movement suggests that the 
process of private-sector symbiosis is more complicated than a simple causal 
relationship between social movement and TPM.  Many TPMs, such as the 
scratchware, modding and shareware movements can be seen as emerging not 
from a traditional social movement, but from the open source software 
movement, another TPM.  Indeed the hacker ethic that is at the heart of the open 
source software movement continues on throughout the other three.  All of these 
movements can also be seen as major influences in the current independent 
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games movement, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, can be seen as a TPM as 
well.
Just as the independent videogame movement suggests a broader 
understanding of private-sector symbiosis, it also suggests a new way of looking 
at the process of incorporation and transformation.  This phase of the life of a 
TPM generally refers to the target industry incorporating the innovations of the 
TPM as they become more widely accepted.  In the case of the independent 
games movement, however, its success has not only inspired traditional industry 
organizations like Microsoft to become involved with indie games, but has 
inspired many traditional developers to leave the industry and “go indie.”  As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, these former industry developers often bring with them 
many of the approaches and attitudes common in larger studios.  These can be 
problematic in an independent environment, even to the point of undermining 
much of the creative freedom that the developers were seeking in the first place. 
This suggests that the process of incorporation can go both ways, with the TPM 
taking on aspects of the target industry, even as that industry attempts to change 
the TPMs products to better fit with its structure.  
The view of modding as a TPM also suggests that the concept of object 
conflicts can also be expanded.  While Hess defines object conflicts as being the 
primarily the result of design choices (Hess, 2005, p. 520), the object conflicts 
that I have identified between modders and developers occurred not because of 
a change in the design of the technological artifact itself, but because of a 
change in the political-legal networks to which the artifact was connected, 
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namely, the introduction of the EULA.  Although the introduction of these 
agreements did not make any changes to the games or to the moddings tools 
which developers like Id had already begun making available, they changed the 
ways in which modders were able to use these tools.  It also transformed them 
from renegade hackers who mischievously defaced games to pseudoemployees 
whose efforts were both sanctioned by and beneficial to developers.  Thus, from 
an actor-network perspective, object conflicts can be created not only by 
changes to the design of a product, but by any significant change to the network.
This paper also has theoretical implications for the use of actor-network 
theory and articulation theory.  As discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5, I have 
attempted to bring these two theories from different disciplines together as a 
unified approach to analyzing the videogame as a sociotechnical-discursive 
system.  This move has its basis in a number of different theoretical 
backgrounds, including Foucault's concept of the “governing apparatus” 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 102) and Greene's view of “rhetoric as technology” (Greene, 
1998, p. 39).  The advantage of this approach is that it is able to utilize the 
strengths of both theories together.  Articulation theory contributes a number of 
concepts that allow us to better understand network dynamics, particularly the 
concept of antagonisms as the limits of discourse and the concept of 
disarticulation as the process by which hegemonic discourse can be dismantled. 
Actor-network theory gives us the network structure and the materiality that 
Greene and others have called for, while also contributing valuable concepts 
such as obligatory points of passage and actor-network scripts.
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This work also adds to the body of literature in the field of videogame 
studies.  Perhaps most significantly is a corollary to O'Donnell's concept of 
breaking into the industry.  While the ever-increasing barriers to entry into the 
videogame industry have made breaking in a significant discursive element 
within the culture of the industry, the increasing discontent among developers 
and rising viability of independent development are making the idea of breaking 
out or “going indie” a significant concept as well.  As high profile success stories 
like 2D Boy and Tim Schafer become more common, the concept of breaking out 
will likely become more salient within videogame discourse.
The Future of Videogames
The research presented in this paper suggests a number of practical 
implications for videogame developers.  First, the view of the independent games 
movement as a TPM emphasizes the interrelated nature of the videogame 
industry and the independent games movement.  As with all TPMs, the success 
of the movement helps to drive the industry toward  the processes of 
incorporation and transformation.  As independent games become a more 
important part of videogame culture, we should expect the industry to begin to 
incorporate more technologies into its existing technical systems in the same way 
that many of the larger industry players have now embraced digital distribution. 
The transformation of these technologies to meet the needs of the industry will 
inevitably create object conflicts which may take the form of competing 
technological artifacts or, as in the case of modding, competing sociopolitical 
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structures.
This interconnected view of the videogame industry and the independent 
games movement is also supported by the network analysis conducted in 
Chapter 5.  Many prominent indie games, such as Super Meat Boy, still have ties 
to more traditional industry nodes, which in turn shapes the course of the game's 
development.  Additionally, the indie scene is linked with the industry through the 
flow of developers who are leaving the industry to work independently.  Although 
cultural problems within the industry often contribute to their leaving, this does 
not mean that their time in traditional game development roles was not 
significant.  It is not by chance that Tim Schafer and Double Fine's Kickstarter 
project has earned hundreds of times more than other successful videogame 
projects on Kickstarter.  Long before founding Double Fine, Schafer had gained 
celebrity within the videogame community through his time at LucasArts, creating 
such titles as Day of the Tentacle, Full Throttle and Grim Fandango.  Indeed, the 
Kickstarter project itself invokes these early games, hoping to recreate a similar 
experience in the form of a new point-and-click adventure game (Kickstarter, 
2012).  Despite the many new paths to entry that independent development 
provides aspiring developers, industry experience will likely be a major factor in a 
developer's success for a long time to come.
Although the industry will not be disappearing any time soon, that does not 
mean that there are not major changes lurking just over the horizon, particularly 
for publishers.  While major publishers like EA and Activision serve as obligatory 
points of passage for traditional development studios, independent developers 
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have many more options available to them.   New sociotechnical systems such 
as crowdfunding, digital marketplaces and bundles allow developers to bypass 
traditional publishers while allowing a much greater degree of interaction with 
their audiences.  While the videogame industry is certainly beginning to 
incorporate many of the technologies associated with the independent games 
movement, it seems that developers are adapting much faster than publishers. 
In the wake of Double Fine's success, other developers are beginning to turn to 
Kickstarter rather than to publishers (Takahashi, 2012).  Unless they are able to 
incorporate and transform these new funding methods into a form that fits their 
existing structures, publishers will likely experience a decline in their influence 
over both independent and more traditional developers.
Finally, this paper has implications for groups that have been marginalized 
by the hardcore gamer culture that pervades the videogame industry.  While the 
conservative nature of the industry means that most major publishers are still 
unlikely to create new games that go outside their target demographic of young 
White males, independent developers' ability to bypass these gatekeepers 
means that they can produce a much more diverse range of games.  Additionally, 
technologies such as open source game engines and digital distribution channels 
lower the barriers to entry into videogame development so that marginalized 
individuals can become content creators, rather than merely consumers.
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Recommendations for Future Research
While I have attempted to be comprehensive in my analysis of the greater 
games industry, there is still a great deal of territory that I have left uncharted.  As 
every node in an actor-network can be expanded to become a network in itself, 
the methodologies employed in this study can be applied both to projects more 
broad in scope as well as to more tightly focused ones.  Nodes which I have 
neglected in this study could easily provide new insights into the complex 
dynamics of videogame culture.
I also believe that our understanding of independent development culture 
would be greatly improved by more research into the daily practices of these 
developers.  The ethnographic work conducted by Casey O'Donnell in various 
game studios has been invaluable to my understanding of developer culture. 
This paper suggests, however, that the development processes used by 
independent developers differs sufficiently to warrant similar ethnographic studies 
of independent developers.  Since these development teams could range from a 
single person to a moderately sized company, there is a considerable amount of 
research that could be done.  Thus, I believe that it would be valuable for future 
studies of this type to conduct the kind of ethnographic studies that O'Donnell did 
in traditional studios in independent settings.  This research could be even further 
expanded to look at independent game development outside of the United 
States.
It is my hope that in addition to informing scholarly research, that this 
paper might encourage discussion about the role of independent games as 
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resistance to hegemonic videogame culture and about the potential of 
videogames as a medium to be used as tools of resistance.  Indeed, pioneering 
game designers are already using games to challenge not only issues of 
videogame culture, but also those of corporate responsibility, government policy, 
gender roles, and many other issues.  
I also hope that this kind of research might lead to a greater diversity of 
voices utilizing videogames as a form of expression and, therefore, a greater 
variety of games to be enjoyed by those who do not fit the narrow industry view 
of videogame players.  Whether the industry as we know it now survives or not, I 
hope that videogames continue to thrive as a vibrant and powerful part of our 
media landscape.
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